Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

EALING CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.

ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL BILL (By Order)

WEST HARTLEPOOL EXTENSION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday next.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION

School Building

Mr. James Johnson: asked the Minister of Education the total value of building licences issued to independent schools for work done in their premises during 1951; and what is the value of building work licences for 1952.

The Minister of Education (Miss Florence Horsbrugh): During 1951 building licences to the value of £1,979,000 were issued by the Ministry of Works on the recommendation of my Department. I estimate that about half of this total was for work at independent schools. No figures are yet available for 1952.

Mr. Johnson: Is the Minister aware that many of these schools are in houses and buildings which are well below the standards expected by H.M. Inspectors and that they do need this attention? But if building cuts are to be endured by State schools, will she see that these independent schools also take their place in the queue besides them?

Miss Horsbrugh: If the hon. Member will read Circular 245 again he will see that exactly the same procedure applies to these schools.

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Minister of Education to ensure that the additional accommodation necessary for the increased school population will be available in 1953.

Miss Horsbrugh: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave the hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude) on 28th February.

Mr. Thomas: Does that reply mean that the Minister is completely satisfied that by 1953 all the necessary accommodation will be available?

Miss Horsbrugh: I am satisfied that the building programme should produce the number of extra school places that my predecessor was satisfied were necessary. I think he was right in his judgment of the extra number of school places—1,150,000.

Mr. George Thomas: asked the Minister of Education how many school building projects in England and Wales, respectively, are affected by her economy Circular 245.

Mr. George Chetwynd: asked the Minister of Education how many schools originally contained in the uncompleted educational building programme for 1951–52 and the programme for 1952–53 have been excluded from the revised programme for 1952–53; and how many school places, in primary, secondary and technical schools does this represent.

Miss Horsbrugh: I regret that I cannot give this information until discussions with all local education authorities have been completed and the whole of the revised school building programme for 1952–53 has been settled.

Mr. Thomas: Can the Minister say how long we shall have to wait before we know how many school building projects in Wales will be brought to a standstill?

Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot say exactly when this full information can be given because we are communicating with each local authority and it depends how long these discussions take. I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will give him the information as soon as I have it.

Mr. Chetwynd: Has not the ban on school building for three months and the consequent late starting dates dissipated


the building force? In those circumstances will the right hon. Lady be able to complete the projects which have been set down?

Miss Horsbrugh: Yes. With the stopping of new starts I think we shall be able to complete the buildings that we require by the end of this year. The fact that we have concentrated on completing buildings under construction will, I think, be more satisfactory than having a larger programme of buildings not completed.

Mr. George Tomlinson: Is the right hon. Lady aware that the figures which she admits are correct were based upon a programme which has now been suspended?

Miss Horsbrugh: I quite agree. The figure of 1,150,000 that the right hon. Gentleman thought sufficient is the basis for my programme. I do not think that we should have had that completed—and we certainly would not have had the 400,000 places required at the end of this year—if we had allowed new starts without completing the work already under construction.

Mr. Ralph Morley: asked the Minister of Education the total amounts spent on school building for the financial years 1948–49, 1949–50, 1950–51, 1951–52; and the estimated amount that will be spent from 1952–53.

Miss Horsbrugh: Capital expenditure on school building is recorded by calendar years. The sum invested on major projects was £12 million in 1948, £16.5 million in 1949, £29 million in 1950 and £37 million in 1951. The forecast of investment in 1952 is £36.5 million.

Mr. Norman Dodds: asked the Minister of Education why she has given instructions to the Kent County Council to hold up the building of 14 proposed schools in view of the difficulty now being experienced with regard to school accommodation and the greatly increased school population to be catered for in the next two years; and what proposed schools are affected.

Miss Horsbrugh: The reasons for revising the 1952–53 school building programme are explained in Circular 245, of which I am sending the hon. Member a copy. The revised programme for

Kent has not yet been settled, and I cannot say exactly which projects will be deferred.

Mr. Dodds: But is not the Minister aware that the Chairman of the Kent Education Committee, a Conservative, has said that, as a result of instructions from the Minister of Education, school building in Kent will come to a dead stop, 14 proposed schools will not be built, 4,000 primary and secondary school places will be lost, and that this is a serious blow? Will she give an assurance that at least the urgently needed Erith Grammar School, about which she gave such an optimistic reply some months ago, will not be held up at all?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think it is known that the Kent authority had got on very well with their building. At the end of 1951 they had provided about 40,000 new places, and nearly another 15,000 were under construction. [An HON. MEMBER: Why not answer the question?"] In answering the question I am giving the facts. We have not yet decided with the Kent authority what the school building programme will be, but it will be directed to the same aims as there are in the areas of other local authorities—to the providing of places on new housing areas and where there is an extra school population.

Mr. Dodds: As that is one of the most shocking answers I have ever heard—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—I give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment—to convince hon. Members opposite.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: On a point of order. The hon. Member has just given notice that he will raise the matter on the Adjournment in words which, I understand, Mr. Speaker, contravene a Ruling of your predecessor, which stated quite clearly that the correct words to be used were, "In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply—" and so on.

Mr. Speaker: I do not ask hon. Members, when they ask supplementary questions, to leave out of their questions words of an objurgatory character. It does not expedite business. The word "shocking" is capable of several connotations. I took it to mean, in this case, that the hon. Member found that the answer came as a shock to him.

Economy Proposals

Mr. Frederick Peart: asked the Minister of Education if she will hold a special inquiry into the proposals of the local education authorities who, in response to Circular 242, are impairing the main structure of the educational system.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir, I do not think that there is any occasion for such an inquiry. If an authority were to propose measures inconsistent with the guidance given in the opening paragraph of the Circular, I should take the matter up with them directly, as I have already done in one or two instances.

Mr. Peart: Is the Minister aware that there are several authorities who are going far beyond Circular 242? If she will not grant a special inquiry will she be very vigilant and prevent their putting into effect what is beyond the requirements of the Circular?

Miss Horsbrugh: Certainly—and I shall be receiving estimates from the local authorities in April.

Mr. Edward Short: asked the Minister of Education whether she will refuse to sanction those economies in the services administered by local education authorities which will reduce educational opportunity.

Miss Horsbrugh: The basis on which I have asked authorities to seek economies in preparing their detailed estimates for the coming financial year is clearly stated in the first paragraph of Circular 242. As regards university scholarships and similar awards to students, I am sending the hon. Member a copy of a circular which I have recently issued to local authorities.

Mr. Short: In view of the assurance which the right hon. Lady has given, implicitly, will she ensure that local authorities who are contemplating cuts in their grants to students are not allowed to make those cuts?

Miss Horsbrugh: If the hon. Gentleman will look at the circular he will see that I have asked local authorities to await the further information they are to receive and the further schemes which I am sending to them before they decide on the number of their awards.

Local Authorities (Expenditure)

Mr. Peart: asked the Minister of Education if she has completed her review of the forecasts of educational expenditure of local education authorities for 1952–53; and if she will present detailed information for each local authority.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. While it is open to authorities to consult my Department—and some have already done so—Circular 242 does not ask them to submit revised figures showing the result of their review of the forecasts which they prepared last autumn. This will be reflected in the estimates which the authorities will be sending to my Department about April next.

Mr. Peart: Would it not be possible to give a general survey for each county when all these forecasts are presented? Would that not enable hon. Members to have a better picture of what the local authorities are doing in response to the circulars?

Miss Horsbrugh: I am not asking them for forecasts. I shall know when the estimates come in in April.

Economies, Buckinghamshire

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: asked the Minister of Education whether she has yet approved the decision of the Buckinghamshire Education Authority to reduce education expenditure by £80,000 for the forthcoming year, including £29,150 on upkeep of buildings and grounds, £5,000 on equipment and furniture for primary and secondary schools, £4,200 on further education, £1,350 on aid to pupils and university grants, and £5,700 on medical inspection and treatment; and to what extent this reduction is in addition to a reduction of £14,000 reported to her Department prior to her recent circular authorising a cut of 5 per cent.

Miss Horsbrugh: Circular 242 does not ask authorities to submit for my approval the reductions which they decide to make in their forecasts for 1952–53. As regards the reduction of £14,000 referred to, I understand that in preparing their detailed estimates last November the authority corrected by this sum an overestimate in the forecast which they had prepared the previous month. The figure


of £80,000 quoted by the hon. Member includes this sum.

Mr. Brockway: Is it not a fact that the figures given in this Question represent the published original estimates for this year and the cuts which followed the right hon. Lady's Circular? Does she not regard these cuts as interferring with the county's educational fabric?

Miss Horsbrugh: When the estimates are sent to my Department in April I shall certainly see if any economies which are made interfere with the essential fabric of education, and if they do I shall discuss the matter with the authority concerned.

Mr. F. Beswick: As the Minister appears to be against the detailed economies mentioned in the House, is she still certain that she will get the original economies for which she asked?

Miss Horsbrugh: Nothing in this life is certain; we can only hope.

Schools Exploring Society

Mr. Cyril Bence: asked the Minister of Education if she will make a grant to the British Schools Exploring Society.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. I do not think it reasonable to take on an additional commitment of this kind at the present time.

Mr. Bence: Is the Minister aware that this Society has been sending 60 or 70 boys annually on expeditions to parts of the Commonwealth and Scandinavia and that many secondary school boys have been able to go only because they have been able to obtain assistance, as they are the children of working-class people? Is she aware that if the Society does not give assistance the only boys who will be able to go will be the sons of wealthy parents from the public schools?

Miss Horsbrugh: It is open to education authorities to assist boys if they are satisfied of the value of the expedition. I do not think I can take on an extra commitment however much I might feel it would be good for these boys to join these expeditions.

Sir Edward Keeling: Is my right hon. Friend aware that boys who go on these

expeditions and who cannot pay their own fees are already subsidised from various quarters and have no great difficulty in getting subsidies, and that she is quite right in leaving well alone?

Mr. Tomlinson: Is the right hon. Lady prepared to advise a local authority to assist in a special case?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think that local authorities must decide for themselves. This would be an entirely new commitment for the Ministry, calling for an Exchequer grant, and I do not think that this is the time for me to enter into a new commitment.

Meat Meals

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Minister of Education whether she is aware of the wastage of meat that occurs in many schools where children are supplied with such meals as so many children do not like it; and whether she will provide suitable and nourishing dishes, without meat, to all children so desiring it, as was arranged at the inauguration of this scheme.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. Meat meals are not provided every day, and it would not be practicable to provide special meals on days when meat is served.

Mr. Freeman: Is the right hon. Lady aware that great dissatisfaction is caused because some children are forced to have these meat meals when neither they nor their parents want them? Is she further aware that if meatless meals can be provided she will save meat for those who want it?

Miss Horsbrugh: I do not think it is possible to differentiate. I have had investigations made and I find that there is less waste in meat than in anything else.

Disputes

Mr. J. Johnson: asked the Minister of Education how many disputes have been formally declared by divisional executives against county education committees; and how many of these were decided in favour of the divisional executives.

Miss Horsbrugh: Fourteen. Three fully and one partly.

Intelligence Tests

Mr. James MacColl: asked the Minister of Education whether she is aware that recent experiments indicate that individual scores in group intelligence tests can be improved by systematic coaching; and whether, in view of the use made of such tests in the competitive selection of children for different types of secondary education, she will advise local education authorities on the best way of correcting this.

Miss Horsbrugh: I think it best that I should leave local education authorities to work out methods for determining the most suitable secondary education for each child.

Mr. MacColl: Is the Minister not aware that the Professor of Educational Psychology for the Institute of Education has suggested that scores of intelligence quotients can be raised by as much as 14 points by systematic coaching? Is it not desirable that there should be a uniform practice in this matter either by giving coaching, as he suggests, or by forbidding it altogether?

Miss Horsbrugh: I do not think it is possible to get a completely uniform practice. I shall be only too happy to enable local education authorities to obtain any help they may want from my expert advisers. Local authorities have seen the various suggestions made in the Press and elsewhere.

Miss Alice Bacon: Is it not clear that there is no satisfactory method of selecting children at the age of 11 for different types of secondary education, and would not the right hon. Lady agree that the only right method is to ensure comprehensive schools?

Miss Horsbrugh: I quite agree that it is very difficult to know exactly the abilities and aptitudes of any child, at a particular age, but I would rather see mistakes made in this scheme than increase the number of comprehensive schools until an experiment has been tried in these schools.

General Certificate Examination

Brigadier R. Medlicott: asked the Minister of Education if she has yet received the conclusions of the Secondary Schools Examinations Council, with re

gard to the minimum age requirement for sitting for the general certificate of education; and if she will abolish the age requirement for examinations held after 1952.

Miss Horsbrugh: The Council have not yet completed their review, but I expect to receive their considered recommendations in good time for me to reach a conclusion about the need for any changes in the 1953 examinations.

Brigadier Medlicott: Is the Minister aware that the imposition of this minimum has caused bewilderment in many quarters? Will she try to ensure, in future, that there is consultation with parents whose plans for the careers of their children are very much affected by considerations of this nature?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think it is better that I should await the report of the Secondary Schools Examinations Council. When I receive that report I shall then have to decide what is the best step for me to take next.

Burnham Committee (Teachers' Panel)

Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: asked the Minister of Education whether she will appoint a representative of the National Association of Schoolmasters to the Teachers' Panel of the Burnham Committee.

Miss Horsbrugh: As I have already stated, I see no reason to dissent from the view expressed by my predecessor on this matter in an answer which he gave in this House on 13th July, 1950.

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that the numbers of the membership of this Association justify at least one seat on the Burnham Committee? If numbers are not the test, what is?

Miss Horsbrugh: I have given my view as it is now. I have agreed to receive a deputation from this Association, and if they can put before me any other views that will make me change my mind I shall certainly do so.

Swimming Instruction

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Minister of Education if she is aware that the 5 per cent. cut in education costs


has resulted in the closing of school swimming baths, the dismissal of qualified swimming teachers, members of the Swimming Teachers' Association, and a serious diminution in facilities for school children learning and practising swimming; and if she will refuse her approval to these proposals and restore full facilities for swimming and other physical training for children.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. I know of only one local education authority which proposes to economise in the provision of swimming instruction.

Mr. Hughes: Would the right hon. Lady be so kind as to explain—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."]—and provide deaf aids for some hon. Members on the other side of the House—how this kind of attack upon the educational standards of the people can benefit anybody but banks and moneylenders?

Miss Horsbrugh: I really do not see the connection between banks and moneylenders; but if the hon. and learned Member will put down a Question about banks and moneylenders, and show how they affect the matter, I shall be very pleased to answer it.

Catholic Schools

Mr. David Logan: asked the Minister of Education if she is aware that the financial obligations of the Education Act are almost impossible to be borne by the Catholic population; whether negotiations with the various bodies have now been completed; and when an enabling Bill is likely to be introduced by her so as to ease the financial position in regard to Catholic schools.

Miss Horsbrugh: I can only refer to what I said in reply to the hon. Member for Ardwick (Mr. L. M. Lever) on 28th February last.

Mr. Logan: Does the right hon. Lady understand the gravity of the present position, which has been in existence for over 12 months? Is it not possible for her to make a statement? On moral grounds alone is not some concession justified? When will the necessary Bill be brought in?

Miss Horsbrugh: I should like to make a statement as soon as I can. I am having discussions now, but I have not been in charge for 12 months.

Handicapped Children, Wales

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Minister of Education if she will make a statement concerning the progress being made in the provision of a school for physically handicapped children in Wales.

Miss Horsbrugh: I hope that the Glamorgan local education authority will proceed with the purchase of a suitable site and with the planning of the school at an early date.

Attendances, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

Mr. Short: asked the Minister of Education how many children were in attendance at county primary and county secondary schools in Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 1st April, 1951; and how many she estimates will be in attendance on 1st April, 1952.

Miss Horsbrugh: According to the local education authority's figures, there were 31,605 children in county primary and secondary schools in April, 1951, and there will be 33,671 in April next.

Mr. Short: In view of this considerable increase in the number of children, would the Minister not agree that a cut of 5 per cent., as far as the amount spent per child is concerned, would be a cut of considerably more than 5 per cent.?

Miss Horsbrugh: If the hon. Gentleman will look again at the circular he will see there was no thought of a cut of 5 per cent. on the amount spent per child. Included in that 5 per cent. was further education, recreational and vocational classes, administration, and other things.

History of Mankind

Brigadier Ralph Rayner: asked the Minister of Education what consultations have taken place between her Department and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation regarding the writing of a History of Mankind under the auspices of the organisation.

Miss Horsbrugh: The project for a History of Mankind has been discussed by the United Kingdom National Com mission which advises me on U.N.E.S.C.O. matters, and the Commission's views upon it have been presented at successive U.N.E.S.C.O. Conferences by the United Kingdom delegations. It is


now in the hands of an international body of scholars, established for the purpose, under decisions taken by the General Conference of U.N.E.S.C.O.

Brigadier Rayner: Will my right hon. Friend endeavour to see that we have proper British representatives on the subcommittee of U.N.E.S.C.O. which is to deal with this important work—proper in the sense that they subscribe to British traditions and to our national Christian religion?

Miss Horsbrugh: The appointments to this Committee were made before I had any responsibility for them. If there are any changes, and if I am asked in any way to advise, I will certainly advise having in mind the point of view which my hon. and gallant Friend has put.

Mr. Tomlinson: Would the right hon. Lady say whether, among the personnel who have been nominated, she considers that anybody differs from what has been suggested?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think there is a difference of opinion on this matter. I said that if I were asked to advise—and I do not think I shall be asked to do so—I should take into consideration the type of person I believe the British people would like to see on this body. It is not for me to criticise those who have been put on it by many nations with different outlooks. That is not my job.

U.N.E.S.C.O. (U.K. Representation)

Brigadier Rayner: asked the Minister of Education what contact is maintained by her Department with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation; and who chooses the United Kingdom members on its publication committees and to conferences sponsored by the organisation.

Miss Horsbrugh: Close contact with U.N.E.S.C.O. is maintained by my Department on behalf of the Government. The arrangements for the representation of the United Kingdom on committees and conferences vary with the circumstances, but United Kingdom members are usually appointed by the Minister or after consultation with the Minister.

School Transport (Taxi-cabs)

Mr. Anthony Fell: asked the Minister of Education how many taxis are employed for the purpose of taking children to school in England and Wales; how many children of nine years and over are transported to school by taxi; what is the average distance of transportation; and how many cases there are of one or two children only, of nine years and over, being transported by one taxi.

Miss Horsbrugh: I regret that the information is not available.

Mr. Fell: Can my right hon. Friend tell me why this information is not available to her, in view of the fact that I have already had it, so far as my own area in Norfolk is concerned, from the Norfolk education authority, on request from me, in a week? This Question has been on the Order Paper for over a month.

Miss Horsbrugh: It is not available because I did not inquire from the 146 local authorities who are responsible for dealing with transport. They know the statutory regulations. In Circular 242 I have asked for economies to be made, where possible, in transport, and when I see the estimates of the authorities in April I hope to find that economies have been made.

Special School, Staffordshire (Allegations)

Mr. Julian Snow: asked the Minister of Education whether Her Majesty's Inspector, while investigating the cases of Margaret Harris and Linda Yates, who were removed by their parents from Walton Hall Special School, took steps to see the parents in question in order to hear direct their allegations of cruelty before he reported completely favourably on this school.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. It is the duty of Her Majesty's Inspectors to report to me on the conduct and efficiency of schools. It is not one of their duties to interview parents who have complaints to make against a school; this is a matter for the school authorities. Her Majesty's Inspector was, however, aware of the allegations made against the school before she sent me her last report.

Mr. Snow: Is the right hon. Lady aware that the local authority have held


a special meeting to discuss these allegations and that they again came to the conclusion that there is no basis for these allegations? Is the right hon. Lady aware that some of the parents have been to see me and have maintained that their children have been cruelly treated? Is it not absolutely desirable, since her Department threatens to take action against these parents, that she should comply with the request I make? Is there not some duty on her Department to see that the parents are questioned?

Miss Horsbrugh: As I think the hon. Gentleman knows, members of the authority have met again—in any event, in the last three weeks—and have interviewed the parents. The hon. Gentleman has now been asked whether he will go to the school to see the authorities there and to make any inquiries he likes. I believe that if he looks into this matter he may have more confidence in the arrangements at the school than he has at present. If he would do that, I should be only too willing to discuss the problem with him, either now or after his visit.

Mr. Snow: Is the right hon. Lady not aware that many people, including myself, do not consider themselves competent to judge whether a school is well run or not? Is she further aware that I have received a third complaint about this school? Will she please look into the matter?

Miss Horsbrugh: I quite agree that many of us may not be competent, as the hon. Member says, to find out whether a school is run on the right lines or not. That is why we have the report of Her Majesty's Inspector. She visited the school, which she has known for a number of years—this is not the first occasion on which she has visited it—and afterwards made a report about it.

University Awards

Mr. Frederick Mulley: asked the Minister of Education if she will now make a statement on the guidance she proposes to give local education authorities concerning their university awards.

Miss Horsbrugh: I am sending the hon. Member a copy of a circular issued last week in which I gave local

authorities all the information I could at this stage.

Mr. Mulley: Could the right hon. Lady tell the House whether there is to be any reduction in the number of local authority awards and whether she is taking steps to improve the number of awards which are being made by authorities such as Leeds, who issue one per 10,000 of the population, and Birmingham, Hampshire, Somerset, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire, who are all well below the national average? May the House be told what is the position in this matter?

Miss Horsbrugh: I thank the hon. Gentleman for the information he has given to me. If he will look at the circular I think he will find that the point he mentions is met satisfactorily.

New School, Acton

Mr. J. A. Sparks: asked the Minister of Education if she will exempt from the general slow down in building the proposed new school at Bromyard Avenue, Acton, in view of the serious shortage of school places in the borough.

Miss Horsbrugh: This project remains in the Middlesex authority's building programme for 1952–53.

Mr. Sparks: Is the right hon. Lady aware that in the next year or two there will be a shortage of at least 800 school places in the borough and that unless some degree of priority is given to this school within that time a great many hundreds of children will not be able to gain admission to other schools?

Miss Horsbrugh: All I can say is that the school is included in the building programme. I will certainly watch the position because we all agree that we want these places to be provided at the right time.

Mr. Beresford Craddock: Is my right hon. Friend aware, and does she not agree, that the position is Acton is no worse than, and probably not so bad as, that in other parts of Middlesex?

Miss Horsbrugh: All I am anxious to do is to see that the school building programme is carried out and that we have the places for the children who are to be taught.

Grammar School Pupils, Hornsey

Mr. Sparks: asked the Minister of Education in view of the closing of the Hornsey Grammar School, what arrangements have been made for the accommodation of the pupils there; and how many grammar school places have been lost as a consequence.

Miss Horsbrugh: Final arrangements have not yet been made, but 133 pupils have been offered a choice of other schools in Hornsey and adjoining areas. On the second part of the Question, I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave him on 21st February last.

Mr. Frederick Messer: Does the right hon. Lady know that the closing of this school will result in a great inconvenience to a large number of children?

Nursery Schools, Shropshire

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: asked the Minister of Education the outcome of her further inquiries regarding the proposals made by Salop Education Committee for the closing of four out of their total of six nursery schools.

Miss Horsbrugh: I am not yet able to give any information.

Mr. Thomas: Would the right hon. Lady say whether the words contained in Circular 242 of December to local authorities—
The Minister does not expect reductions which would impair the essential fabric of the service"—
apply to nursery schools? In other words, does she consider that nursery schools are a part of the essential fabric of the service and, if so, will she see that such schools are not closed either by the Salop education authority or by any other authority?

Miss Horsbrugh: I have already said, and I have already informed local authorities, that I could not approve any indiscriminate closing of nursery schools. Each case must be considered to see the purpose which the school is serving. Above all, we must consider cases where children are attending nursery schools while their mothers are working.

University Students (Grants)

Mr. Bence: asked the Minister of Education if she will increase the grants to university students, in view of the rising cost of living.

Miss Horsbrugh: New standard figures of maintenance will come into use next autumn for awards to university students made by my Department.

Mr. Bence: Is the Minister aware that, owing to the vast number of circulars that have been issued, and the mass of statements of the most ambiguous nature, many working-class parents are reluctant to get their children to accept university places when they are offered to them?

Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot think that in the four months that I have been Minister of Education there has been such an enormous number of circulars. There have been a few, and they have been so much discussed by hon. Members and by the Press that, I think, everyone must know some of the things that are in them; and I think that the hon. Gentleman is now finding some of the things that are not in them.

Teachers

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: asked the Minister of Education what plans she has in mind for increasing the number of certificated school teachers so that the size of classes may be reduced; and how she proposes to deal with the growing shortage in mathematical and science teachers.

Miss Horsbrugh: My plans provide for an increase in the number of teachers employed in primary and secondary schools at the rate of between 3,000 and 4,000 a year, but during the next few years the school roll will be increasing so rapidly that this increase will not suffice for any general reduction in the size of classes.
On the second part of the Question. I cannot usefully add anything to the reply which I gave a fortnight ago to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing).

Sir T. Moore: Does not my right hon. Friend realise that school teachers are human like the rest of us, that they want to marry and breed like the rest of us, and that the crux of the whole problem is an adequate salary, which they have not ever had?

Mr. Mulley: asked the Minister of Education if, in view of the fact that she recognises a married student's parents-in-law in order to pay him a reduced


grant, she will amend her training of teachers' grant regulations, in order to recognise his marriage for grant purposes.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. It seems to me reasonable to pay maintenance grant at one rate to students living with parents, relatives or friends, and at a higher rate for those who are living in a college hostel or in lodgings run on a business footing. While this principle is applied to students generally, I could not properly make an exception in the case which the hon. Member has in mind just because the student is married.

Mr. Mulley: Will the right hon. Lady not look again at this case? It seems clear that if this student was living at the same address, unmarried, he would be receiving a grant of £215, but because the Minister is not able to make him a marriage grant on behalf of his wife and family it seems very unreasonable that his grant should be reduced by £50 because the people he is living with are his relations-in-law. Does the right hon. Lady really think that a married man, his wife and child can subsist on £165 a year and also pay the necessary expenses for his college education?

Miss Horsbrugh: If the hon. Gentleman will read the answer I have given, I think he will find that it meets all the points he has put in his supplementary question.

Size of Classes

Mr. Stephen Swingler: asked the Minister of Education if she is now in a position to state the numbers of classes of over 40 and over 50 pupils, respectively, in January, 1952.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir.

Mr. Swingler: When will the information be available?

Miss Horsbrugh: Not yet. I said that I did not know.

School Population

Mr. Swingler: asked the Minister of Education the numbers of children aged five years and over, in the school population in January in each of the years from 1946 to 1952 inclusive; and her estimates of the numbers for 1953 and 1954.

Miss Horsbrugh: As the answer consists of a number of figures I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following are the figures:

Number of children aged 5 years and over in maintained and assisted Primary and Secondary schools (England and Wales) in January:


Actual




Thousands


1946
…
…
…
…
4,869


1947
…
…
…
…
4,881


1948
…
…
…
…
5,209


1949
…
…
…
…
5,392


1950
…
…
…
…
5,540


1951
…
…
…
…
5,623


Estimated


1952
…
…
…
…
5,813


1953
…
…
…
…
6,058


1954
…
…
…
…
6,222

Mr. Swingler: asked the Minister of Education if she will state, separately, the numbers of additional school places which were required for the raising of the school-leaving age to 15 years and the number of other additional school places estimated to be required between 1945 and 1953, owing to the increasing size of the school population.

Miss Horsbrugh: It is estimated that the increasing school roll and the movement of families to new homes require by the end of 1953 1,150,000 additional school places, of which about 160,000 were needed for the raising of the school leaving age.

Mr. Swingler: Will the Minister consult the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has more than once given an estimate that the number of places required by the end of 1953 is 1,450,000? Can we have an authoritative statement from the Government as to which of these estimates is correct?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think perhaps that it would be a good thing if I gave that correction. I think the hon. Gentleman, when speaking in a debate lately, said that the right hon. Member for Farnworth (Mr. Tomlinson) had given the number at 1,450,000. We know now that he was wrong, for it has been looked up in HANSARD. My predecessor gave the number required as 1,150,000, and gave the dates as being from 1947 to 1953. In the same debate—on 4th May, 1950—the present Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated the number at 1,450,000, but he did not state whether this figure related


to the time from immediately after the war, or to the same period as that to which the right hon. Member for Farnworth referred. I have taken the estimate of my predecessor, the right hon. Member for Farnworth, and it is that on which I am now working.

Divisional Executive Committees, Kent (Cost)

Mr. John Arbuthnot: asked the Minister of Education what was the total cost for the last convenient 12 months of running the divisional education executive committees in Kent.

Miss Horsbrugh: £186,700 was the estimated figure for 1951–52.

Mr. Arbuthnot: Is a local authority empowered to abolish a divisional executive in a place where it may think that the expenditure is excessive or where the divisional executive may appear to be, as it were, a fifth wheel on the coach—interposed between the school governors and the county education officer?

Miss Horsbrugh: A local authority has power to reduce the number of divisional executives if it finds that money is being spent and it is not getting value for it. At the same time, as in the case of the nursery schools, I could not agree to the indiscriminate abolishing of the executives. We must look at each one individually, and judge it individually, in the same way as we do the nursery schools.

Mr. Charles Pannell: Is the right hon. Lady aware that her reply is somewhat misleading, because figures have been worked out in Kent to show how much each executive costs in administration—which is the point, I think, of the hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot)—and they show that there are 17 divisional executives costing £300 a year each.

Miss Horsbrugh: The figure I gave includes salaries, wages, office accommodation, printing, stationery, postage, travelling, statistical and other expenses, but not the cost of inspection or any establishment charges against the education service for the services of other departments of the authority.

Dental Services

Miss Bacon: asked the Minister of Education what steps she is taking to

ensure that local authorities do not economise by cutting down the school dental services.

Miss Horsbrugh: I have made my policy clear in Circular 242 and I have no reason to think that further steps are required.

Miss Bacon: Is the right hon. Lady not aware that, although she has asked local authorities to make a cut of 5 per cent., and although she has asked that the essential fabric of education shall not be impaired, the various answers she has given to Questions this afternoon show that in fact she has no real power to ensure that those essential services are not impaired?

Miss Horsbrugh: I do not quite know what the question is, but perhaps I might answer the inferred question, "Have I any power?" My answer to that would be "Yes," and I have already exercised it in connection with some nursery schools in certain areas. I have not yet received the estimates of the local authorities, but I shall receive them, I think, in April.

Oral Answers to Questions — APSLEY HOUSE (OPENING)

Mr. John Parker: asked the Minister of Education if she will give an estimate of what would be the cost of opening Apsley House to the public throughout the year, including Sundays; what entrance fees it is proposed to charge; and what revenue it is anticipated they will produce.

Miss Horsbrugh: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 28th February, to the hon. and gallant Member for Norfolk, Central (Brigadier Medlicott).

Oral Answers to Questions — COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

Bechuanaland (Reports)

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations when he proposes to bring to the attention of the House the reports of the official observers sent to Bechuanaland; and what action he proposes to take as a result of these reports.

The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. John Foster): The reports were published in a White Paper on 6th December, 1951. They were taken into consideration by Her Majesty's Government in coming to the decision concerning Tshekedi Khama announced in the House on the same day.

Mr. Hughes: The Question refers to bringing the matter to the attention of the House. Does the Under-Secretary not agree that it is urgently necessary for him, in conjunction with the Leader of the House, to bring these problems before the House for discussion so that they can be discussed in relation to the adjacent territories which will shortly be the subject of an important conference in London?

Mr. Foster: I will bring the hon. and learned Gentleman's supplementary question to the attention of the Leader of the House.

Commonwealth Development (Report)

Mr. J. Grimond: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations the composition of the group studying Commonwealth development; and when it is expected that it will report.

Mr. Foster: No doubt the hon. Member is referring to the Working Party on Development set up by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers, which met under my chairmanship. The Working Party consisted of officials of Commonwealth Governments; it has, on the completion of a first series of meetings, submitted an interim report for the consideration of Commonwealth Governments.

Mr. Grimond: Do I understand, then, that this is the only joint body which is keeping the financial state of the Commonwealth under review; that it has now ceased to sit; and that there is now no body charged with the duty of keeping these financial considerations under review?

Mr. Foster: There were two bodies set up under the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference and those bodies will sit again when some of the results of the interim report have been communicated back to the Working Party.

Emigrants' Wives (Maintenance Orders)

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations with which of the Commonwealth Governments there are no agreements for the enforcing by them of maintenance orders made by United Kingdom courts; whether he is aware of the hardship caused to wives of emigrants whose maintenance orders cannot be enforced; and what steps he proposes to take to try to give them a remedy.

Mr. Foster: The only territories of members of the Commonwealth other than the United Kingdom to which the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act, 1920, has not been extended by Order in Council are the Canadian Provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick and those parts of India and Pakistan which were not formerly part of British India.
The Act will be extended to New Brunswick in the near future, but the legislature of Quebec has not yet made the provision necessary to enable the Act to be extended to Quebec. The position of the former Indian States is under consideration.

Emigration

Mr. William A. Steward: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he will consult the members of the Commonwealth as to the means by which increased facilities can be made available for emigration from this country.

Mr. Foster: There is constant consultation with the High Commissioners in London concerned and it has not been brought to my notice that existing facilities are inadequate. We are always ready to co-operate in dealing with any difficulties that may arise.
My hon. Friend may care to refer to the Adjournment Debate on emigration to the Commonwealth which took place in the early hours of this morning.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Is my hon. Friend aware of the feeling of hon. Members in all parts of the House that this type of proposal is the only ultimate solution to the economic stability of this country and the political stability of the Commonwealth; and that for years Govern


ments of all complexions have failed to tackle the situation adequately?

Mr. Foster: My noble Friend has taken note of that feeling.

Commonwealth Broadcasts

Mr. Steward: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he will consult the Postmaster-General and representatives of members of the Commonwealth on the advisability of broadcasting a Commonwealth programme at regular intervals in order that its achievements and objects may be more widely known throughout the world.

Mr. Foster: While I sympathise with the purpose my hon. Friend has in mind, he will realise that, while there are many bonds within the Commonwealth and its members share in many respects a common outlook, the members are independent countries, each with its own aims and policies.
I have no reason to suppose that there would be general acceptance among them of the idea of setting up an organisation for the continual broadcasting of joint statements on their behalf. It is through the combined effect of the individual Commonwealth services that the voice of the Commonwealth can most naturally and effectively be heard by the rest of the world.

Celebrations, South Africa (U.K. Pavilion)

Mrs. Eirene White: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what arrangements have been made for the United Kingdom Government to participate in the Van Riebeeck Tercentenary Celebrations in South Africa.

Mr. Foster: Included in the Van Riebeeck Tercentenary Celebrations to which the hon. Member refers, a Festival Fair will be held in Cape Town from 14th March to 5th April. The United Kingdom will have a Pavilion illustrating the contributions made by this country to the development of South Africa over the last 300 years.

Mrs. White: Is the Under-Secretary aware that since the decision was taken to hold these tercentenary celebrations various non-European organisations in

South Africa have decided to use the occasion for organised protests against the racial policy at present pursued by the Government of South Africa? Can he assure the House that nothing will be done by those responsible for United Kingdom participation which would imply, directly or indirectly, any approval of racial policies which are repugnant to many people in this country?

Mr. Foster: Participation does not imply the holding of any views by Her Majesty's Government on the party politics or internal policy of the Union. Her Majesty's Government are very glad to be able to take part in these celebrations.

Captain J. A. L. Duncan: Will my hon. Friend assure the House that the person chosen to open the United Kingdom Pavilion in Cape Town will not be the right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes)?

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (TERMS OF REFERENCE)

Mr. Eric Fletcher: asked the Prime Minister to what extent the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income were changed on the initiative of Lord Waverley; and whether, in view of Lord Waverley's resignation from the Commission, he will now restore the original terms of reference.

Mr. Douglas Jay: asked the Prime Minister (1) how far it was at the request of Lord Waverley that the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income were altered;
(2) whether he will now restore the original terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Winston Churchill): I see no occasion to make any further change in the terms of reference. The amendment was made in agreement with Lord Waverley, but the same point had been raised by the former Chairman, Lord Cohen, in a letter to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell), then Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 20th April. He did not


dissent from the interpretation placed upon the terms of reference by Lord Cohen. This has now been made explicit.

Mr. Fletcher: Is not the change in the terms of reference a sinister and unnecessary attempt to invite the Commission to make recommendations in accordance with Lord Waverley's well-known political views on the amount of revenue raised from taxation; and ought not the Prime Minister now to restore the original terms of reference?

The Prime Minister: It is hardly possible to misrepresent the facts more thoroughly and more patently. The former Chancellor of the Exchequer was addressed in writing by the late Chairman, Lord Justice Cohen, who said that certain things required amplifying and clarifying, and he wrote back expressing his agreement; but no special action was taken then. On a new Chairman taking over the amendments were introduced in accordance with what had been agreed beforehand.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: As the Prime Minister has referred to correspondence between Lord Cohen and myself, would he be good enough to publish that correspondence? I do not myself recall that the proposals in Lord Cohen's letter were by any means identical with the change in the terms of reference made, apparently, at the instance of Lord Waverley.

The Prime Minister: I see no objection to the correspondence being published, but it will be necessary to ask the other parties concerned. I have it here. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman may care to refresh his mind with it before he requires publication. I shall be very glad to have it handed to him after Question time is over.

Mr. Gaitskell: I think that it would be for the convenience of everybody if the correspondence were published, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman, with the consent of Lord Cohen, will do so.

Mr. Jay: As the Prime Minister now admits that it was in discussion with Lord Waverley that this particular change in the terms of reference was made, surely it would be more natural now to restore the original terms of reference. Is there

any precedent for the Government tampering radically with the terms of reference of a Royal Commission in the middle of its work?

The Prime Minister: This is all an elaborate step to fabricate another mare's nest.

Following is the correspondence:

ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION OF PROFITS AND INCOME

Royal Courts of Justice,

London, W.C.2.

20th April, 1951.

MY DEAR GAITSKELL,

The economic conditions in the country have altered a lot since the Terms of Reference to the Commission were originally approved by your predecessor.

I have recently been discussing them with Millard Tucker, one of my colleagues (who will act as Vice-Chairman of the Commission) and we both think that the usefulness of the Commission's work may be seriously diminished if the Commission had to place too literal a construction on that part of the terms of reference which requires that our recommendations should be "consistent with maintaining the same total yield of the existing duties in relation to the national income."

On a literal construction, the Commission could make no recommendation containing any concession to the taxpayer generally or to any particular kind of taxpayer, unless (a) it could devise some other tax on profits or income or suggest the imposition of some sort of counter-balancing change, or recommend some increase in rate of an existing tax on profits or income which the Commission could assume would produce the revenue estimated to be lost by the concession or (b) it were to come to the conclusion that the concession would provide such a stimulus to the production of profits or income that the same revenue as before would accrue despite the concession.

"(b)"must be based largely on speculation and I am not certain whether it was intended that we should have regard to psychological factors in applying this qualification of our terms of reference.

As to "(a)," bearing in mind the increases indicated in your Budget speech, it is difficult to think of any new tax on profits or income which might meet the case (except possibly a tax on capital profits).

As to whether we are expected to make up possible deficiencies simply by a bare recommendation of an increase in the rate of tax, is to me also uncertain.

Several problems where the qualification of our terms of reference will have to be kept in mind have already been specifically referred to us by the Tucker Committee itself, and in these circumstances it seems to me that we might usefully place a broad construction on our terms of reference and treat ourselves as being at liberty, not only to recommend concessions to which we thought priority should


be given and for which we could at once provide compensation, but also to make recommendations as to other concessions which we thought advisable or equitable, even though we ourselves were unable to suggest any means by which any resulting loss of revenue might be made good.

In the latter case, we could, of course, if that is necessary, make it clear that we appreciated that the grant of such other concessions might be dependent on an improvement in the economic position of the country or on the Chancellor being able to obtain compensation for any consequent loss of revenue by some other means.

Yours sincerely,

LIONEL L. COHEN.

The Rt. Hon. The Chancellor of the Exchequer,

The Treasury,

Whitehall, S.W.1.

Treasury Chambers,

Great George Street, S.W.1.

26th June, 1951.

MY DEAR COHEN,

You raised with me recently the question of the construction to be placed upon the concluding words of the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, viz., "to make recommendations consistent with maintaining the same total yield of the existing duties in relation to the national income."

The intention of these words was to indicate that the Commission was expected to proceed on the assumption that the revenue from taxation of profits and income is to be maintained at its existing level, and their primary relevance is to any major changes in the tax structure—for instance, a new system of company taxation or a new form of P.A.Y.E.—that the Commission might think fit to recommend. That is to say, if such a change involved, by itself, a substantial reduction in the yield of tax, the Commission would be expected to say how they would propose that the gap should be filled by an increase in yield from tax otherwise levied on profits or income.

The words are also relevant in a broad way to the sum total of the Commission's recommendations, but I agree that they should not he interpreted so as to debar the Commission from including recommendations on particular matters that might in the final result bring out a balance on the wrong side. Indeed, if so narrow an interpretation were placed upon them the advice of the Commission on a number of matters that they had had under consideration might be lost.

I think, however, that if the final balance should prove to be on the wrong side the Commission should, as you suggested, state in their Report that they realise that the implementation of certain of their recommendations may have to wait until the economic situation allows taxation to be reduced.

You suggested, in this connection, that the Commission might list such recommendations in order of preference, and, if this course could be adopted, it would be most valuable to know in what order the Commission considered that effect should be given to the recommendations when circumstances permit.

Yours sincerely,

HUGH GAITSKELL.

The Right Hon. Sir Lionel Leonard Cohen.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE

Vegetable Acreage

Mr. Gerald Nabarro: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware of the substantial decline, during the period September, 1950, to September, 1951, in acreage in the United Kingdom devoted to vegetable production for human consumption; what are the reasons for this decline and what steps are in hand to prevent the position deteriorating further.

The Minister of Agriculture (Major Sir Thomas Dugdale): I am aware of the decline to which my hon. Friend refers. Large fluctuations in the vegetable acreage are not uncommon. The exceptionally low acreage of 1951 was probably due partly to the wet spring of 1951 which delayed planting and partly to heavy supplies and consequent low prices in 1950. Prices were steadier in 1951 and I should expect some recovery in acreage in the course of this year.

Mr. Nabarro: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend satisfied that the recovery to which he refers will yield a total acreage of output that is approximately equal to the anticipated demand without imports?

Sir T. Dugdale: Horticulture as a whole is included in a survey of the problems of agriculture upon which the Government are at present engaged. I am not yet ready to make a general statement on that subject.

Pigs

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Agriculture what measures are contemplated further to increase the pig population of the United Kingdom in 1952.

Sir T. Dugdale: The only important obstacle to further increases in pig numbers is the supply of feedingstuffs. I


can hold out no hopes of increased imports, but we are doing all we can to encourage farmers to grow more coarse grains and other suitable feedingstuffs, such as fodder beet in this country. I hope the introduction of grants for ploughing up old grassland will help.

Mr. Nabarro: Would my right hon. and gallant Friend reconsider the position of the owner and rearer of pigs—that is, the man who is rearing pigs for his own consumption and that of his family—who is often scared off by the complexity of the slaughtering regulations?

Sir T. Dugdale: We are always considering this problem, but I say again that it revolves round the amount of feeding-stuffs available. There is no regulation to prevent a householder from rearing pigs, provided he complies with the bye-laws in force in his locality and is not using rationed feedingstuffs. The householder, however, must obtain a licence for the pig to be killed from the Ministry of Food and comply with the conditions of slaughter.

Mr. Fenner Brockway: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that one of the difficulties is not only the amount of pig feedingstuff available but the price which is now being charged for it?

Mr. Nabarro: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that the complexity to which I refer is specifically this licence of the Ministry of Food to kill, and that that is the principle deterrent? We could get a lot more pigs if my right hon. and gallant Friend would relax the regulation.

Sir T. Dugdale: Yes, Sir, but we must be very careful in amending particular regulations not to cause further hardship in other directions. The real problem is the amount of feedingstuffs available.

Fruit Acreage

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Agriculture the average acreage devoted to fruit production in the United Kingdom during 1951; the estimated average acreage in 1952; and what measures are contemplated to offset the reduction of fruit imports from Western Europe and elsewhere during 1952.

Sir T. Dugdale: The total area in the United Kingdom returned at 4th June.

1951, as occupied by fruit grown primarily for sale was 331,671 acres. The corresponding forecast for 4th June, 1952, is 333,000 acres but this is subject to a wide margin of error. New plantings made in 1951 would bear no fruit in 1952, but the National Agricultural Advisory Service are always ready to advise growers on means of increasing the productivity of existing plantings.

Mr. Nabarro: Would my right hon. and gallant Friend answer the second part of the Question which deals specifically with the measures contemplated to offset reductions of European fruit imports?

Sir T. Dugdale: I attempted to answer that by saying that the National Agricultural Advisory Service are always available to try to help growers and to show them ways and means of increasing their productivity.

Food Production Societies (Fertilisers)

Mr. E. G. Gooch: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he will encourage members of food production clubs and allotment societies to increase production by making a contribution towards the cost of fertilisers purchased in bulk by clubs and societies.

Sir T. Dugdale: It is intended that schemes made under the Agricultural (Fertilisers) Bill, now before Parliament, shall provide for the making of contributions towards the cost of fertilisers acquired by associations of allotment holders or smallholders which buy fertilisers in bulk for re-distribution to their members. Food production clubs if their members occupy private gardens (which are not agricultural land) are not covered by the Bill.

Mr. Gooch: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman take into consideration notifying the various societies of the concession that he has made, perhaps due to pressure from this side of the House?

Sir T. Dugdale: I will take note of what the hon. Member says.

Sheep-Worrying

Mr. Gerald Williams: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he has now come to any decision to deal with the problem of sheep-worrying by dogs.

Sir T. Dugdale: I am having further consultations about this problem with the interests concerned and I hope to be able to make a statement shortly.

Mr. Williams: Is the Minister aware that the N.F.U. have made some very sensible and practical suggestions, and will he do something about them, because this matter has been held up for a considerable time?

Sir T. Dugdale: Yes, Sir, but I think the House will realise that this is a very complex problem, and I wish, if possible, to obtain the advice and co-operation of all those concerned.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: Has the Minister consulted the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the cost of dog licences, which may affect this particular problem?

Sir T. Dugdale: All these problems are under consideration.

Captain J. A. L. Duncan: Has my right hon. and gallant Friend consulted the Scottish interests as well, because the problem of animal and sheep-worrying by dogs is equally bad in Scotland?

Sir T. Dugdale: I am very well aware of that.

Executive Committees (Cost)

Sir Waldron Smithers: asked the Minister of Agriculture if, in view of the fact that the cost falling on public funds of county agricultural committees for the year 1950–51 was nearly £4,000,000, he will now close them down.

Sir T. Dugdale: No, Sir. The main function of the county agricultural executive committees, which were established on a permanent basis under the Agriculture Act, 1947, is the promotion of agricultural development and efficiency and they have many important duties to perform in the interests of food production.

Sir W. Smithers: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that now we have a Conservative Government in power this form of Gestapo should be brought to an end?

Sir T. Dugdale: I cannot agree that the agricultural committees are a form of Gestapo.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH FISHERIES ZONE

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that the recent decision of the Court of International Justice in the Norwegian fisheries claim based on the Norwegian decree of 12th July, 1935, extending the Norwegian fisheries zone, diminishes the area of British fishing rights; and when, in these circumstances, he intends to take steps to extend the British fisheries zone.

Sir T. Dugdale: The reply to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I have nothing at present to add to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to the hon. Members for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson) and for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) on 29th January.

Mr. Hughes: Does not the Minister agree that it is urgently necessary to apply this doctrine to the Moray Firth and east and west coasts of Scotland in the interests of not only the fishermen there but also of the consumers of fish all over this island?

Sir T. Dugdale: I am aware that there are many problems involved, but I would remind the House that the general issues raised by the decision of The Hague Court are of a very far-reaching and important character and require mature consideration

Oral Answers to Questions — SALTHOUSE, NORFOLK (SEA INUNDATION)

Mr. Gooch: asked the Minister of Agriculture if be will call the attention of the new river board for the area to the threat to Salthouse, Norfolk, of inundation from the sea, so that they may consider whether it is possible for them to undertake protective works.

Sir T. Dugdale: The East Suffolk and Norfolk River Board will not take over its functions under the Land Drainage Act until 1st April. Arrangements have been made to bring this subject to its early attention.

Mr. Gooch: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman take into consideration the fact that the inhabitants of this village have been ravaged by the sea to a very material extent, and regard the matter as one of urgency?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. C. R. Attlee: May I ask the Leader of the House if he will state the business for next week?

The Minister of Health (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 10TH MARCH—Supply (5th allotted Day):
It is proposed to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on the Army Estimates, 1952–53, and to consider Votes A, 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, and Army Supplementary Estimate, 1951–52.
TUESDAY, 11TH MARCH—My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget.
WEDNESDAY, 12TH MARCH, and THURSDAY, 13TH MARCH—General debate on the Budget Resolutions.
Perhaps it will be convenient to the House if I say that this will be continued and brought to a conclusion on Monday, 17th March.
FRIDAY, 14TH MARCH—Consideration of Private Members' Bills.

Mr. Ernest Davies: In view of the sudden and sweeping rise in London fares this week, and the proposal to raise railway fares further on 1st May, will the Leader of the House provide time for a debate on the question of railway fares and charges?

Mr. Crookshank: No, Sir. We shall be busy enough on the Budget.

Mr. Davies: I was not suggesting next week, but before 1st May, when the further rise takes place.

Mr. W. Nally: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that well over 12 months ago a very distinguished Royal Commission, under excellent chairmanship, produced a Report on Betting and Gambling? The facts and figures in that Report are rapidly becoming outdated. Will the right hon. Gentleman consider providing an opportunity for discussion of the Report some time in the next month at any rate.

Mr. Crookshank: I do not think that this Government would find it possible to give opportunities which the previous

Government did not give. In any case, the subject might be discussed on Private Members' days.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: With regard to the Army Estimates, will the Leader of the House bear in mind that a large number of military people wish to take part in the debate and that a large number of non-military people wish to co-operate with the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reduce expenditure and eliminate waste? Will he give further time for the Army Estimates?

Mr. Crookshank: It is the normal practice to suspend the Rule on the day on which the Estimates are introduced.

Miss Irene Ward: With regard to the Supply days, can my right hon. Friend say whether, as a result of yesterday's debate, there are now three parties who are entitled to nominate subjects for discussion instead of two as heretofore?

Mr. F. Beswick: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to answer the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies)? If he cannot find time next week for a discussion on the increase in rail fares, will he find time for it before the further increases on 1st May?

Mr. Crookshank: I should have thought that that was the sort of matter which Private Members behind the Front Opposition Bench would first of all take up with their own usual channels.

Mr. Ernest Davies: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when the previous Government were in office, the last debate on fares took place in Government time?

Mr. Hector Hughes: In view of the London conference next month on Central African territories, will the Leader of the House find time for discussion of the Bechuanaland Report about adjacent territories?

Mr. Crookshank: Perhaps I may be allowed to remind hon. Gentlemen opposite that there are certain days at the disposal of their own right hon. Friends. There are still some this month. No doubt if the hon. and learned Gentleman makes representations in the proper quarters, those quarters will consider them.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: Can the Leader of the House say when the White Paper on the Lisbon Conference will be available?

Mr. S. S. Awbery: In view of the interest in Malaya and the re-appointments, and the resignation of high officials there, can we have some time for discussion of the Federation, especially in view of the recent visit of the Colonial Secretary to that area?

Mr. Crookshank: That seems eminently suitable for one of the Supply days to which I referred.

Mr. Norman Smith: Will the Leader of the House say when he proposes to take the Second Reading of the Currency and Bank Notes Bill?

Mr. Crookshank: Not next week.

BILL PRESENTED RATING AND VALUATION (SCOTLAND) BILL

"to amend the law relating to the rating and valuation of lands and heritages in Scotland leased or occupied by certain public bodies and of lands and heritages used or occupied as sub-post offices in Scotland; and to make provision for notice to rating authorities of proposed entries in the valuation roll made up by the Assessor of Public Undertakings (Scotland); for correction and amendment of the said roll and for prescribing dates for the purposes thereof; and for regulating the procedure in valuation appeals in Scotland," presented by Mr. Stuart; supported by the Lord Advocate, Commander Galbraith, Mr. Snadden and Mr. Henderson Stewart; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 62.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[4TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Navy Estimates, 1952–53, and Navy Supplementary Estimate, 1951–52

MR. J. P. L. THOMAS' STATEMENT

Order for Committee read.

3.35 p.m.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
This is the seventh occasion on which I have taken part in the discussion of the Navy Estimates from one or other of the Front Benches, but it is the first time that I have had the honour of introducing the Estimates themselves. I noticed in the defence debate yesterday that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was criticised for choosing a Minister of Defence—and a very good new Minister of Defence—from another place; but if that choice means the return of the job of First Lord of the Admiralty to the House of Commons after six years, then I must confess that the Prime Minister's action has my own unqualified approval.
I realise that, so far as the past is concerned, I am reporting on the stewardship of my predecessors for three-quarters of the last year, and I hope to avoid claiming for the present Government any virtues which belong to the past one. But I have some sympathy for the ex-Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), who, I believe, is to follow me today, for he is perhaps in a greater difficulty. If he wishes to charge the present régime with sins and omissions in the last annual record, he will have to be very careful that those sins and omissions took place after 25th October. If it is any consolation to him, I was faced with an even greater difficulty in 1946 when I had to follow a First Lord who only a few months before had been my chief at the Admiralty.
I must ask the House to bear with me for a few moments while I explain some rather complicated figures in this year's Estimates.
The sum of money for which I had intended to ask today was £357,250,000 or £78,750,000 more than the sum voted


for 1951–52. However, we have reached an agreement with the United States Government, since the Estimates were prepared, about the application of sterling counterpart of American aid to defence expenditure, so I have also presented a Revised Estimate providing for the expected naval share, namely, £25 million, to be taken as an additional appropriation-in-aid. The result of this is that the net cash grant which will be required for naval expenditure in 1952–53 will be £332,250,000, or only £53,750,000 in excess of that voted for 1951–52. The total size of the programme remains unaltered.
I am also presenting concurrently a Supplementary Estimate for 1951–52. This shows that expenditure on naval services in the current financial year is likely to exceed the gross provision for the year by £3 million. Hon. Members will recollect that the Statement explanatory of the 1951–52 Estimates set out that it had not been possible to make detailed provision for the further measures to speed up naval preparedness announced by the then Prime Minister and that the House would be approached in due course for a supplementary grant. The Supplementary Estimate makes provision for the many frigates, minesweepers, seaward defence vessels and coastal craft which were added in 1951–52 to the original new construction programme.
As it happens, despite a liability for increased prices, there has been an under-spending of some £17 million in the programme of the original Estimates for 1951–52 while the expenditure on the acceleration programme, itself barely half what we expected, taken together with other liabilities which I have outlined in the Supplementary Estimate, amounts to about £20 million. The estimated net over-spending on gross provision for 1951–52, is, therefore, £3 million, a sum which can be more than met from additional receipts during the year, so that my Supplementary Estimate is for a token sum of £10.
In 1952–53 we shall need more funds to meet the rise in the tempo of the rearmament programme. Not only shall we have to provide for the continuation of work on the original new construction programme and on the additional vessels

to which I have just referred, but in addition we shall have a further programme of new construction of similar vessels which I have described in the printed Estimates. We have made, as is usual, allowances for possible under-spending in the coming year's programme. We have also taken into account higher prices and pay increases for civilian staff and in industry. The House may be certain, however, that I intend to make all possible economies and reductions in expenditure at home and overseas wherever this can be done without affecting the efficiency of the Service.
In looking back upon the last year, I feel that all ranks and ratings of the Royal Navy would wish me to put on record in this House their great personal grief at the death of His Majesty King George VI. They remember his active service with many of them during the earlier years of his life; they remember also not only his close interest in their problems but the advice and guidance which he gave so unstintingly from his great source of personal knowledge at all times. Perhaps the affection towards His Majesty can best be illustrated by letting the House know that never have so many requests been made in the Commands concerned to form part of the crews of the gun carriages in London and in Windsor as a last tribute to their sailor King.
This last year has been one of exceptional activity for the Royal Navy; during it, the House will not be surprised to hear, the Navy has been able to meet efficiently the very varying tasks indeed with which it has been faced. The war in Korea has kept our naval forces there employed on constant operations, and we have provided a substantial part of the United Nations Task Group under a British Flag Officer on the west coast. This Task Group has included units of the Royal Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and Netherlands Navies and of the United States Navy in support of the Security Council's resolutions.
The co-operation between the Commonwealth Forces has been excellent. At the end of September, 1951, H.M.A.S. "Sydney" replaced H.M.S. "Glory" as the Commonwealth carrier in Korean waters while the latter was refitted and her air crews rested in Australia. For four months of winter weather, until she


was relieved by H.M.S. "Glory," the "Sydney" most fully maintained the very high standards set by her predecessor in this area. We are grateful to the Australian Government and to the Royal Australian Navy for this relief and we congratulate H.M.A.S. "Sydney" on her very fine achievement.
Cruisers, destroyers and frigates have operated close inshore, often in very difficult and treacherous waters, and they have carried out many successful bombardments. One patrol, owing to narrow waters, had actually to stop and turn on its anchor under heavy fire. The House will remember another occasion, when a crashed Russian fighter was recovered from a river sandbank under the nose of the enemy by small craft—a really remarkable operation and a very useful one from the information angle, as this fighter was the first of its type.
Aircraft from our carriers have patrolled the coast, spotted for bombardments and ranged far inland to attack enemy targets, communications and positions in the face of some very determined opposition. The House will realise from the following figures what a remarkable record in flying intensity and in freedom from accidents our carriers have put up in the Korean theatre of war. In H.M.S. "Glory" last summer each pilot averaged between 40 and 50 flying hours a month—a very high figure—and the average serviceability of aircraft was nearly 90 per cent. Earlier in the year, as the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, told us in the last Estimates debate, the pilots of H.M.S. "Theseus" had carried out more than 1,000 successive deck landings and almost as many catapult launches under operational conditions without even one mishap.
These feats call for a tribute, which I am sure the House will be glad to pay, to the efforts of not only the air crews but also the technical members of the ships' companies who have maintained this equipment at such a high pitch of efficiency and often in the face of great difficulties. But looking back on this last year, our tribute should go not only to naval aviation, but to all units of the Fleet, which have been operating most efficiently in those distant waters for long periods and far away from their base.
In January last the work of the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, in Korea came to an end. This unit numbered about 200 officers and other ranks and they served with very great distinction. Above all, we shall remember their fighting withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, and we add our tribute to the very high one paid to this unit by the United States Commander when he said:
Your superb achievements have been a source of inspiration to freedom-loving people the world over and will go down in history's brightest pages.
The unit has now been disbanded those who served in it for nine months or more have returned to the United Kingdom, while the remainder have been drafted to No. 3 Commando Brigade in Malaya. This Brigade will move from Malaya to Malta by 1st July, 1952. It will then have served for two years under operational conditions in Malaya, and will be relieved as part of the rotation of infantry units. For the majority of its Malayan service the brigade, in conjunction with the police, has been responsible for the security of the State of Perak. These troops have had ample opportunities to engage the Communist bandits and to date they have accounted for 171 bandits killed and 48 captured at a loss to themselves of four officers and 15 other ranks killed.
In recognition of their many operational successes 18 decorations and 25 mentions in despatches have been awarded to ranks of the brigade. During its service in Malaya, the 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, has received many commendations, including that recently sent by the High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templer, and there is no doubt that it has maintained its high reputation under unpleasant and most difficult conditions.
Although the experience gained on these operations has been of great value, there has been a disadvantage that the brigade has had little opportunity to train for its primary role, that of amphibious operations. This will be remedied on its arrival in the Mediterranean, where it will be able to carry out that amphibious training in conjunction with Royal Naval and Army units. During my recent visit to Malta I was able to visit the Royal Marine Training Centre there and I was


most impressed by what I saw: the scheme of training is as thorough and imaginative as any that I have ever seen.
In Malayan waters also ships and light craft have maintained patrols round the coast to prevent gun-running and infiltration by bandits.
The House will remember the part played by the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf during last year. It was a difficult time in very trying weather conditions, for which some of H.M. ships present were ill-adapted. Decks were so hot that the ships' cats put up a pantomine performance by appearing in boots! I should like to put on record our gratitude for the cheerfulness of the officers and of the men under these very trying conditions and in this unhappy episode.
Then comes the work of the Royal Navy in the Canal Zone since Egypt claimed to abrogate the Treaty, last October. I do not wish to take any credit away from the Canal Company, which I believe is extremely efficient, but the House will get some idea of the help given by the Royal Navy when we find that no fewer than 3,432 ships of all nations, 57 per cent. of which were foreign ships, were berthed and unberthed up to the end of February by the Royal Navy. I was lucky enough to meet, during my recent visit to Malta, many of those who helped in this vital work of getting shipping through the Canal, and I was glad to tell them personally of our gratitude, which I am sure is shared by many nations who were helped to get their ships through this great international waterway.
We should make a point of remembering something which the ex-Parliamentary Secretary made a point of in his Estimates speech last year and of which I would remind the House now. It is that all these actions I have described by the Royal Navy, off Korea, Malaya, Persia and in the Suez Canal, have been additional to the Royal Navy's normal peacetime duties. Today we have the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The birth of that organisation has made it necessary to have large and small-scale exercises between the navies concerned.
I have described in my explanatory paper the exercises and manoeuvres which have lately taken place, and I will not weary the House now with a repetition of them, except to add that, as each exercise takes place, it is an improvement in

co-operation upon its predecessor, which has not always been the case.
I now turn to the progress of the rearmament programme. The year 1951–52 has been the first complete financial year of that programme. The main purpose of the past Government and the present one has been the build-up of our naval strength, including our naval aircraft, to meet the under-water menace in all its forms. These forms are many. For this reason, Her Majesty's Government and the previous Government have set out to modernise existing carriers, submarines, destroyers and frigates. We are doing all we can to improve the speed of building of ships in these categories which are at present under construction, and we are building more frigates and minesweepers, as the White Paper has told the House.
The Prime Minister explained in yesterday's debate in his statement on defence, and also in his speech, that the programme, being a maximum programme, was liable to inevitable delays, and that by last autumn it was clear that it was slowing down because of production difficulties and by the worsening of our balance of payments. To keep up the rate of progress for which we had hoped, we obviously had to have sufficient labour, raw materials, machine tools and manufacturing capacity available.
There are shortages in all these categories, and although the programme will be achieved, indeed will, in the end, be more than achieved in certain important fields, this process will take more than the original three years which the last Government thought would be the period. I think I should stress that we are particularly short of labour on naval work in the shipyards, which are, of course, fully engaged with their merchant programmes, and that if construction of Her Majesty's ships is not to suffer we shall need considerably more men at work on them.
It is true that the number of Admiralty industrials in Her Majesty's dockyards and naval establishments in the United Kingdom has increased by 3,000 to 100,000 during 1951, but we still need more labour of a certain type, and particularly of craftsmen. Our major shortage, however, is of shipwrights; we need 600 in the Royal Dockyards and 200 could be taken at once at Portsmouth, where the reconstruction of H.M.S. "Victorious" has been seriously delayed.
Apart from these shortages, it is obvious from what I have said that the dockyards are working to capacity on naval work, and they are undertaking the major part of the modernisation and the conversion programme in addition to the normal refit and repair of Active and Reserve Fleet ships.
While I am talking about staffs and workers, and before I continue with the re-armament programme, perhaps the House will let me digress for a couple of minutes and talk about the size of the Admiralty non-industrial civilian staffs, and in particular the Headquarters' staffs—

Commander Harry Pursey: Hear, hear.

Mr. Thomas: —which have been so often criticised in this House, particularly by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just interrupted and by myself, in past debates.

Commander Pursey: And by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Thomas: I want to assure hon. Members that I have been tackling this problem. I found that the numbers were rising substantially, due to the great increase in the scale of production, research and development, works services and general planning.
My first aim has been to restrict increases to those grades of civilians where shortages are holding up vital work: naval constructors, electrical engineers, electrical draughtsmen are all examples of the grades I mean. My second aim has been to make economies in other grades of staff by concentrating on essentials. This I am doing by the inspection of complements and methods of work, simplification of organisation and the adoption of more business-like procedures.
I can say this to the House at least, that I have reached the stage when I am satisfied that it will be possible to limit the numbers of staff to below the figures shown in the present Estimates, but until my investigations are finished, I think it will be rash of me to have a guess at the actual figures of the reductions which I hope to achieve.
Let me now turn to the production programme. We estimate that some £38 million will be spent on new construction

during 1952–53. More than 80 per cent. of this will be ships already under construction, such as "Ark Royal," the four "Hermes" class light fleet carriers, the six "Daring" class destroyers and frigates of four types as well as a large number of coastal and inshore minesweepers.
The fleet carrier "Eagle" has completed, and is now in commission, while her sister ship, the "Ark Royal," is fitting out and is expected to be completed in 1954. I feel that the House will want a special word from me about H.M.S. "Eagle," in spite of the fact that the Prime Minister mentioned her at some length in the debate yesterday. Only a few days ago, on 1st March, to be exact, she was accepted into Royal Naval service following the completion of her sea trials. The Prime Minister in his speech yesterday mentioned the other H.M.S. "Eagle" of Elizabethan times, and perhaps I may therefore add that it is interesting and very fitting that the first new ship to join the Royal Navy since the accession of Her Majesty the Queen is one which she herself launched at Belfast in 1946.
H.M.S. "Eagle" will be able to handle larger and faster aircraft, and to handle them more quickly and with greater ease, than any previous carrier of the Royal Navy. The "Eagle's" two hangars are served by high-speed lifts; the flight deck covers an area of more than two acres, and the catapults for launching aircraft are more powerful than any that the Royal Navy have used up till now. The aircraft are put into position for loading into the catapults by an automatic device which should greatly speed-up launching operations. Very much improved arrester gear will accept landings by faster and heavier aircraft than any previously launched from our carriers and the new system of flight-deck lighting will make the operation of jet aircraft possible by night as well as by day.
H.M.S. "Eagle" will have a peacetime complement of 88 officers and 1,337 ratings, excluding the complement of air squadrons embarked in her. I hope it will be possible very soon to arrange visits for Members of Parliament to see this great ship for themselves. It is our wish that the "Hermes" class—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Before the First Lord leaves the question of the "Eagle," can he tell us what it cost?

Mr. Thomas: It is in the Estimates. I am concealing nothing. The figure is a little over £15 million.

Mr. Hughes: I am sorry to interrupt again, but can the First Lord say whether that figures includes the cost of the guns?

Mr. Thomas: The cost of a little over £15 million covers everything. Later in my speech, when referring to modern equipment, I shall be speaking of the mass of modern equipment which the "Eagle" carries. I hope to satisfy the hon. Member, when he has heard the rest of my speech, that the money has been well spent.

Mr. James Callaghan: Would the First Lord be good enough to tell us when he expects that the aircraft will be embarked on the "Eagle"?

Mr. Thomas: I am afraid that I cannot say at the moment. I will let the hon. Gentleman know as soon as I have the answer.
I turn to the "Hermes" class of light fleet carriers, which are urgently required in service to match the production of modern high performance aircraft. It is our wish that they should be completed with as little delay as possible. The contractor's sea trials of "Centaur," the first ship of the class, are expected to begin early next year and will be followed by those of "Albion" in the spring of 1953.
The only carrier of the "Majestic" class in hand is "Majestic" herself and she is being completed for the Royal Australian Navy whose other carrier, H.M.A.S. "Sydney" has—as I have told the House earlier in my speech—done such valuable work in Korean waters. The "Tiger" class cruisers—it has come up in almost every Navy Estimates debate in the last few years—remain suspended while we are waiting for further development of armament and fire control.
Two of the "Daring" class destroyers—"Daring" itself and "Diamond"—are now complete. The remainder, except the "Diana," should be finished during the coming financial year. H.M.S.

"Diana" should complete in the summer of 1953. These destroyers are virtually what would have been looked upon as a light cruiser 20 years ago, and they are indeed the last word in destroyers. I am sure that the House will be glad to see those old names back in service, especially in view of the gallant but tragic losses of their namesakes during the last war.
The House will be especially interested in our new frigates and they will see in my Explanatory Memorandum that they are of four types—two types for antisubmarine work, a third for anti-aircraft and a fourth for aircraft direction. Hon. Members may wonder why it has not been possible to produce an all-purpose vessel. The answer is that modern equipment is now so great that it will not go into one vessel of a reasonable size. No one ship, therefore, can carry all, but at the same time each type can do some of the work of the other type. Two of these new types of anti-submarine frigates are laid down and well under way. That is all I have to say of this particular part of the programme at the moment.
There are orders already for substantial numbers of coastal and inshore minesweepers. They have been placed and a number of these vessels should be completed before the Navy Estimates next year. These vessels carry with them a mass of special equipment in the form of sweeps and other gear which we are producing at very high pressure.
Not least amongst our defences against the menace of mines in coastal waters is, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, the quick and accurate spotting of these mines as they fall so that the water can be speedily cleared. For this purpose, we have started recruiting for the Royal Naval Minewatching Service. Our present plans aim at getting 30,000 civilian volunteers of whom we hope that over half will do full-time paid service if war should unfortunately come. They will be working in co-operation with the Royal Navy and, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, they will be performing, in the event of war, a most invaluable service.
The modernising of the cruisers "Birmingham," "Newcastle" and "Newfoundland," which is nearly finished, has greatly improved their effectiveness. As soon as they have finished, further cruisers will be taken in hand for modernisation.
I come to the "Rocket" and "Relentless," of which the House has heard before—prototype destroyer conversions to first-rate anti-submarine frigates. These are now completed successfully and a further conversion programme is under way. Anyone who has seen the complicated gear in these ships will understand what I mean when I speak of the need for four types of frigates. There are 13 of these conversions now in hand and each vessel takes about 18 months to convert.
A more limited form of frigate conversion has been undertaken. The prototype of this simpler type of conversion—the "Tenacious"—was finished in January, and four more are in hand. This limited conversion takes only 11 months. The work of improving the efficiency of existing destroyers and frigates by installing new anti-submarine equipment, gunnery and fire control is continuing, and five vessels are now in hand. Then we have the modernisation of submarines. Two submarines have been satisfactorily completed during the year and many others are in hand as my White Paper shows, for 1952–53. This will mean a considerable increase in under water speed.
Let me say of the Reserve Fleet that there is a very marked improvement in the state of its effectiveness now that practically all the vessels have been refitted. That is particularly encouraging. The task was a colossal one as most of them had seen pretty strenuous war service. The officers and men who carry out the not very inspiring duty of keeping them efficient must feel that they now have vessels which are really worthy of their care.
I hope that the House will think this news of the Reserve Fleet most encouraging, as in many quarters there were doubts on this particular question, which I must say I myself shared. So I withdraw the criticisms which I made on this subject in the debate on the last Navy Estimates, and I congratulate the previous régime, followed now by us, in putting the Reserve Fleet in so good and encouraging a condition.

Mr. Callaghan: That is a most gracious withdrawal to which I could take no exception, but why did the right hon. Gentleman persist in his criticism last

year when I made the same statement as he is now making and told the House that all the ships in the Reserve Fleet had had at least one refit since they were put in reserve?

Mr. Thomas: I am afraid that I did criticise the hon. Gentleman last year, certainly I did so the year before, and I apologise. I have read his speech on the occasion of the Navy Estimates more than once, with great interest, but I was not aware he had given so many details as I have given the House today. If so, I owe him a second apology, to be added to the one I have already given him.
Much of what I have already said in this first part of my speech is the result of our research and development programme. That programme is planned with the maximum co-operation between the Commonwealth, United States of America and the nations of N.A.T.O. The House will see from the Explanatory White Paper that in the field of submarines in general a great emphasis has been placed on propulsion. Much has already been done in our investigations into the use of oxygen-bearing fuels and nuclear energy.
I wish I could tell the House more about that, but for obvious reasons the House will not expect me to give these details of the progress in the development of our submarines, except to say that in this generation of atomic energy the submarine is of particular interest in view of the fact that atomic energy is independent of oxygen supply. The possibilities, therefore, are very great, particularly as regards endurance.
A new detector has been developed for dangerous concentration of hydrogen and other gases in submarines. We are also paying the closest attention to submarine escape. By mid-summer this year we hope to complete the construction of a 100 foot escape tower which will primarily be used for training for escape, using free ascent from the one-man escape chamber with which all new submarines are to be equipped. This tower will also be used for escape training for personnel from submarines now in service. Then there is a new type of breathing set which is being developed for assisting escape with present methods, and a new type of life jacket is being manufactured for issue.
Then I come to the rescue bell which has been mentioned in the House during the last few months. It has been obtained from America and is undergoing trials at the present time. Trials are also going on of a new buoy fitted with a light. These have been successful and the new buoys are now being manufactured for service. Trials are also going on with this new buoy fitted with an automatic wireless telegraphy beacon.
In the field of anti-submarine work, there is a numerous and fairly well-equipped enemy to be faced if war should come. As the House knows, the Asdic, the aircraft, the depth charge, the torpedo, radar and ahead-throwing weapons are all part of the antisubmarine team and the reports on progress in all those fields are encouraging. We have had trials of the special lightweight, high-powered Diesel engine of an advanced design. Those have been continuing satisfactorily during the past year. Sea trials are now being held and we are making plans for large-scale production.
The location of H.M.S. "Affray"—which is such a gloomy chapter in the naval history of the past few months—was an example of the progress which is continually going on. It was located by equipment which passed its prototype trials in 1948 and had just been fitted in searching ships a few months before the disaster. To have sent down divers to examine every one of the wrecks in the area where the "Affray" sank might have taken an infinitely long time, and this new device for distinguishing between one type of wreck and another was of the greatest value, as my predecessors at the Admiralty in the last régime will remember. The final identification of the "Affray" was achieved by using recently developed under-water television, a device which had in fact reached the prototype stage.
Last June the former Parliamentary Secretary told the House that the policy for the fitting of indicator buoys in submarines had been reviewed. The present practice is to provide two buoys, one at each end of the vessel, and they are intended for release by hand in emergency and to rise to the surface, giving the name of the submarine and its position. We have considered a number of schemes for releasing these buoys auto

matically, but I am told that none increases the chance of saving life, and all suffer from the disadvantage that they would have to be removed or rendered inoperative in time of war. As it is already possible, as long as anyone remains alive to do so, to give indication of the position of a submarine from any compartment, the Board of Admiralty have decided, after the fullest consideration, that no change in the present practice is warranted. Accordingly automatically released indicator buoys will not be fitted to Her Majesty's submarines.
A great deal of valuable information about the latest torpedoes has been obtained from trials with models and certain full-scale components, including one which will seek out and destroy its target, no matter what evasive tactics that target may adopt. Much work has also been done in mine warfare and mine counter-measures, for, as I have said before, they are bound to play an exceedingly important part in war.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of anti-submarine measures, has anything been done to develop the submarine itself as an anti-submarine weapon? That point was raised in several previous Estimates debates and I am wondering whether anything has happened.

Mr. Thomas: Yes, it has, and I am sorry that I have no details with me. If I can, I will try to provide the hon. and learned Member with details at the end of the debate. There is a great deal to say and I have had to miss out some things.

Mr. Paget: I am most grateful to the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Thomas: Various measures to meet the mine menace are under development at high priority, including new and more efficient minesweeps.
Now we come to the speed of the aircraft, which is always increasing and is always presenting new problems for defence. By the time a shell from the main anti-aircraft armament of a ship reaches the range of its target, the aircraft will have moved on 1,000 yards, so that in the air the shell fired from astern is hard put to it to catch up with the aircraft it is pursuing. Guided weapons are obviously the answer to this problem. At


the same time we are trying to improve our gunnery systems to combat the fast aircraft.
As I am talking about production, I want to say one word about ship welding. The naval architects and ship builders of the world have been very worried of late by the breaking up during gales of two American all-welded cargo vessels built during the late war. Fortunately, no similar mishaps have fallen on British ships during winter gales, but we do not want to be too complacent on that account. I am glad to tell the House that a great deal of research work in this field is going on at Rosyth and we regard this not only as a very important but as an essential duty.
Now let me turn to naval aviation. Every naval officer now recognises that this is the main striking power of the Fleet, and naval aviation today employs nearly one-quarter of the total manpower of the Navy. It is, of course, important for officers and men of the Navy today to be as air-minded as they are sea-minded. I must say a few words about the characteristics of the front-line aircraft which have come, or are coming, into use, and also about the development of the steam catapult.
The present single-seater day-fighter, the "Sea Fury," which has proved most effective in the strike-role in Korea, is at present being replaced by the "Attacker" jet fighter. The "Attacker" is, however, only a stop-gap until the arrival of the "Sea Hawk," which is now being built and to which the Navy is looking forward. I hope it will be in service during the coming year. It will carry four 20 mm. guns and a rocket battery.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: How many guns?

Mr. Thomas: Four 20 mm. guns and a rocket battery, and it will have both greater endurance and considerably higher speed than the "Attacker." We also have on order a two-seat all-weather night and day jet-fighter, the "Sea Venom." This has armament similar to the "Sea Hawk." For anti-submarine work we have the "Firefly" Marks V and VI, in service. We are developing a swept-back jet-engined interceptor fighter. At the moment I cannot tell the House details of the performance of this aircraft, but I can assure hon. Members

that it promises to be quite outstanding. Not only are we aiming for the best aircraft for attack and defence, but we are not overlooking the potentialities of the helicopter for anti-submarine work as well as for rescue work.
Hon. Members will have read of the steam catapult. It is a high-performance catapult.

Mr. Callaghan: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of naval aviation and types, can he tell us how the G.R. 17 is coming along and when it is likely to be in service?

Mr. Thomas: No, that is one of the questions which I cannot answer in the House at the moment.

Mr. Callaghan: I told the House last year that it was expected this would be in service at the end of this year. Has the programme dropped back? If so, will not the right hon. Gentleman tell us by how much? That was not a secret last year, so presumably it is not a secret now. I hope he will not be carried away too much by the desire of the Intelligence boys to keep everything under their hats.

Mr. Thomas: It is not a question of being carried away by the intelligence boys. There are reasons why I cannot tell the House today even as much as the hon. Member told the House last year. If I could give him a date, I certainly would, but it is quite impossible. If he is particularly interested in it, perhaps we might have a word later. I was talking about the steam catapult. It is a high performance catapult capable of launching the most modern carrier-borne aircraft. It is highly satisfactory. Trials have been taking place in home waters and also equally successful trials have taken place in America. This new apparatus will be installed for operational use in carriers of the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy.
The amount of steam required for sustained operation is, of course, considerable but preliminary trials have proved that the demand put upon the main boilers can be met without interfering with the satisfactory operation of the ship. This outstanding development will, obviously, have a very far-reaching effect indeed on naval air tactics by reducing the need for carriers to steam for long periods into the wind in order


to fly off their aircraft. Indeed, I am told that under certain conditions it will be possible through this invention to launch aircraft from a stationary ship.
Of course, all this build-up of naval aviation means that we have got to have our airfields and shore accommodation adequate for these new aircraft. There has to be lengthening and modernising of runways to meet the needs of the jet aircraft. The U.S. Navy has been very generous in offering us a chance to under-take pilot training out there to help with our air expansion while these alterations are going on, so that our programme of training will not be held up during the alterations to the runways to modernise them to meet the needs of the jet aircraft. So much for production and naval aviation.
I now come to the problems of manpower. Obviously, we have got to find a sufficient number of properly qualified men for the aircraft, ships and weapons about which I have been speaking. As the House knows, the rapid increase of naval manpower in 1951–52 was mainly the result of the retention of time-expired Regulars and the recall of selected Royal Fleet Reservists for a period of 18 months. By these means, and by continuing the steady build-up of the normal Vote A. the total strength reached 147,000 at the end of 1951. This made it possible to meet not only the increasing demands of the re-armament programme, but also our very special requirements of the war in Korea.
In my Supplementary Estimate for 1951–52, I show an increased Vote A of 149,000 as the strength that will be reached at the end of the present financial year. For 1952–53, Vote A provides for an overriding maximum strength of 153,000, which will be reached about October next. From then onwards until the end of the financial year, there will be a reduction in this total, because increased numbers are due for release. This will cause shortages in certain categories of skilled maintenance ratings, for there will be no more available in the Royal Fleet Reserve to be called up to replace those going out.
The House will have seen in the Defence White Paper that the Navy can- not look forward to releasing its recalled and retained personnel as quickly as the

Army and the Royal Air Force. Retentions are still on the 18 months basis announced at the beginning of 1951, and no early reduction is possible if the Navy is to continue in 1952 to keep more ships at sea.
I hope the House will realise that the position of the Royal Navy is different from that of the other two Services. It relies more on men of long experience and high technical ability, and dilution in this respect cannot go beyond a certain degree.
The warship is a unique concentration of technical equipment. This meets the point asked earlier by the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes). Technical equipment consists of electrical, radar, engineering and armament power which, in the other two Services, is dispersed over a large number of units. The Navy, to a far greater extent than the other two Services, is constantly fighting a hostile natural element—the sea. With the concentration of warlike assets in a few valuable and costly ships, every possible step towards eliminating mistakes and accidents is justified. The House will realise that naval history has demonstrated the fundamental necessity for experienced ratings throughout the ship retaining their efficiency in the teeth of a gale, as well as in the calm of the harbour. Consider for a moment H.M.S. "Eagle." Think of the responsibilities of her ship's company. She, apart from all her strategic significance, cost £15. million—I now have the exact figure, for which I was asked.
I am well aware that great disappointment will be caused when sailors see the earlier releases in the other two Services, but I can at least give the House the assurance that we will do everything in our power to cut down the period of service as soon as possible. Our aim is to begin that cut in 1953, but I cannot yet say when the retentions will cease altogether. I am afraid, however, that this policy will mean continued call-up of the Royal Fleet Reserve which, as the House knows, is the Navy's first-line Reserve. This Reserve will be increased from 1953 onwards by substantial numbers of short service men who have an automatic Reserve liability after their engagements have expired.
We are also simplifying re-entry to help to redress the shortage of senior ratings by attracting men who left at the end of the war. At the same time, we are offering inducements to recalled Reservists to enter special engagements of five and seven years beyond the 18 months' compulsory service, with the option later of completing time for pension. We also hope that the steps taken to improve the manpower position generally by increasing the re-engagement of men for pension on completion of their 12 years' service will be effective. This is very important in order to provide the strength of the supervisory rates.
One of the main reasons for the unsatisfactory re-engagement rate since the war was the desire of men and their families to be together again after a good deal of war-time separation and the ease with which men with technical qualifications find work in civilian life today. There has also been some dissatisfaction with the pension code. We now hope that the re-engagement rate, which averaged about 25 per cent. in 1950, will be increased to about 50 per cent. in the coming financial year.
The introduction of the new pay and pension codes and the extension of the re-engagement bounty of £100 until the end of 1952 should be good inducements to help us in reaching our aim. The retention of time-expired men has resulted, we must admit, in most of them postponing a decision on re-engagement, but the re-engagement rate of naval ratings has already increased to about 40 per cent. and we hope that it will increase still further shortly. After all, it will be some months before we know whether our 50 per cent. target will be reached, and the House will also remember that it was only two months ago that it was announced that the re-engagement bounty was to be retained until December of the present year. Finally, we hope that men at present on seven years special service engagements will transfer to continuous service engagements.
To help meet our difficulties we are, of course, trying to build up the "normal" strength of the Fleet by regular recruitment as rapidly as possible, but here again the shortage of senior ratings naturally limits the extent to which the numbers of junior ratings can be increased.
The National Service entry will slightly increase in 1952–53 to rather more than 3,000, of whom 400 will be wanted for special training in foreign languages. From the same age group, we expect to receive in the normal way about 4,500 on Regular engagements. The two figures combined total 7,800, as shown in the Defence White Paper.
We try to get the bulk of our requirements of retired and Reserve officers by means of voluntary offers to serve, and the response has been excellent. We shall continue this policy as long as we can. The 18 months' period will soon be coming to an end for some of the retained and recalled officers, but I cannot stress too strongly the need for as many as possible of them to remain. So much disorganisation could be avoided in the future if these officers remained with us for a further 18 months, and in some cases longer, and we are asking whether they will volunteer for a further period. In appropriate cases, the volunteers will be paid a gratuity at the end of their further service at the rate of £100 per annum.
Recruitment for naval air crew, which in many ways is the most difficult of our officer recruiting problems, is I am glad to say, as the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, knows, showing an encouraging upward trend but there is still a good deal of room for improvement. Although a large number of officers in naval aviation come from the regular Executive officer entry through Dartmouth and the Special Entry, the majority of the officers are at present being obtained through short service schemes and from National Service.
As an experiment, we are now allowing Regular ratings to apply for the eight years short service commission scheme while National Service officers may turn over to Regular short service commissions. To meet past deficiencies in recruiting, we have during the last 12 months re-entered a number of ex-naval pilots and observers, and we can do with more of the trained or part-trained officers. We have undertaken to give permanent commissions up to 20 per cent. of the eight year short service entry who complete their engagements, and also the re-entered pilots and observers. We are also arranging—to increase the interest in naval aviation—that young officers of the Executive Branch who wish


to do so may learn to fly in light aircraft in their spare time without cost to them- selves.
Mention of officers leads me to the problem of recruitment of cadets. The House is aware that cadets now enter the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, either at the age of 16 years or as special entry cadets at the age of 18 years, but, unfortunately, the numbers we are able to secure are insufficient. The requirement for officers has risen very steeply during the last few years. Civil life today holds greater chances for the boy with brains and ambition than it did in the early part of the century, and all three Services are experiencing great difficulty in meeting their requirements for young officers. This applies to both forms of cadet entry I have mentioned, the 16 years old and the special entry at 18. We are having to take more of the cadets who are only just good enough in order to get the numbers of today, which are still inadequate.
The prospects of getting increased entries at 18 or more promotions from the lower deck—we are doing our best to see what we can do—are not good enough, and although the numbers applying for the age 16 entry have been on the upgrade in recent competitions, the need for a considerably larger entry really has become imperative if we are to get our officers. We cannot afford to take the risk of waiting to see whether, given time, the age 16 entry will produce the full additional numbers required.
The Admiralty have been considering this problem for some time. Both my predecessor, Lord Pakenham, and I have taken a personal interest in it. What we have to do is to find ways and means either of securing at once an appreciably higher yield from the existing competitions or of tapping some additional source of entry. My only regret is that this afternoon I cannot tell the House what the answer to this difficult problem is going to be. But I have been in touch with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education. We are setting up a working party, an inquiry—call it what you like—to tackle the problem from the stage which my own informal inquiries have reached and to advise me on the methods of supplementing the present inadequate entries.
I do not propose to discuss the reserves at any great length—

Commander Pursey: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the question of the shortage of cadets, can he assure the House that there is no question of the Admiralty going back to the early entry at 13, because when he says it is necessary quickly to increase the officer strength of the Navy, he must remember that one does not get the commissioned officer from the early age of 13 for eight years. We on this side shall oppose any question of going back to a closed shop from preparatory schools.

Mr. Thomas: I can give the hon. and gallant Gentleman no such assurance. Every suggestion and idea will be open to this working party for consideration, but I can tell the hon. and gallant Gentleman from my own personal inquiries that nobody I have met or have talked to has any wish whatever to abolish the age 16 entry. This is a question of finding something with which to supplement the other two entries, the entry at 16 and the special entry at 18.

Commander Pursey: The entry age of 13 will not give us the officers for eight years.

Mr. Thomas: We need officers quickly, and we shall still need them however long it may take to get them. The working party will have to go into the matter to see how best the matter can be arranged.
I do not propose to discuss the Reserves at any great length today, as I have given a great many details about them in the White Paper. We have something like a dozen bodies of Reserves in the Royal Navy, ranging from the old established ones, like the Royal Naval Reserve, with a tradition as long as the Navy itself, to those which have come into being since the end of the last war, including the W.R.N.S. Reserve, which, building on those old traditions, are giving such useful service to the Royal Navy. Generally speaking, these Reserves are all in good heart, and if mobilisation should come we should get the same help from them as in years past.
I should like just to mention the position of the officers and men who saw service during the last war, or shortly afterwards, and who now correspond to what the Army call Class Z. Even when our present National Service Reserve, based on the 1948 Act, has reached its full strength, we shall probably need their


services on mobilisation. We are getting a tally on their civil occupations so that call-up notices are not sent to men on work of national importance from which they could not be spared.
I wish it were possible at the moment to give these officers and men refresher training as the Army do for their Class Z Reservists, but owing to demands on our training programme we have had to decide against this, at any rate for the present. We shall do everything we can for them at the first available moment in the future.
When I come to the question of accommodation, the House will realise that both the last Government and the present Government had many difficulties in fitting new shore accommodation into the general overcrowded building programme. Apart from this, a great deal of priority has now had to be given to works required for the support of naval operations. I wish I could give to the House today a more encouraging report on accommodation.
We have completed—of course the previous Government laid it down—and occupied, the first seamen's blocks at the Royal Naval Barracks at Chatham and Portsmouth this year. Shortage of steel has delayed the start on the new chief and petty officers' block at Devonport, but we hope to make considerable progress during the coming year. So far as naval aviation is concerned, we are doing what we can to provide accommodation at the Royal Naval air stations, but here, too, some of our plans have had to be slowed down. We have, however, made good progress in the building of ratings' married quarters at remote establishments and in the air stations, and some junior officers' married quarters—

Mr. W. J. Edwards: The right hon. Gentleman means that progress has been made on the previous Government's plans.

Mr. Thomas: I thought I had made that perfectly clear. It is obvious that we could not have done all this in a few short months. As I was saying, we have made good progress in the building of ratings' married quarters at remote establishments and in the air stations and some junior officers' married quarters have been finished at the Royal Naval Air

Station, Ford. At the Leydene Signal School, four out of five new sleeping-blocks have been completed for junior ratings and new sleeping accommodation for chief and petty officers will be ready this summer. As I made clear, this is what the Department laid down in the past.
The bulk of married quarters at home are built as a charge to Vote 15, but in my Supplementary Estimate for 1951–52 I said that I intended—if I may use a technical phrase—to exercise virement on unexpended funds from Vote 10 for housing at home in order to avoid unnecessary borrowing from the Consolidated Fund.
During the year there has been further improvement in living conditions in ships, especially in bathrooms, mess fittings, water coolers and refrigerators. In H.M.S. "Eagle" there are electric galleys throughout and in the laundry there are electric machines such as those found in some of our larger shore establishments. Bunks have been tried instead of hammocks and, as a result, the "Hermes" class and the "Majestic" are being fitted with the former. We are also going to introduce a small type of single cabin for junior officers instead of putting so many of them into larger cabins.
I have given a general picture of the Royal Navy during the past year, as I see it from inside the Admiralty once more. I have tried to fit as many details as possible for the coming year within the broad outlines laid down by the Prime Minister in his reference to the Service in his speech yesterday.
Those who have introduced the Estimates of Service Departments will know only too well what a mass of material reaches one from every branch of the Department and how difficult it is to do everyone justice, or to mention all their work without monopolising the debate. So one has to be ruthless in choosing the subjects that one feels will most interest the House and the country at the present time and try to surmount that handicap so well known to Service Ministers that all the most vivid and exciting material invariably bears that sinister label—"Top Secret—on no account to be disclosed."
But I can assure the House that my colleagues on the Board of Admiralty


believe—and I believe—that the programme agreed for the Admiralty, both by the last Government for the past year and by this Government for the coming one, narrowed though it has had to be at the present time owing to financial stress, was most wisely chosen, both by the past Government and the present Government, and that our research experts and designers, backed by the skill of the workers of the dockyards, the shipyards and the factories, are giving to all ranks of the Royal Navy ships, aircraft and equipment worthy of those who use them. There can be no higher standard than that.

4.42 p.m.

Mr. James Callaghan: We have listened this afternoon to a very faithfully delivered account by the First Lord of the activities of his Department over the last year, and I am bound to say that it is not one with which I should quarrel.
The trouble with the First Lord is that he is so disarming that it is difficult to quarrel with him. He comes here this year and distributes praise and blame in an equally dispassionate way. He presented what I thought was a balanced picture of the achievements and the failures of the Department as though he and the Prime Minister had never uttered a word of criticism of the late Government. I thought it was an astonishing performance.
I only wish that the First Lord were like some of the other Ministers in his Government who are slightly more venomous than he—then I could get really cross with him. But how can one get cross with a First Lord who apologises for having unjustly criticised one in the past? I will do my best, but I do not guarantee that it will be as good as it might have been if he had been one of his colleagues.
The First Lord has had a long apprenticeship with the Admiralty, whether in office or speaking about these matters from this bench, for a matter of seven or eight years. By what he said this afternoon I think he displayed a competence and knowledge of his subject, showing that the apprenticeship is finished and that now he has had the honour of presenting the Estimates for the first time he has become a fully fledged craftsman. If

his Government should be so fortunate as to survive the next twelve months—which I doubt—we shall look forward to hearing him again next year and hearing his review of what he has done during the next 12 months.
We have handed over the Navy to the right hon. Gentleman's care after six years of Labour Government. It has been nourished and supported by the Labour Administration since 1945. I ask the House, in the light of what they have heard this afternoon—the full books having been opened up to the right hon. Gentleman and his having had full recourse to all the records of the Department—whether the strictures passed on the late Administration, for which hon. Members opposite voted 12 months ago, were justified.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: The hon. Member will get his criticism later.

Mr. Callaghan: I value criticism from the First Lord more than I value it from the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, North, because the First Lord has the books. Since last November he has been having a long series of meetings, if tradition has been followed, in which everything has been unfolded to him, and by now he should have passed under review every phase and activity of the Department.

Captain Robert Ryder: Will the hon. Member clear up one point? He said that we divided on the Navy Estimates last year—

Mr. Callaghan: I specifically did not say that.

Captain Ryder: Will the hon. Member say to what he was referring?

Mr. Callaghan: Yes, I will explain that straight away. What I was referring to was the untrue criticism made by the present Prime Minister a year ago when he said that we had let the Navy down. I ask the hon. and gallant Member, as a former Navy officer, in the light of what he has heard this afternoon, whether he would be prepared to support that statement?

Brigadier Clarke: The hon. Member referred to me as the Member for Portsmouth, North. I wish to point out that my constituency is Portsmouth, West. It may be remembered that the former


Administration allowed the Navy to run down and that we have had to do a lot of quick re-armament in the last two years. That would be a matter of criticism which the First Lord would not like to raise but which should be stated.

Mr. Callaghan: I must apologise to the hon. and gallant Member for confusing him with the hon. Member for Portsmouth, North. [HON. MEMBERS: "There is not one."] The hon. and gallant Member has been so much less noisy in this Parliament that one began to wonder what had happened to him. I am very glad to see him coming to life again. I hope he will criticise his own Administration as fearlessly as he criticised us.
The First Lord thought that I would be faced with difficulty because I would be commenting on, or criticising, matters concerned with our administration in the past. I do not think I shall be faced with difficulty, especially in the view of the encomiums with which he has flattered us, but my criticisms will be the same as they were when I was in the Admiralty. I am on record in the Admiralty as having criticised a number of matters and, although I did not manage to carry the Board with me on many of them and a number were not adjudicated upon, nevertheless I shall continue.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: The hon. Member is setting me a very bad example.

Mr. Callaghan: I should not like to set the First Lord a bad example in any way. I say to him what I said in an interjection; he will find—as I am sure he has found already—that it is very difficult to hold a balance between the information one can give and the information one cannot give. On the two specific questions we asked him this afternoon, he was not able to tell us facts which I believe he could legitimately have told us if the Intelligence view had not prevailed. This is a great difficulty. I fought it out last year, and I gave the House then a mass of information which did the Navy no damage but, in my view, did it a lot of good, because it showed the House and the country that the Navy was in a much better state than the recriminations of the present Prime Minister had led people to believe.
I come now to my first point, the question of manpower. I criticise very much

the present policy of the Admiralty in the use of its manpower, and I hope the First Lord will stand up against them on this matter. So far he has been carried along with them, as is evident from the fact that the size of Vote A this year is 153,000 men. He is only achieving that by the profligate use of the first line of Reserves, the Royal Fleet Reserve. As he said, Vote A will start to diminish from October next. He cannot maintain the Navy at its present size for longer than another six months, because the Reserves are being denuded much too rapidly.
I know why they are being denuded it is because 1952 was fixed as a year of peril in which the maximum effort should be made. That decision was taken by the last Government. What is the point of him retaining and calling up men for very long periods and having a bigger Navy in 1952, at any rate for the first half of the year, than he can have in 1953 or 1954? I warn him that he will not get as big a Navy as this in the next two years. What is the use of keeping men under arms if at the same time other parts of the Administration are allowing strategic stockpiling to go by the wayside?
If, in fact, 1952 is the year of maximum peril, as was the view of the previous Administration, it is wrong, indefensible, for the Government to let stockpiling dwindle today. I say to the First Lord that the Admiralty has not yet caught up with the rest of the Government policy in this matter. They are still basing their manpower Estimate on the view that 1952 is the year, at the cost of running down the Reserves to the point where they will not be able to use them, and the Navy will be smaller next year than this year.
I am not being alarmist; I think I am being factual. What is the justification for the First Lord telling us on the one hand that he can safely run down strategic stocks and on the other hand that he is prepared to see a smaller Navy in 1953 and 1954 than today? To me, it does not hang together. It is obvious to us that 1952 is the year of maximum peril, and therefore we should build up our stockpiles and have our men in. But we cannot ride both horses at the same time, even if one of them is doped—I


see that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence has entered the Chamber.
I would seriously ask the First Lord, for the sake of the future of the Navy, to reconsider this manpower policy. I think it wrong, and it is unfair on the men concerned. The Royal Fleet Reserve was always designed, as I understand it, for call-up in the event of the mobilisation of the nation and the Navy as a whole. That has not taken place. Instead, in July, 1950, the Labour Government agreed to the call-up of the Royal Fleet reservists and to the retention of those time-expired men who were finishing their service for a period, I believe, of six months.
The Admiralty is taking far too long to get its manpower problem put right. I am not now saying anything I have not said before. This was all being argued out when we were there, but a decision had not been arrived at. I wish we were still there and then a decision might have been arrived at. But what is happening today is that the First Lord tells us he will not be able to start reducing the period of retention for another 12 months; although men who contracted to do service for 12 years are being kept for 13½ years and will continue to be so kept.
That is a longer period of retention than is the case in all the other Services, and I have always taken the view that it is not fair to these men. I defended that view last year and said that we ought to bring it to an end at the earliest possible moment. I do not think it is possible to bring it to an end yet, but I think the First Lord should reduce this period of retention forthwith, not only in fairness to the men involved, but also for the benefit of the Navy.
I believe the Navy is spread over too many activities and should be more concentrated. If it did a little more instead of having so much in the shop window, it could be even more efficient than the First Lord tells us we left it when we quitted office. So I put it to him strongly. Let him consider reducing the period of retention and not calling up the Royal Fleet reservists, but at the same time increasing the Regular component of Vote A. If he did that, I believe he would get into balance much

more quickly and have a smaller but more efficient Navy, which is more worth while than having something which is not efficient.
The right hon. Gentleman will say that we would have to do without something. Indeed we would, but I believe there are certain things we can do without if we are put to it. I will give him one example, although I could quote a number of small ones. I do not see the point at the moment in flying the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in the "Vanguard." It is a very fine symbol. She is the latest and best and, perhaps, the last battleship we shall have. But she is using up a great many trained and experienced men in her ship's company who could well be dispersed and used in other directions.
There were perhaps reasons for commissioning the "Vanguard" and holding her in readiness for particular purposes; but if they no longer exist, I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman might well pay her off and use the engine-room artificers and stokers and the rest of the ship's company in other directions. I assure him that this thousand men, or whatever the figure may be, aboard the "Vanguard," could relieve a great many pressures in other directions. I see no reason why the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, should not return to an aircraft carrier, where it was being flown before the present Commander-in-Chief took over.
I could make a number of other proposals to the right hon. Gentleman, but we would not do what the present Prime Minister did and say, "Look, the 'Vanguard' is paid off. See how weak the British Navy is," and all the other misleading things which the right hon. Gentleman used to tell us. We would take a dispassionate view of the situation and try to see that it was in the real interest of the Navy that this should happen.
I put this point very seriously indeed, because I believe that the Admiralty—and I do not blame the right hon. Gentleman for this—is being much too profligate in its use of manpower and its disposal at the present time; and that it could use the manpower to greater effect if it were prepared to take certain comparatively unpleasant decisions.
I turn now to the matter of production and would ask the right hon. Gentleman what is his policy about the modernisation of aircraft carriers. I have great doubts about this, and I always have had. The "Victorious" is to be practically gutted, stripped down to top deck level, the whole superstructure rebuilt, and the height of hangars to be increased, at a cost of many millions of pounds.
I am not at all sure that it would not be better to leave these ships, the "Victorious," "Illustrious," "Indomitable," "Formidable," and the rest of them, as they are, with the addition of the steam catapults the right hon. Gentleman should be able to put into them. Let them fly off such planes as they can, and when the G.R.17 comes along that should certainly be a possibility.
Incidentally, I suppose there is no chance of changing the name of the G.R.17 from Gannet to something else. I have always disliked that name. On the lower deck "gannet" has always meant someone greedy and noisome who ate up someone else's food the whole time and had no graces at all. That is not a good name with which to christen one of our latest aircraft.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Did the hon. Member christen it?

Mr. Callaghan: I was opposed to the name and I insist therefore on continuing to call it the G.R.17. If these carriers can continue flying off Mark VII and other aircraft used for submarine work they will be doing useful work. I suggest to the First Lord that instead of modernising the rest of these fleet carriers, he should do what he asked us to do last year, namely, complete the "Powerful," the "Leviathan" and the "Hercules." We should then have additional carriers capable of doing a lot of work when the new jets come along, and at the same time we would have these other carriers in reserve.
There is a craze in the Admiralty for modernisation. They spend a lot of money rebuilding old ships, putting a great deal into them which has been discovered since they were first built, and in the end they have got quite a good job—but they could not get anything more. I should be in favour of keeping older ships in good condition, where they

can be used, and putting into new ships the amount of money that is being spent on modernisation.
These three aircraft carriers have been on the stocks for many years, during the whole period of the administration of the Labour Government. They were never completed. In present circumstances, now that the programme of modernisation is coming along, the position should be reconsidered. What about the cruisers? I do not wish to express a view on them, but I had hoped that the First Lord would have told what his view was. He has expressed doubts in the past, but I shall not hold that against him now. However, perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary, whom I am sure we are all glad to see occupying that office in view of his past contributions to our debates and his knowledge of the subject, will be able to tell us that he and the First Lord have got a policy on the question of the completion of the cruisers that had been building.
On construction generally, the First Lord said: "What we propose to do is to carry on the programme that the previous Government laid down. It will fall behind and we regret that but, never mind, we will do the best we can." If any of my hon. Friends wish to get really angry with the Government, I invite them to read what was said about this new construction by the Prime Minister in the defence debate last year.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: And 1948.

Mr. Callaghan: I know that in 1948 he was even more scathing. We will let that pass. Let us go back no further than last year. The Prime Minister pooh-poohed the new construction we were undertaking. He said, "You are doubling your conversion of antisubmarine frigates. That is all you are going to do. Forty-one new coastal craft: that is all you are going to build."
Today the First Lord comes here with a glow of satisfaction and says that they propose to continue that programme. That is fine. I am delighted to hear it. But does he think that in last year's defence debate he was justified in going into the Lobby against the Government on this issue? I do not intend to make many quotations, tempted though I am, but when I heard what the First Lord said this afternoon and contrasted it with


what was said by the Prime Minister on 15th February, 1951, I felt that I must make one quotation. The Prime Minister said:
We are convinced that the mismanagement exhibited in civil and domestic affairs extends also to the military field, and that that is the growing opinion of the nation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 626.]
Why? It was because we were only doubling the conversion from destroyers to frigates; because we were only building 41 new craft. Then today the First Lord claims credit for that. I leave the First Lord with his own conscience on that matter.

Mr. James Hudson: What a companion!

Mr. Callaghan: I come to another issue—the Royal Marines. I did not gather from the First Lord whether the Royal Marine Commando is to be replaced in Malaya or not. I know that they have been withdrawn. I understood the First Lord to say that. I did not gather whether they are to be replaced by other Royal Marines. Apparently not. I hope not. Before the First Lord makes up his mind, let me say that he should not replace them. The Army have had them there for far too long.
The Royal Marine Commando are not intended for that role or for that purpose. I am delighted that they have been withdrawn. The First Lord should not allow himself to be trapped by the Army into putting Royal Marines into Malaya again, when they have other jobs to do and when the jobs in Malaya are not jobs for Royal Marines, although they did them very well indeed. If the final decision has not been taken, may I strengthen his arm in this matter? Another Royal Marine Commando should not go back to Malaya now.
My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) has passed me a note reminding me that a number of the commandos who were serving in Korea are a little puzzled why they have been disbanded. I can guess at some of the reasons for that, but perhaps it is not for me to volunteer them. Perhaps it is for the Government to give the reasons why they have been disbanded. I wish to ask why. The Royal Marines did a very fine job, as my hon. Friend who visited them has reminded me, in the re

treat from the Chosan Reservoir a year ago, which was one of the most gallant actions undertaken. It was an action which brought great credit upon that Corps.
I am delighted to see that their numbers are going up. If the First Lord will not think that I am being condescending in this, I would say that he should not be persuaded by the naval staff into making the Royal Marines a fixed percentage of the Royal Navy. There is a feeling among certain people who wear dark blue that the Royal Marines should only be a fixed percentage of the Royal Navy. That is not right. They have a job to do on their own and their number should be variable according to the role they have to fulfil.
I should like to see them cut clean away from their wardroom duties. I believe it is right to say that the number of Royal Marines is increasing this year. My hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. W. J. Edwards) has passed me a note which appears to show that the number is diminishing by 300, but no doubt there is an explanation for that. I understood that the number was increasing. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will deal with the point.
Is it possible to cut them away from their wardroom duties? After all, the sort of jobs such a crack force did in Malaya and Korea combined with the sort of duties they have to do in wardrooms do not go very well together. I should very much like to see them cut clean away from their wardroom work, if that is possible.
I am pretty suspicious of the First Lord on the subject of Dartmouth. He was careful not to commit himself this afternoon, but when the new Dartmouth scheme was introduced in 1948, both he and the Parliamentary Secretary asked questions which appeared to indicate that at least they were not full-blooded in their enthusiasm for it. There are a great many people in the Admiralty who are not full blooded for recruitment at the age of 16. They want to get away from it. They want to get back to entry at the age of 13½. I am sure that the First Lord will already have come across that feeling. We shall wait to hear what his proposals are. He wants to get more naval officers immediately. I suggest that he should advertise for them.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: We have had applications from 1,000 of the 1,300 likely schools, so the advertising must have been pretty good.

Mr. Callaghan: I do not think that the Admiralty have advertised nearly enough the jobs that are available and open for any men as naval officers. A lot more could be done in that direction, and I put it to the First Lord that he should do more. I think that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) hit the nail right on the head when he said in a previous debate that if the Admiralty wanted naval officers now it was no use going back to the system of bringing in little boys of 13½ who would not be fully qualified for eight years. The First Lord will find that argument awfully difficult to answer if he wants to go back to entry at 13½.
If he attempts to get away from the 16-year-old entry and go back to entry at 13½, we on this side of the House will be bitterly opposed to him. There is no doubt that every other profession in the country which has its own high standards of discipline, its own code of behaviour and its own long period of training, can do what they wish with young men who enter between the ages of 16 and 18. There is no need to go hack to entry at 13½ for recruits for naval officers' jobs in order to make sure that they become efficient naval officers.
The Parliamentary Secretary himself was a special entry in this manner; he went into the Navy at 18. and became a very gallant destroyer commander during the war and was much decorated. I am quite certain that the views of those who say that, after a few years, it is impossible to tell the difference between the Dartmouth entry and the special entry are right. It is not possible to tell the difference between them, and so, although the First Lord has been very careful in what he has said this afternoon—

Mr. Thomas: I made it quite clear that neither I nor anybody who was consulted wished to abolish the 16-year-old entry, and I repeat that statement now.

Mr. Callaghan: After he has introduced another method of entry at 13½, it clearly will have the effect of interfering with the 16-year-old entry, unless he can give an assurance that the 16 or 18 year

old entries will not be reduced at all, because that is what he is doing. He will be introducing a State subsidised boarding-school education for the sons of Navy officers, and if that is what he wants to do, let him come to the House and say so.

Mr. Thomas: That is exactly what the committee of inquiry will have to discuss.

Mr. Callaghan: If he introduces such a scheme, in which boys from preparatory schools would come in at 13½, he should not exclude boys from grammar schools and secondary schools, with whom the natural change-over takes place between 11 and 12, when they go from primary schools into secondary grammar schools. There can be no doubt about that. The right hon. Gentleman will have to go back to the system under which he will be able to get entrants into the Navy at 11 or 12, and he will have to say whether he is prepared to recruit boys of 11 and 12 for a Dartmouth boarding school, and that will have to be examined with very great care.

Commander Pursey: They are the sons of petty officers.

Mr. Callaghan: At the moment, as my hon. and gallant Friend says, they are the sons of petty officers, and there is, at the moment, the son of an Admiralty messenger, who is a pensioner, at Dartmouth and doing extremely well under the scheme introduced by the Labour Government, and we do not want to see that challenged.
I now pass on to other matters, as I do not want to take too long, although there are many other points on which I should like to comment. On the question of the command arrangements, I should like to say a word about the Prime Minister's statement when he came back from the United States, in which he said that he had been able to secure—to use his own words—
…certain alterations which will provide great flexibility in the whole of the Atlantic sphere."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th January, 1952; Vol. 495, c. 196.]
He went on to baffle the House by talking about the 100-fathom line, which he said has many advantages. I am bound to say that this is extremely misleading. When the White Paper was issued by the late Government on the system of command established within the North


Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Cmd. 8214), it said:
The Supreme Commander Atlantic's command covers broadly the North Atlantic Ocean but excludes British and European coastal waters and the English Channel. The exact limits of the Atlantic Command. I have not yet been finally settled.
Those limits had not been finally settled. All this trouble blew up, and there was a lag somewhere before the limits had been worked out.
At that stage, the present Prime Minister asked the Government where the line of demarcation was to be drawn, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman to note the difference between the voice of the present Prime Minister when in Opposition and as Prime Minister. On 19th April, 1951, he said:
The area"—
that is, the area of command—
is severely restricted round our own coast, and the line that is drawn, be it the 100-fathom line or not …in no way corresponds to any boundary which applies to U-boat attack."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th April, 1951; Vol. 486, c. 2024.]
Now, what does the voice say when in power?
The 100-fathom line has many advantages. Among others, it broadly corresponds to the limits within which moored mining is profitable and was a very known feature in all our affairs in the war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th January, 1952; Vol. 495, c. 196.]
Really, to anybody who followed the account of these negotiations, the Prime Minister's story of having secured that concession and flexibility is meaningless. He has not secured anything of the sort. The 100-fathom line starts somewhere north of the Shetlands, cuts in across near St. Kilda, almost touches the south-west coast of Ireland and cuts across the Channel to the Bay of Biscay. Indeed, we could not have anything closer to the British Isles than the 100-fathom line that was to be of any purpose at all, and what the Prime Minister has done has been to try to secure a face-saving device by pretending that, by going in for the 100- fathom line, he secured a concession which the Labour Government could not get in these matters.
The Prime Minister said yesterday that he had no need to depart from the truth. Well, perhaps, he did not depart from the truth, because the limits were not circumscribed, but he did not give us a very clear indication of what the truth

was in this matter. Let there be no doubt about it. The Prime Minister has done no more to secure concessions in this matter—and has not, in fact, secured a concession—than the Labour Government did.
Now, what about the Mediterranean Command? I know there have been difficulties about it. Indeed, as long ago as last June, the Prime Minister was taunting and chivvying us on why my right hon. Friend did not get it fixed up. He asked us why we did not get the Mediterranean Command settled. What has been the present Prime Minister's argument about the Atlantic Command? Has it not been that there should not be an overall command, but that it should really be separate and divided into two? Has that really not been the gravamen of his case?
How does he explain this?—and I do not know whether it is accurate or not. The "Daily Telegraph," which is usually pretty well-informed on these matters, on 27th February, a week ago, under the heading "Mediterranean Command," had a number of things to say, and finished up with this:
The British believe that it would be altogether too complicated to have convoy, coming through the Mediterranean separately labelled according to the command they are supposed to come under.
Is not this the very reverse of the argument which the present Prime Minister has been using in regard to the Atlantic?
If it is wrong in the Mediterranean to have convoys going through separately labelled and to have two separate commanders, it is also wrong in the Atlantic, and I hope that the Prime Minister will be convinced by the experts in the Admiralty that we want one command in the Mediterranean as we do in the Atlantic. History will show that my right hon. Friend the former Prime Minister was correctly pointing the way when he said that the U-boat war would be fought in the Atlantic and when he agreed with these arrangements.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: May I point out to the hon. Gentleman that the Mediterranean is a land-locked sea, with two natural entrances and one artificial entrance, whereas the Atlantic is an ocean?

Mr. Callaghan: I do not know what the hon. and gallant Gentleman deduces from that, but I hope he is not differing from his own Front Bench. I do not know whether I should gather from that that his view is that there ought to be separate convoys coming through the Mediterranean, separately labelled. If he believes that, he will have the Parliamentary Secretary on his tail.

Captain Ryder: The hon. Gentleman has been casting various aspersions on the Prime Minister. Does he not realise that when one has sold a horse one cannot always buy it back again?

Mr. Callaghan: I also remember an occasion when the present Prime Minister was asking a question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), when he was Minister of Defence, and the present Prime Minister said categorically—I think it was on 20th June—that he doubted whether the Atlantic arrangements about the Supreme Commander would ever come into force, and he would not agree.

Captain Ryder: He has not. The Prime Minister has made it perfectly clear that he does not consider them to be necessary.

Mr. Callaghan: In that case he has not agreed to them; he has accepted them and is going to work them. In that case I am glad to think that the arrangements between him and the new commander are made and that they will be developed rapidly, and I hope that the new commander has convinced the Prime Minister of the wisdom of his own appointment.
While we are on these appointments, what about the admiral in Oslo? He has a command up there which stretches out to the North Sea. What are the limits of his command? Have they been delimited yet? This whole business of the commands is very untidy. It has not been cleaned up and it ought to be cleaned up pretty quickly. There is no reason why these problems should not be solved in view of the consideration given to them in the past.
I come now to the question of naval aviation. I am disappointed that the First Lord could not tell us a little more about the date on which the "Eagle" is to embark its planes and the G.R.17 is to come into service, and also when

some of the present R.N.V.R. squadrons are to be re-equipped. The R.N.V.R. air squadrons are almost as important, if not quite as important, as the front line squadrons are in the Fleet today. They are the only source from which we can draw qualified pilots and observers and they really should be equipped.
I do not expect the First Lord to achieve that in four months, but they should be equipped at the earliest possible moment with the sort of plane they would have to fly if they were embarked. We will certainly strengthen his arm to ensure that that happens, if it is necessary to do so, because these R.N.V.R. officers and men are giving 50 week-ends in the year to flying. They are doing a first-class job and they ought to have first-class machines.
The First Lord mentioned recruitment. In some ways we are pulling against the natural desires of the careers masters in secondary schools and grammar schools by going in for an eight-year period of engagement. I know that the party opposite do not believe in security, but the trouble is that careers masters in schools do and want to advise their young men to go in for jobs with a long-term future. The eight-year form of engagement has something to commend it, but I am not at all sure that in the long run the First Lord will be successful in obtaining large numbers of candidates under this system. He must be prepared to offer a longer period of service.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: Will my right hon. Friend the First Lord not recall that I gave precisely the same advice four years ago and that there has been remarkable reluctance to accept that advice?

Mr. Callaghan: We must leave that to the First Lord. After all, the First Lord has to reform something. He has not told us that he has reformed anything yet and it will be a good opportunity for him to start.
I see that the United States and the Royal Air Force are to do some training of naval pilots. The way this job of training is done at the moment is highly satisfactory but I do not know that the cost is particularly low. Indeed, I am informed that it is rather high and I think there is a case for the Navy doing its own training. I put it to the First


Lord for consideration that rather than having to rely upon the United States and everybody else for training of this sort, the Navy should consider whether it ought not to set up an establishment equipped to do its own training.
If any words of mine should reach the aviators in the Navy at the present time, who are uneasy because of the nature of their task since the war, I think I would say this to them. When I was at the Admiralty I discovered that everybody who had anything to do with naval aviation was aware of its importance, understood it, and wished to press ahead with it. But I do not think there is a clear conception yet of what should be the role of the naval aviator and how he fits into the Navy generally.
One reason for that is that naval aviation is truncated. There is only control of the ship-borne planes. One can only provide a career for a young man for a certain period of years and the consequence is that at present he does not know whether he is expected to be a seaman or, as he colloquially puts it, "a fish-head"—which is a term of disrespect applied to executive officers. But I think the position is being reached where the Admiralty have not only to have good will about this matter, but have finally to make up their minds.
I ask the First Lord not to hesitate to come to the conclusion, if he feels it proper, that naval aviation cannot be integrated into the Navy as a whole and may have to be developed on separate lines. The Vote on the Air Estimates would be the occasion to discuss this matter in connection with the antisubmarine command. The First Lord must make up his mind very soon about these issues. They are difficult, and we would not blame him if he takes some time to decide, but the moment has been reached where he has to decide finally which way the air branch is to go. That is an important matter that has been placed on his plate.
I should like to mention briefly one or two other matters. I was very glad indeed to hear that bunks are to be introduced. I am sure that is right. I have never believed in slinging a hammock if one can sleep in a bunk, and I notice that the officers never do so if there is a chance of sleeping in a bunk.
There is one other thing I should like to mention—if my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. J. Hudson), is not present—and that is the provision of beer for ratings. When I was in the Admiralty we were pushing ahead with a scheme for providing naval ratings on board with beer, and there is no reason why it should not be shared equally throughout the ship. The First Lord, when he was in Opposition, pushed this matter with characteristic energy. It is a minor reform which the lower deck would very much appreciate.
As to recruitment, we are faced not so much with the reluctance of the men to sign on as the reluctance of their wives to permit them to remain a long time away from home. The wives are the main problem. The First Lord should consider seriously introducing a task force system so that a group of ships serving abroad should be able to return to their home port at much shorter intervals than two years, or the two years and three months to which the period may be extended at present.
There is another question to which I never got a satisfactory answer when I was in the Admiralty. Perhaps the First Lord has had better luck. I should like to know why ships in the Home Fleet should not be refitted in Malta and ships in the Mediterranean Fleet refitted at home. There are all kinds of answers, but I hope the right hon. Gentleman will ask the question to see what sort of answer he gets and to see if he gets anywhere. That would enable ships in the Mediterranean Fleet to be brought back home for substantial periods of time. The conversion to task forces would help him very much in relation to the question of men signing on again after their first period of service.
I have not dealt with such matters as the submarine menace and mining, but I am very glad to see the prominence the right hon. Gentleman has given to anti-mining measures. I am certain that this question should be given top priority. This is the bread and butter work of the Navy. It is not spectacular, dashing or daring, but the anti-mining work and the dull daily grind of anti-submarine duties is the real bread and butter work of the Navy today. Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons have gone, but it is important not to let the spirit of an offensive Navy


die. It cannot become a purely defensive Service; we must have an offensive spirit in the Navy.
The way in which that offensive spirit can be expressed is, I think, in the full development of naval aviation. That is why I think it is important that we should have in the Navy today an air arm that is qualified and that has an offensive spirit, to maintain the traditions of the Navy, which has served this country so well in the past.
I was very glad to listen to the review given by the First Lord. I hope I shall not listen to another one from him—not because I wish him any personal harm, but because I doubt whether his Government can last; but if he maintains the standard that we have heard today, I am quite certain that he will continue the good work which the Labour Government maintained when it nourished the Navy for six years between 1945 and 1951 and handed over to him and his Government a service of which the whole House can be proud.

5.32 p.m.

Mr. Robert Allan: The nervousness and diffidence with which I rise to address the House for the first time is made somewhat less by being called by such an old friend as yourself, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
I have the honour to represent South Paddington, which, although it has no very direct contact with the sea, has nevertheless quite a strong indirect one through having been represented in this House for over 20 years by an admiral who was very lusty in these debates. In addressing the House for the first time on a naval occasion, I hope that I am following his example and I hope to be of as much service to South Paddington as he was.
I wish to discuss the subject of the R.N.V.R. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) stressed the importance of the R.N.V.R. pilot, but we must not forget the equally important functions of the R.N.V.R. with the Fleet. It is well known that before the war there was not a great deal of enthusiasm in the Service for training the R.N.V.R. Before the war I served for 10 days in a destroyer, as a sub-lieutenant, and the commanding officer never once spoke to me.
I know that during and immediately following the war that near-hostility has completely vanished, but I do hear, from those whom I know in the R.N.V.R., both officers and men, that something of that feeling is creeping back. I urge my right hon. Friend the First Lord to do everything he can to try to stop it, because it can be done very easily. Now is the time to do it, because the younger officers, who now command the small ships in which most of the men of The R.N.V.R. do their sea-time training, have not had first-hand experience of the value of the Reserves in time of war, and they may be a little sceptical.
It is also important because many of the young reservists now doing training have not had a great deal of sea-going experience themselves, and there is nothing more alarming than one's joining a sea-going ship for the first time, unless it is speaking in this House for the first time. But that alarm turns absolutely to despair if one feels that one is unwanted. I am not suggesting that the red carpet should be put down every time a revervist joins a ship, but I think it is most essential that reservists joining ships for training should be made to feel welcome or at least not to feel that they are unwanted.
I think that can be done, because the complaints have always come from people who are going in for sea training rather than for short or long courses, which I understand are efficient and much appreciated. I understand that 14 days' notice is always given to a ship before a body of reservists arrive in it and I should like to suggest that it should be incumbent upon a commanding officer to see that a short schedule of training is prepared, so that the reservists are immediately able to get into the swim of things.
Another point is the question of R.N.V.R. watch-keeping certificates and qualified officer status. For good reasons—unfortunately reinforced recently by an unhappy accident—it is virtually impossible for any R.N.V.R. officer nowadays to keep a watch at sea long enough to enable him to get a full naval watch-keeping certificate or to get qualified officer status. If the Reserve Fleet were manned, the lack of these officers with these qualifications would be felt very severely, and a great burden would be thrown on the Regular officers. Added


to that, R.N.V.R. officers who could feel that they were getting something for their efforts instead of being frustrated, as they so often are today, would be greatly encouraged.
I should like to turn briefly to that branch of the Service in which most of the young reservists are particularly interested—that is, Coastal Forces. When I first joined Coastal Forces, there was only a handful of boats—M.T.B's—all of one design. By the end of the war there were hundreds of these craft of many different designs. I understand that the present policy is to try to concentrate on a dual-purpose craft which will be an effective anti-E-boat and torpedo boat; but in view of the fantastic cost of these craft—I see that they cost as much as a pre-war destroyer—I should have thought a strong case could have been made for building much cheaper and smaller boats which would carry only torpedoes. That would have considerable advantages, but, whether or not it is done, I think it is most important that anybody who is ever in a position to operate these very small coastal craft should be well qualified to do so and should at least know something about them.
Reverting again to my experience in the war, I was sent out time and again on operations in conditions which were absolutely impossible, and the result was only damage to boats, exhaustion of crews, and loss of morale. I was once sent on a particular operation which was an extremely costly failure, because the people in charge of it did not know anything about the boats they had to operate. I urge very strongly that it should be a matter of Admiralty policy that officers who are in a position to operate and control these craft should have had a chance, at any rate, of having first-hand experience of them.
During the war I had the pleasure of being sunk in an M.T.B. with the present First Sea Lord. It was a relative pleasure because there was no serious damage; and Admiral McGrigor certainly had firsthand experience of those boats, which helped enormously in morale thereafter. I am not, of course, suggesting that to be sunk in an M.T.B. leads to promotion to any high Flag rank.
I have touched on these matters of the Reserve officers and the craft which they mostly man, and I make no apology if

my speech has been limited to this, because I know what a lively and important part they played in the last war. If we have the men and the craft, properly encouraged and developed, we shall be able to provide a sure anti-E boat protection for our coastal convoys and also to menace swiftly and by night harbours that might be considered to be inviolate. If we could do that in this small sphere of naval warfare, we should have gone a long way to deter that aggression by invasion the prevention of which is our ever-present aim.

5.42 p.m.

Mr. Austen Albu: I am sure that the whole House has listened with very great interest indeed to the description by the hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. R. Allan) of the difficulties of the branch of the service in which he served so very gallantly in the late war. I understand that the hon. Member received not only the D.S.O., but the highest awards of both the American and French Governments. The whole House listens with very great interest when someone, especially from the Silent Service, speaks with such sincerity and with such obvious knowledge.
I was particularly interested in the hon. Member's remarks about what in industry would be called "induction." Of course, the business of being accepted into a new community is not peculiar to the Navy. It applies in industry and as he will have discovered, it applies also in this House. I am sure that what he had to say will be taken very seriously by the Admiralty, and I hope that he has some success with his proposals. The hon. Member will, I am sure, excuse me if I do not follow him in his remarks because, as he will understand, on these occasions the debate covers a very wide field.
I want to remind the House that the Board of Admiralty is one of the largest industrial employers in the country. It employs something like 60,000 persons in the home dockyards, as well as very many abroad, and the Director of Dockyards is responsible for the expenditure of between £30 and £40 million of public money.
The Royal Naval Dockyards have a very long history. They started in the reign of Henry VIII, and anybody who has studied the maps that are to be seen


in the offices of the admiral superintendents can see there pictured almost the whole course of British naval history and the expansions that have taken place during the centuries, the major expansion having taken place at the end of the last century. Since then, there has been very little change in the structure of the management of the dockyards.
We are all proud of the quality of work, the traditions of craftsmanship, and the conditions of apprentice training in the dockyard schools, which have been built up during the last half century. But not only ex-naval officers in this House, but many others, as well as business men from outside, have been aware for some time that everything is not necessarily right in the dockyards.
There are continual criticisms of the delays and of the obsolescence of business methods and these criticisms have been going on for many years. They arose after the First World War and, as a result, in 1927 the Admiralty set up a Committee, composed largely of persons with shipbuilding and industrial experience outside the Service, under the chairmanship of Mr. R. S. Hilton, to investigate the system of costing in the Admiralty, which was antiquated—costing, of course, developed very greatly in industry during the First World War—and to make other recommendations.
In addition to the recommendations they made about costing, which were accepted very largely by the Admiralty—the present system of cost accounting is pretty good—the majority of the members also made suggestions for far-reaching changes in organisation, to which I will refer later. A minority, not surprisingly, perhaps, including most of those in the Service, reported in favour of the status quo, which, equally not surprisingly, the Admiralty accepted. The report was never published, however, and nothing further was heard about it.
During the recent war, a sub-committee of the Select Committee on Expenditure made an investigation into the management of the dockyards, but it never finished its investigation and it did not report. It is doubtful whether, in view of the conditions at the time, it could have been able fully to do so.
During the last Parliament, the dockyards were, for the first time, fully examined by the Estimates Committee, who made their Report last Session. Owing to the promotion of my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, South-East (Mr. Champion), I happened to become the chairman of the subcommittee which made the investigation. The Members of the Committee had the advantage of seeing the Hilton Report, and I have had discussions with those who are still Members of the House and who were Members of the Expenditure Committee during the war. The Estimates Committee reported unanimously, and it is interesting to see that many of their findings were in general agreement with the findings of previous inquiries.
Perhaps the main recommendation to which I wish to draw attention, and from which all others flow, is the necessity in the dockyards of a strong and harmonious management team. The present structure of management in the dockyards is headed by an admiral superintendent, who is generally within two or three years of his retirement from the Active List and who usually serves in that post for some three or four years. He does not occupy his whole time in the duties of administering the dockyard, for at least a quarter of his time is taken up with naval duties, either as deputy to the commander-in-chief or, in one case, indeed, as commander-in-chief of the port itself. He receives no special training for the job.
It is important to remember that he is a Flag officer, on his way out of the Service, and although there is no doubt that the officers who undertake this duty are first-class naval officers, with a great sense of duty and great experience of administration, they cannot really at that time of life be expected to learn completely new tricks.
Under them there are the managers of the separate professional departments, who, with the exception of the captain of dockyards, are professional technical men, either members of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, or engineer naval officers, or, as in the present case of the electrical branch, are civilians with the necessary qualifications who have been brought in from outside or who have risen from the dockyard apprentice schools, although it is proposed in future


to debar the civilian electrical officers from reaching the highest ranks in the Service and to substitute, as in the case of the engineer officers, officers of the newly established "L" Branch.
There is a very serious danger, in view of the great growth of the electrical branch in the Service, that, in barring the way of promotion to the manager and deputy manager level, men of first-class ability will be prevented from entering the electrical branch. I am glad to see that it is the policy of the Admiralty at present to allow such men to acquire naval commissions and, therefore, of course, subsequently to rise in the Service; but one is bound to have very great doubts about this, because some time ago the opportunity for someone who had risen from the apprentice schools to go to the Royal College of Naval Engineering to obtain a commission as a naval engineer officer was removed, so that it is no longer possible for a lad who enters the Service from an apprentice school to rise in the Navy with a commission to the highest rank in the dockyard service.
One of the greatest difficulties in building up a really good, harmonious management team in these very large industrial undertakings, employing from 10,000 to 15,000 men in the major home dockyards and in at least one abroad, is the very short period of time for which senior officers hold their positions. Hon. Members who are interested may refer to Annexes 10 and 11 of the Report of the Select Committee which gives the careers and length of service for the senior officers in the major home dockyards. I am aware of the difficulties that face the Admiralty in posting naval officers, who have to have certain tours of duty at home as well as abroad. But I would suggest that in matters of this kind, where efficient administration is concerned, and vast sums of public money are involved, it is not good enough to say that no solution can be found.
We find that men are moved about in the senior positions between the Fleet, the Admiralty, and the dockyards and other stations, and a large part of their lives up to the time when they reach the position of manager is not spent in industrial activity at all. It is rare for a manager or a deputy manager to stay five years in his post in a major dockyard. Portsmouth has had five managers since the beginning

of the war; Devonport, five; Chatham, three; Rosyth, four. Portsmouth has had five engineer managers since the beginning of the war; Devonport, five; Chatham, five; Rosyth, four.
I say that that is particularly bad if one is trying to build an experienced team, and good morale, and good relations between managements and industrial workers—and we must not forget that these are industrial workers whom the Admiralty are managing. The managers may have had no previous industrial experience and there is no method of selection, so far as I can see, for the members of the Corps of Naval Constructors or for naval officers, to ensure that those chosen for these duties are particularly suited to the job of industrial management.
The Committee therefore recommended that naval officers and members of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors should, at some period of their lives, round about the age of 35, and at the rank appropriate to that age, be able to choose permanently the dockyard service, and at that time should be given special training in industrial management—go to a refresher course at a university or a course at the Administrative Staff College at Henley, and perhaps visit private shipyards, pay visits to dockyards abroad, and so on; and that they should, in addition to staying in the dockyard service, when they reach rank of deputy manager or manager, remain for longer periods of office in each dockyard—not less than five and preferably not less than seven years.
One recommendation was the appointment of personnel officers in the dockyards. If costing was the main development in industry during World War I. I suppose that personnel management was the great development of World War II, and as a result, and owing to pressure from the Ministry of Labour—or, at any rate, suggestions from the Ministry of Labour—in 1945, a Departmental Committee was set up within the Admiralty to look into the matter of whether there should be some sort of personnel management or personnel officers within the dockyards. In view of the fact that it was a Departmental Committee, composed mostly of members of the Admiralty, it was not, perhaps, surprising that it did not make any very drastic recommendations It certainly did not recommend the


appointment of personnel officers in the dockyards, but it suggested the appointment of personnel advisers to the staff of the Director of Dockyards.
Quite frankly, the Admiralty have carried this out in the letter; but really they have disgustingly abused it in the spirit, because what have they done? What they have done is use the opportunity to find a home posting for an engineer captain. The engineer captain is an excellent man, but it really is a waste of his professional qualifications to use him in the way he is used as a sort of office boy between the Admiralty, the Director of Dockyards, and the dockyard deputy managers, who are supposed to act as personnel officers.
It is quite clear—and the Committee was quite clear—that that special experience was required. At the present time this is a liaison post only and a waste of public money. There is considerable confusion at present between the duties of the post and the duties of the civilian branch—the labour branch—of the Admiralty, which is concerned with the administration of the industrial staffs, which deals with the conditions and wages, with Whitley Council and joint consultative machinery, and so on. It is extraordinarily difficult for anybody outside the Admiralty to understand—

Mr. Callaghan: Or inside.

Mr. Albu: —how this can work when we have this extraordinary set-up. My hon. Friend says it is difficult for anyone inside, too. I am, therefore, supported in my argument by this expert knowledge. The Committee was quite clear about the needs for a personnel department in the dockyards themselves. It envisaged decentralisation and standardisation of records about absenteeism, sickness payments, and so on, which are spread around a number of branches. This was a recommendation of the Departmental Committee and it was not adopted. There is also certainly a very great need for somebody to have responsibility in the dockyards themselves to co-ordinate the information and the experience of the recently instituted merit award scheme, which is causing very considerable dissatisfaction.
It is the sort of scheme which, if not administered under standard conditions throughout the enterprise, with great care

to avoid favouritism, with great care to see that everybody is satisfied, will not only cause a very great deal of hardship, but also great antagonism, and there is nobody in the dockyards themselves who specialises in the administration of schemes of this sort, just as there is nobody in the dockyards themselves whose responsibility it is to stimulate the joint consultative machinery which has been set up for some years.
Everybody knows in industry that if the joint consultative machinery is to work—the joint production councils, which they have in the dockyards—the initiative and a good deal of the original pressure must come from the management, who must be interested and must want it to succeed. It is a specialised job. There is nobody to advise on that in the dockyards at the present time. The deputy managers who act as personnel officers are excellent professional men, but they have no experience and no training for this sort of work.
The dockyards are finding some difficulty—the First Lord made some mention of this—in finding sufficient industrial staffs, craftsmen and others. Here again. there would be a great advantage in having somebody whose personal responsibility it was to advise managers in the dockyards on methods of selection and recruitment, which are today becoming more and more specialist matters in industry. The Committee did not suggest, and I certainly would never recommend, that the post of personnel officer—the duties of which should also include the present very meagre welfare provisions in the dockyards—should be an executive one. It is a functional and advisory post. But there is no doubt that such a post is needed in the dockyards at present; and if such an appointment is made, the person appointed should not be just anybody picked up from anywhere and posted to the job, but somebody with real training in and experience of the job.
Most of the recommendations of the Committee dealt with the home dockyards, but I suggest that the recent happenings in Malta indicate that it might have been better had some such personnel officer existed in the dockyard in Malta, and I was interested to see that an ex-governor of Malta made that suggestion in "The Times" recently.
What I now have to say will be a good deal more controversial. I wonder whether it is right or necessary to have an admiral as the head of the dockyard at all? The Estimates Committee, on the whole, recommended no change, but it is very difficult to see what the real functions of the admiral are. The Admiralty, of course, hold that it is necessary to have an admiral at the head of the dockyards because of relations with the Fleet. But if there were a civilian general manager—and the Committee recommended the appointment of one under the admiral superintendent—it is a little difficult to see why he could not be responsible for liaison with the Fleet, and so on, to the commander of the port.
With a civilian general manager there would be opportunity for promotion for those in the departments, and the argument used by the Admiralty that there would be jealousies if somebody were appointed from one department do not bear investigation by anybody who understands how people get to the top in industry. Men do not get to the top in industry unless they come up from one of the branches, and it is nonsense to suggest that from among men who have been managing departments of 5,000 and 6,000 workers we could not find one capable of being appointed as general manager, especially if given the sort of training and if selected at the sort of age that I am suggesting. In this field, is an admiral really necessary?
Another matter which is very relevant at the present is the adequacy of the replacement of plant and equipment of the dockyards. From reading the Estimates and dockyards accounts it is difficult to judge the efficiency of the enterprise because there are no comparative figures, such as those to be found in a trading account. Comparisons cannot be made because today the dockyards are concerned almost solely with conversions, or refits and repairs, which vary greatly. It seems that the Admiralty have no real policy about replacements. Either money is so short that the work cannot be afforded, or there is expansion and the Fleet has to have everything, with nothing left for the yard itself. The result is that there is nothing left to bring the dockyards really up to date, and I suggest that this may well be the result of naval control in the dockyards.
If the customer is put in control of production, he has a very short-term view; he wants the goods now; and he has neither the experience nor, if I may say so, the patience to be able to judge how much of the money he gets every year should be spent on producing ships and things for the Fleet and how much should be spent on ensuring that the dockyards, on which the Fleet depends, are at the highest pitch of efficiency. I understand that we are spending money, not for an immediate war but in preparation for a war, and during a war repair and refitting is of major importance.
The Committee drew attention to the fact that in the electrical department the Admiralty have undoubtedly seriously under-estimated the enormous cumulative expansion that is taking place in equipment, to which the First Lord referred today. I was shocked to see in the Estimates that there are no new works proposed for this year. If that is the case, I wonder how it will be possible efficiently to carry out these extremely complicated conversions, as in the case of the "Relentless," which involved this enormous and complicated mass of electrical machinery, which those who have read that very amusing novel "Sylvester" can fully appreciate.

Mr. Harold Watkinson: I am sure the hon. Gentleman does not want to mislead the House. The "Relentless" conversion was quite satisfactorily handled, and the ship is now at sea with the Fleet. It does not appear, therefore, that the situation is quite as bad as the hon. Gentleman makes out.

Mr. Albu: I thought the hon. Member was a business man.

Mr. Watkinson: So I am, but I have been in the Navy as well.

Mr. Albu: Of course, one can complete anything if one has all the money and all the time, but the Board of Admiralty are given a limited amount of money, and I am only making suggestions for improving the efficiency with which they spend it. The hon. Gentleman is surely not suggesting that the cost, in terms of labour, materials, occupation of works, and so on, is of no importance. It is of very great importance.

Mr. Watkinson: I am sorry to intervene again, but I understood the hon.


Gentleman to say that work of the nature of the conversion of the "Relentless" was quite beyond the powers of the Royal Dockyards. That is demonstrably not so.

Mr. Albu: Certainly not. There is no doubt that was extraordinarily brilliantly done: It was a very fine job of work. But the workshops in which the electrical work is carried on are absolutely shocking, and if the expansion of the electrical department goes on at the cumulative rate at which it has been going on in the last five or 10 years, it will be quite impossible to maintain the Fleet. We can build as many hulls and guns as we like, but if we are not able to maintain the electrical equipment the Fleet can no longer go to sea. There is no doubt that in this department there has been a gross under-estimation and gross under-equipment—that applies particularly to the workshops. This is completely false economy.
The methods of providing new plant and machinery in the dockyards are, in my opinion, cumbersome and out of date. The dockyards are asked for their proposals, and in the last financial year they asked for £902,000 worth of machine tools and other equipment: they got £78,000. Enormous schedules were got out and inspectors went round from the Admiralty to examine every single item of equipment. What an extraordinary way to go about it! What confidence in the management of these very large undertakings! Would it not be better to have a manager they could really trust to carry out the job, and have decentralised responsibility for doing it?
As far as I can see, there appears to be no relationship in the minds of the Admiralty between the nominal figures for depreciation, which seem quite fair in the dockyard accounts, and the figures they spend every year to maintain the assets. I believe that the policy for plant maintenance should be worked out each year in conjunction with the superintendents in the dockyards. At least a fairly large proportion of the sum to be allocated for this purpose should be allocated to them to spend as they like, and they should be left to get on with the job. I do not say they should buy it themselves. They could requisition it from the central purchasing department

of the Admiralty, but they should have some responsibility for spending it themselves.
The Committee was unable, and had not the time, to make an investigation into the responsibility for dockyards at the Admiralty. Here I think the arguments are stronger than ever against a naval officer as director of the dockyards. He does not have that intimate contact with the Fleet that even the superintendent has, and he is entirely dependent on the senior civilian professional man, the deputy director, who in fact does the work. It is quite wrong, I think, that the man with the greatest experience and greatest knowledge of this vast industrial undertaking should only have contact with the Board through naval officers whose jobs are entirely ephemeral. Here is an industrial enterprise of very great importance. I observe in the Estimates for this year that a second Deputy Director of Dockyards has been appointed for special duties. I asked the First Lord yesterday what the nature of his special duties was to be. His reply was:
…This officer had been appointed for the purpose of revising and rewriting the technical portions of the Home Dockyard Regulations and also the Professional Officers' Instructions.…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 5th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 51.]
I cannot believe that an officer at £2,500 a year is appointed solely for that reason. I hope that one of the purposes of this appointment is to make a greater study of the proposals of the Estimates Committee and of the methods of managing our dockyards at the present time so as to bring them into line with modern industrial conditions.

6.10 p.m.

Commander R. Scott-Miller: This is the first occasion on which I have had the privilege of addressing this House, and I am deeply conscious of my shortcoming, and pray the indulgence of the House. I represent King's Lynn, which is not a naval port, but it is one of the oldest seaports in the country, and many of my constituents are most interested in the welfare and the actions of the Navy.
I am going to raise a point which deals with Vote A of the Estimates, dealing with the number of personnel borne on the books of Her Majesty's ships,


and, in particular, I want to mention the officer part of that personnel. What is bothering me more than anything else is the impact upon the efficiency of the Royal Navy as a separate entity of the various Allied combined organisation headquarters which we see coming into being with greater and greater intensity.
As I see it, the need for the Navy today is to present itself in as strong and efficient position as it can with the personnel and equipment at its disposal. That is our contribution to the "cold" war which we are now fighting. Obviously the more efficient and ready the British Fleet can appear, the greater the deterrent to a third world war. On the other hand, the Navy is continually having to supply staff officers, experienced and senior officers to various N.A.T.O. commands, and that, of course, is again necessary preparatory to the fighting of a "hot" war, should that calamity ever come upon us.
The First Lord's statement today made it clear that an immediate and substantial number of additional experienced officers has been needed as the result of the measures taken to increase the preparedness of the Fleet. That is an indisputable fact. The Navy has never had to meet such commitments in time of peace as it is doing today.
As has been already mentioned, Korea, Malaya, Egypt, the combined exercises in the Mediterranean, the greater number of ships of the Reserve Fleet that have to be kept up and manned with care and maintenance parties—all these are large commitments on the Service today. The First Lord mentioned our new types of frigates. There is so much equipment required in the ships of the Fleet today that it cannot be got all into one ship. We have anti-aircraft frigates, antisubmarine frigates and anti-aircraft direction-finding frigates—that is three sorts. Surely the effect of that will be that we shall need more captains (F), more and more senior officers commanding our squadrons of frigates and destroyers.
So we see, on the one hand, a greater and greater pull at the experienced officers at our disposal, and at the same time, a pulling at the structure of our Navy by these new commands which are coming into being. The Supreme Allied Commander of Europe must have naval elements with many staff officers. Under

him there are three subordinate commands—the Northern Europe, the Western Europe and the Southern Europe. Again that calls for a number of liaison officers. A Supreme Allied Commander (Atlantic) is now coming into being. He will need a staff of our senior and experienced officers. Indeed, they are already being appointed. Soon, I have no doubt, we shall see a Channel Command formed.
There is another point, and that is the Allied air commands which will need their naval elements of liaison officers. I presume that before long we shall see a Supreme Allied Commander (Mediterranean) appointed, with an Allied air commander again in that sphere, all of which will tend to pull away from our Navy those officers whom we can ill-spare. The Navy is a very balanced force. It has been built up over many years on a rough proportion of one officer to 10 men. If we see the balance of that structure being upset by large numbers of the more experienced and senior officers being pulled right out of the organisations which are necessary for the efficient functioning of the Fleet as an entity, I am afraid we shall see, or may see, the fighting capacity of our Navy seriously impaired.
That is my concern in the matter today, and I ask the First Lord to consider these points. Perhaps the matter should have been raised in the defence debate yesterday, but I purposely left it for today because I thought that it would come better from a naval angle than if it had been brought up in the general defence debate.

6.19 p.m.

Mr. A. G. Bottomley: This is the first time I have had the pleasure of following a maiden speaker, and I am sure that I express the opinion of all Members of the House when I say that we have listened to a speech which has shown knowledge of the subject and has been of great interest. Indeed, it can truly be said that the words match the action of the man, because during the last war the hon. and gallant Member for King's Lynn (Commander Scott-Miller) rendered gallant service with the Russian convoys in the Mediterranean and in North-West Europe. We shall all look forward to listening to him again on another occasion.
I do not want to follow the hon. and gallant Member in his line of thought. I agree with him at once that the Royal Navy is still the pride of our country and the basis of our traditions, but I am sure that he will agree with me that I can apply equal sentiments to those who man and build the ships.
I represent a constituency which gives its name to one of the famous dockyards of our country. It was one which was built in the time of the first Queen Elizabeth and since then it has been built up and it is now a very capacious dockyard which is able to take the heaviest ships, equip them and send them right away to sea. In the dockyards there is very fine equipment, which is lacking in many ways, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) has said, but the saw-mills, the metal-mills and all the workshops which go to make up a great naval station are handled to the best of their ability by the craftsmen and others who work there.
I should like also to refer to the comment by the First Lord about the sailors who took part in the funeral of our beloved late King. Those men were trained and stationed at Chatham. I was delighted to hear the First Lord pay tribute to their work.
At Chatham we have the Royal Marines. They are, indeed, interwoven into the town. The town's motto is "Loyal and true," and the town gave the Royal Marines its freedom. It was very sad when the last Government had to do away with the substantial force of Royal Marines based at Chatham. There were very powerful reasons for doing that, but the then First Lord gave an assurance that the Royal Marines would in some way always be associated with Chatham and I hope that the present Government will endorse that and that later in the debate we shall be assured that the association of the Royal Marines with Chatham will not be impaired.
The last administration recognised that the removal of the Royal Marines would weaken Chatham as a naval depot and establishment and they agreed that other services might go there to enable Chatham still to take its place in the front rank of our dockyards. The former First Lord arranged for the shore-based ship H.M.S. "Ceres" to go to Chatham. The Parliamentary Secretary will expect me to say

that on Monday of this week a deputation from the Medway towns, including the mayors, the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) and myself, was called by arrangement to Admiralty House, where we were told that H.M.S. "Ceres" was not going to Chatham.
I gather that the decision was taken by the First Lord's predecessor and confirmed by the present First Lord. I do not know whether he or his immediate predecessor knew that the First Lord in office at the time of the removal of the Royal Marines gave an assurance that they would be replaced by a permanent establishment. I hope that when the matter was considered by the present First Lord and his predecessor they knew of that and took it into account. However, if it is a fact that, because of the more vital needs of defence, it is necessary to make some economy so that other services can be rendered, I am still not sure that full consideration has been given to the cause of economy. I should have thought that it would have been more economical to have an establishment based on a dockyard town like Chatham than to have it placed away on the moors of Yorkshire.
I hope that further consideration will be given before it is finally decided that H.M.S. "Ceres" shall not go to Chatham. If it is finally decided that H.M.S. "Ceres" cannot go there, I beg the First Lord to do something to honour the earlier assurance which was given upon the advice of the First Lord's officials. There is an obligation on him to see that the promise is fulfilled.
There are two general items about which I wish to speak. I had intended to talk on the subject with which my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton has dealt so adequately, and hon. Members are anxious to speak will be pleased to know that my remarks will now be shortened. I want to make one comment on that subject. It is not only the short-term system of admiral superintendents and departmental managers which causes inefficiency in many ways. If there is one thing which really counts in the dockyard, it is complete harmony between the administration and the men on the job.
The Whitley Council machinery which has been built up is a fine one, but it is weakened to the extent that the staff side are not sure how long those sitting on the


other side will be there. The frequent changes themselves impair good relationships. I make that comment in particular while supporting what has been said by my hon. Friend.
The First Lord said there was difficulty in getting staff, particularly craftsmen, into the dockyards. The last Administration did many things to improve the lot of dockyard workers and to help to retain them. I was assured that the last Administration would consider giving way to the trade union representation that the men should have two weeks' holiday instead of one week's holiday.
It is an odd thing that inside a dockyard we have industrial workers who get one week's holiday and non-industrial workers who get two weeks' holiday and upwards. I say nothing against the temporary clerk, for he is entitled to get what he can, but it is not just treatment that he should get three weeks' holiday when the industrial worker, who really builds the ship, has only one week's holiday. As soon as possible two weeks' holiday ought to be given to the industrial workers.
I listened with interest to what the First Lord had to say. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), the former Parliamentary Secretary, indicated that there is not a lot of difference between us on the subject of the Royal Navy and the dockyards. We both have high standards, but there is a difference of application, and we think that we can make the whole thing work better than can hon. Members opposite.

6.28 p.m.

Mr. G. R. Howard: I am sure that the right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley) will forgive me if I do not follow him in what he has been saying. I wish to speak about a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
I speak of the R.N.V.S.R., or the Supplementary Reserve, about which many people in this country know very little. The reserve was started before the war when a large naval expansion was foreseen, and, for various reasons, not much could be done for it in respect of training. At that time I was a member of a certain flotilla, and we bought two picket boats and had to purchase our coal

from the Admiralty in order to operate them.
Those days have changed. Since the war this Force has grown to approximately 9,000 reserve officers, many of them with six years' experience at sea during the war. At present they carry out training with the fullest co-operation of the Admiralty, within the Admiralty's financial limitations, in the following ways. First, there are paid courses. Second, there are unpaid courses for those who are keen enough and are able to take them at their own expense. Third, there are lectures, which are regularly attended and the Admiralty give all facilities they can.
Fourth, there is the very generous cooperation of many of our shipping lines who accept officers of the Reserve on trips at very reduced passage rates, giving them extremely valuable navigational instruction and enabling them to stand watches at sea and so on, which is of very great use to the officers.
There is great keenness in this Reserve. In the London Flotilla alone there are some 900 officers. But there is a likelihood of this keenness waning for reasons which I shall try to give. My hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South (Mr. R. Allan), mentioned the feeling of officers in the R.N.V.R. who go to sea. I admit I have not been to sea in one of H.M. ships since the end of the war, but during the Christmas Recess I went on a course at a naval shore establishment where I found the most wonderful co-operation and tact in the way that our shortcomings were overlooked when one had possibly forgotten something. Using the most Parliamentary form of language, the instructing officer would remark, "No, doubt you will remember, Sir," to which one replied as quickly as possible, "Yes. of course."
Being one of the lucky few who were able to go on one of these unpaid courses, I was very struck with the immense advances made in instructional technique—I.T. as it is called—since the war. First of all, in damage control I noticed remarkable improvements. Those of us who came up against this problem during the war will know how vital it is under active service conditions. The damage control school, with its very realistic fire-fighting and damage control models to demonstrate flooding and so on, is doing wonderful work in this field.
Then it was interesting to see the immense advances in what I might call the equipment breakdown. Many hon. Members in this House who have had to grapple with this problem in the old days will remember the confusing, complicated diagrams on the wall which looked like the entrails of some monster, and which were rapidly explained to us by a chief petty officer or some instructor who had forgotten more than we should ever learn and who was trying to teach us in a short time. I was interested to see in the naval establishment I visited that they had, for instance, "broken down" the various parts of some electrical equipment so that a person trying to follow it could trace the wires on various wooden boards.
Lastly, and most important because of its high training value, was the special equipment known as the action speed teacher. I am sure that hon. Members could imagine my anxiety when on the last day of my course I was confronted with the knowledge that I was going to be put in the position of a senior officer of a convoy escort. I was the only R.N.V.R. officer on this particular course. But I found that once I was shut up in the small box full of intricate machinery and equipment and the exercise got going the years between slipped away and my six years of experience at sea during the war, most of which was spent in the Atlantic, came back to me. The many problems that confront the senior officer of a convoy escort were not quite so difficult as they might otherwise have been, especially with the invaluable help of a staff officer.
On these training courses the help given by the Admiralty could, I think, be expanded. There are various reasons why perhaps not enough R.N.V.R. officers know about these courses at the present time, and I believe I am right in saying that in some cases the courses arranged for reserved officers have not been fully availed of. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, there is question of money. Whereas the Admiralty are arranging paid courses for R.N.V.R. officers, I should like to suggest a scheme whereby the numbers could be greatly expanded. Those who are not fortunate enough to be included in the small number of people going on paid courses could easily undergo a certain amount of training. Their Lordships would provide them with free

travel warrants when proceeding on a course as well as some provision for their messing and general expenses when they are on their course, or undergoing their training.
Secondly, we are given no uniform allowance. It often happens that by reason of advancing years or the putting on of a little extra weight it is found that the old monkey jacket will no longer fit. I understand that the reefer, trousers and lace for a lieutenant-commander in the R.N.V.R. costs £29 15s. 6d. plus Purchase Tax at £7 8s. 10d. A cap and badge will cost £4 10s. and a greatcoat £27 plus £6 Purchase Tax. These few items, not taking into account the cost of socks, shirts and other essentials of that nature, come to a total of £76 10s. 3d., and that would seem to be a very unfair amount of money to ask an officer to pay, particularly as he is going to make quite a large financial sacrifice in any case.
The next thing is probably the most difficult of all, the situation arising in regard to a man's employer. After all, one must appreciate the situation of an employer who has a Reserve officer working for him. It is difficult for him to give the employee both the normal holidays and the additional time for training, because other people in his employment who are not in any Service will say, "Why should we not get the same?" I want to suggest two ways by which this could be met.
First of all, if every volunteer who is selected by the Admiralty for a course could get some form of call-up, it would make it much easier for the man himself and also for the employer. I also suggest that their Lordships could consider starting courses of perhaps five days instead of a fortnight or even a weekend, because I am sure these officers would be only too keen to work in the dog watches and at the weekend in order to acquire their instruction and knowledge in as short a time as possible.
I should like to see greater liaison between the Admiralty and those excellent flotillas throughout the country which are doing their best to train large numbers of officers and which know the officers who are keeping up-to-date and who are therefore the best to send on these courses. It should also be possible to have some form of liaison, not only with the shipping


lines but with business firms, to impress on them the great importance of training these reserve officers.
After the First World War a large number of Regular officers were retired under what was called the Geddes Axe, and they were available to come back at the beginning of the last war. But owing to the policy of their Lordships during the last war, there is not, I understand, such a large reserve of officers to be called upon now. Therefore, these R.N.V.S.R. officers, many of whom have great experience with long course qualifications and so on, might well fill the gap.
To sum up, I should like to suggest to the First Lord that, first of all, a free warrant should be given to all officers in the R.N.V.S.R. proceeding on naval training. It is obviously unfair that where two men go on a course one gets his fare paid because he is on a paid course while the other has to pay his own fare because he is not. Secondly, I suggest that their should be some allowance to these men at naval rates for messing during training. They should be given some concession, perhaps a tax rebate on any uniform they buy.
I hope the First Lord will institute or look into the possibility of some form of call-up to take the onus off the individual and the employer, because often the employer gives the unfortunate individual the choice of going on training or taking promotion. The course I suggest would make it easier for both sides. Will their Lordships consider shorter courses of five days or a week-end and a closer liaison between the Army and the R.N.V.S.R. flotillas? They are doing a very great job. For a large section of our Reserve of officers, in fact, the R.N.V.S.R. would be, to use a phrase of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister during the defence debate, in his own inimitable language,
…that great background and foundation of hereditary seamen, generations going back to generations, gathered round our great seaports and towns, furnishing us with a magnificent supply of youth, sustained by the tradition of their fathers."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 5th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 440.]
I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to consider the modest claims of these very keen, patriotic men and to help them all he can.

6.41 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: This is a very quiet debate on the Navy Estimates. Perhaps that is because some hon. Members have not recovered from yesterday, or perhaps it is due to the way in which the First Lord introduced the Estimates and which makes it very difficult to engage in controversy with him. All of us would like to congratulate him on his appointment to his office. If we are to have a Tory Government, we would rather see him as First Lord of the Admiralty than anybody else. Therefore, I add my congratulations to those which have been spoken by other hon. Members.
I want, first of all, to refer to a matter which was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and that is the retention of the time-expired men for a further 18 months, and the proposed call-up of 3,500 further men from the Reserve list during the coming year. I hope that the argument presented by my hon. Friend will be fully dealt with by the Parliamentary Secretary when he replies. It is very rough on these men who have been held for a further 18 months. The greatest hardship falls on those who are being retained, and there is the strongest possible feeling on the subject. It is certainly very hard on a man who may have made all his family and domestic arrangements, possibly some definite arrangement about getting a house on the basis that he is coming out of the Service, that they should be upset by his retention.
I have no doubt that the Parliamentary Secretary understands the difficulties and I hope that he will be able to give us some expectation that this system will be brought to an end as soon as possible. We want an assurance that the Admiralty are not going to rely on this system, and that the Minister will do his best not only to reduce the period but to bring it to an end as quickly as possible.
Another matter which I want to raise affects recruitment for the Navy, although not directly, and relates to naval pensions. I am sure that the Admiralty must be aware—the Parliamentary Secretary is aware of it, because he raised the matter in the last Parliament—that the proposals made by the last Government for an increase in naval pensions did not apply to those who left the Service before 1st September, 1950. The period for which


a man would get an increased pension was dated back to 1st September, 1950. This system no doubt applies to all three Services, but so far as the Navy is concerned the amount involved is only £1 million in order to give to naval pensioners the increase which was given to those who left the Service before 1st September, 1950.
There is a very strong case for doing this, because many of the pensioners concerned fought in one or two world wars. It is hard that there should be discrimination among naval pensioners. The Navy have a special interest in this proposal, because if there is a grievance among naval pensioners about the way in which they are treated, as there undoubtedly is at the present time, it might have an effect on the general prospect of recruitment.
The main matter I wish to discuss deals with the dockyards. Those hon. Members who have been good enough to listen to me on previous occasions will be glad to know that I have a new speech on this occasion. I have had to make roughly the same speech in five successive Navy Estimates debates, but on this occasion I have a good deal more ammunition. However, I would say to my hon. Friend who was the previous Civil Lord of the Admiralty that, although I have had some criticism to make of him in the past, and some of the things which I will say today will reflect on his administration as well as on the administration of those who are now in office, he has the right to congratulate himself, because in the six years when he was Civil Lord more reforms were introduced into the dockyard than had been introduced during the previous 40 years. There was the whole change in the establishment scheme, and many other reforms. That is no reason why we should not go on trying to secure greater reforms.
I have suggested in previous Estimates debates that the Royal Dockyard organisation is nothing like as efficient as it should be. It is thoroughly antiquated, and a real effort should be made to bring it up to date. I suggested that the best way to start on that process was by having some inquiry into the whole of the arrangements and organisation of the dockyards. When I said that before, I supported my case with evidence which had been given me by workers and trade unionists in Devonport Dockyard.
The previous Civil Lord very often questioned the evidence, and suggested that my complaints were unfounded and that the workers in the dockyards did not hold the views I had suggested. I am sure he has read the Report of the Select Committee on Estimates and that he will not be able to hold those views any more. From the evidence given by those in Devonport, there was no doubt whatever of their views, and I will quote in a few minutes some of the views which they expressed, in good Devon language.
Before I turn to some of the matters which were covered by the Select Committee, I want to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) on the fine work he did as Chairman of that Committee. The same is true of some of the other Members of the Committee, in particular, Mrs. Lucy Middleton, the former Member for Plymouth, Sutton, who played a great part not only in this House but in making the Select Committee inquiry the finest inquiry we have ever had into the Royal Dockyards.
Some of the things revealed in the Report of the Select Committee have already been referred to in comparatively mild language by my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton. He revealed in the Report that there was an inquiry which was conducted way back in 1927. It was not a public inquiry, or rather the Admiralty made sure that its report was not made public. Towards the end of the proceedings of the new Select Committee last year, the inquiry which had taken place in 1927 was discovered.
When they managed to get the Admiralty to unearth the conclusions in this document, it was discovered that many of them were exactly those which my hon. Friend said had been reached in the Select Committee's Report. So they have been lying there in the Admiralty with no one in the Admiralty intending to do anything about them. It was a remarkable discovery that many of the recommendations made in the year 1952 had been presented to the Admiralty in the majority report in 1927, but the Admiralty decidedly and determinedly said that they would not do anything about them. It was an astonishing revelation, indicating the difficulties we are up against in trying to get the


Admiralty to look at this matter in a proper and radical spirit.
I hope that some of my hon. Friends will pardon me if I quote extracts from the Select Committee's Report. I know that many hon. Gentlemen wish to speak and have no direct interest in the Royal Dockyards, but this is the one occasion during the year when we can discuss this important matter.
I want to deal with four special matters covered in the Select Committee's Report, several of which have already been referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton. The first is that of maintenance and repairs and is dealt with, partly at any rate, under Vote 10 of the Estimates. I thought the First Lord today made a sinister reference to this when he said that some money was to be taken away from Vote 10 for matters not directly concerned with that but with something else.
One of the standing grievances of the dockyard workers for many years past has been that quite insufficient sums have been provided under Vote 10 for maintenance and repair work in the dockyards. What should happen is that out of the total amount which the Admiralty are allocated there should be a much bigger effort to divert more to Vote 10 in order to try to deal with the antiquated conditions existing in the dockyards. Anybody who looks at those conditions will see that they amount to a scandal.
When I said the things I did in previous years to my hon. Friend the previous Civil Lord, he said that I used exaggerated language which should not be employed in regard to these matters. Therefore, I was interested to see in the report the evidence given before the Select Committee by the Admiral Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard. He is not a man given to wild language but one universally respected and held in the highest esteem. He was asked this simple question:
Have you yourself any suggestions for improving the efficiency of the yard, anything which you think might help?
He replied:
Undoubtedly. Give us the money to build some decent shops for the men to work in …The position is frightful. It is amazing how the people turn out the work they do…the shops are too congested.

That appears on page 290. Later, on page 291, he said:
The dockyard is in a very bad state.
There was also a discussion of the point mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton as to how much money under this Vote was to be spent by the authorities of Devonport Dockyard. The Admiral Superintendent replied to Question 3617 as follows:
We do have a small amount on which I can give authority to buy locally.
He was asked what sort of amount, and he replied, "£1,000." Of course, it is a ridiculous figure.
The view that something much more radical should be done under Vote 10, and that the Admiralty should give some attention to it, was expressed not only by the Admiral Superintendent, but by the evidence given by the secretary of the trade union side in the dockyard, Mr. Gribbell. In reply to Question 3412 on page 276, he said:
No department has got enough space. The yard has not expanded and the problem of modernisation and maintaining a high standard of production is practically impossible.
He then went on to discuss directly the way in which money is allocated under Vote 10 and how, in fact, this has for many years past been neglected by the Admiralty who have made no real effort to tackle the problem on that side. Mr. Gribbell ended by saying:
You must appreciate that many of the workshops in the yard are obsolete. Many of them are unheated, and in the winter the temperature drops below freezing point.
There is a mass of evidence in this report bearing out what I have said in the House previously and what has been said for many years past by trade union representatives and workers in the dockyards. Therefore, it is high time that the Admiralty paid much more attention to the question of what can be done to improve the shops in which the workers have to work, to see whether they can have proper canteen facilities, which they have never had, and generally to try to bring the equipment and plant in the dockwards, particularly that affecting the conditions in which the men work, up to something like a modern standard.
I have been quoting from the evidence given in respect of Devonport Dockyard because I know those who gave the evidence and because I know they were


speaking the truth. If, however, hon. Members will read through the Report as I have done, the same evidence on most of these matters comes from all the other dockyards, as we have been saying for the past six years in this House, although apparently no one would believe us, and certainly the Admiralty did not appear to do so.
My second point deals with the joint production committees. There is no doubt what is the judgment of the Select Committee on this subject. In discussing its recommendations, the Select Committee said that the production committees had not worked at all properly. At the beginning of the report, on page XI, they said:
Your Committee has to report that the Joint Production Committees have not worked as they were intended to, and have not fulfilled the hopes they raised.
The Committee went on to elaborate that view, but I do not think it came to a firm conclusion as to all the reasons why this was so. In my view, the main reasons for the comparative failure of those joint production committees are given in the evidence to be found on page 272, again given by Mr. Gribbell. Speaking for the trade union side in Devonport Dockyard, he criticised the terms of reference under which the production committees were set up, as follows:
They do not permit anything of a constructive nature.
He goes on to describe how some of these matters are dealt with, or not dealt with, in the production committee. He was supported by Mr. Stevens from the Transport and General Workers' Union who, giving similar evidence on page 274, said:
We find joint production committees outside have greater powers than ours.
He elaborated that point over several pages, showing how in the committees the workers feel that they cannot get at the real issues. From the cross-examination which followed, it seemed to me that to some extent the Select Committee did not accept that point of view, but if hon. Members combine what I have said already about Vote 10—that the Admiralty in London has complete control and that nothing can be done locally—it is possible to realise how valid was the point made by the workers in Devon-port Dockyard before the Select Committee as to why the committees have not

been successful in the past. I hope that the Admiralty will look at that matter, too, in order to see whether they cannot, when considering the overhaul of their organisation, as they should, do it in such a way as to make these production committees really effective.
Now I turn to the third subject which is discussed at some length in the Select Committee's Report, the question of merit awards. My hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton said a few words about it, and the Select Committee said a great deal about it; at page xvi, for instance:
Your Committee consider that there has not been great enough awareness among the Managers of the revolutionary nature of the Merit Award Scheme, which is in direct conflict with long-established Trade Union ideas.
I do not believe that any trade unionist could possibly disagree that the system of merit awards is in general conflict with the ideas and principles for which trade unionists have fought.
But in the dockyards there were particular reasons why the merit award scheme might cause fear and anxiety amongst the workers, because for 40 years before the Civil Lord joined in helping the trade unions to abolish it, we had the establishment scheme, whereby the authorities could come along and pick and choose where and as they wished. Hardly a worker in the dockyards did not believe that those choices were made on the basis of favouritism.
That scheme was done away with, and the principle of the appointment of people to be established—90 per cent. of them on a basis of seniority—was introduced by the Labour Government. That was a great advance, but many workers in the dockyards feel that the Admiralty, having lost the weapon of the establishment scheme, have been all too eager to introduce the merit award scheme because it gives back to them some of the old power they lost when the establishment scheme was done away with.
I am not very impressed when the officials at Devonport Dockyard or anywhere else say that, of course, the merit award scheme is working very well. That is what the previous Civil Lord used to say to me; that, according to his evidence, it was working fine. It will be seen also from the Report of the Select Committee that some of the managers or deputy managers in Devonport said quite


clearly that the merit award scheme was working very well. At page 281 of the report, the deputy manager of the construction department was asked how he thought the merit award scheme was working. He replied, "Very well." He could hardly have heard what was said by the representatives of the workers only an hour or two earlier to the same Committee. Representatives of three or four different unions who appeared before the Select Committee were asked what they thought of the scheme. Mr Brown was asked, and he said:
If you want our opinions on the merit scheme, I can give you the general impression, and that is that the merit scheme is lousy.
At page 277 of the report, Mr. Gribbell, the secretary of the trade union side said:
Ships were not built without bad language, but they have invented some new words since this merit scheme was instituted! 
Later the spokesman, Mr. Stephens, of the Transport and General Workers' Union said:
My organisation thinks there is nothing good in the merit scheme.
and that they had in effect always been opposed to it. Mr. Gribbell, as is reported at page 278, said at the end:
The only analogy I can draw is this: supposing we had a merit scheme for Members of Parliament, and an under-secretary was given the job of assessing M.P.s—just think what would happen! 
It really is an extraordinary state of affairs when—

Mr. W. J. Edwards: I do not want to interrupt my hon. Friend, but may I tell him that the merit scheme was not imposed upon the trade unions? It was accepted very fully by the trade union side in the Admiralty Joint Industrial Council, which is the body responsible for serving the interests of the work-people in the dockyards. They could have refused it, which would have meant that many of the dockyards would not have received that extra money which they obtained through the merit scheme.

Mr. Foot: That is perfectly true. If my hon. Friend casts his mind back to the last debate on the occasion of the Navy Estimates, he will remember that I referred to that fact; that certainly has been accepted by the spokesman on the Whitley Council. I am not trying to contest that. What I am discussing is how it is worked. My hon. Friend the

previous Civil Lord really must look at the evidence. These are the official representatives of trade unions in Devonport Dockyard—

Mr. Edwards: Quite a large percentage of people in the dockyards are members of trade unions, but it is claimed that their representatives do not always express the proper voice of those whom they are supposed to be representing.

Mr. Foot: There are a lot of arguments about who represents trade unionists best. Some people in Devon-port Dockyard, for instance, might say that the representatives on the spot—I am not criticising one side or the other—sometimes represent the workers in the yard better than the person who sits on the Admiralty Joint Industrial Council. It is no good the previous Civil Lord telling me that the people whom I have quoted are unrepresentative. They are Mr. Brown, of the Electrical Trades Union; Mr. Stephens, of the Transport and General Workers' Union, and Mr. Gribbell, the secretary of the trade union side of the Joint Production Committee in Devonport Dockyard. All I am doing is reading out the evidence they gave to the Select Committee. Their evidence, even though there may be many other workers who disagree with them, is in flat contradiction of the evidence presented to the Select Committee by some of the managers, who, I have no doubt, also give their evidence to the Admiralty.
I was sent back to this House by the workers in Devonport Dockyard, and they have a right to have their views on the subject stated here. I also point out to any hon. Member who may disagree about this that the Select Committee itself, while not suggesting that the merit award scheme should be abolished, criticised it and made proposals for amending it. I am not necessarily suggesting that it should be abolished, but that it ought to be looked at very carefully, and certainly the modifications in the scheme proposed by the Select Committee should be very carefully considered, because they might go some way to remove a great deal of the grievance on this subject which undoubtedly exists in all the dockyards.
I should like to say a word on another and bigger subject, with which my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton dealt:


the subject of the most important recommendation which was made by the Committee. I will not say anything on the proposal about a personnel manager—my hon. Friend dealt with that, and it is dealt with fully in the Select Committee's Report; but I wish to refer to the question of the structure of management. We raised this issue in the previous five or six debates. We were pooh-poohed, we hardly got an answer; it was hardly considered a serious topic for conversation or debate in the House.
But now we discover that the Select Committee unanimously recommends drastic alterations in the structure of management in the dockyards. In doing that, they are repeating recommendations made to the Admiralty as long ago as 1927. Therefore, I say that this is a matter which the Admiralty must consider very seriously and on which they should be called upon to issue a White Paper or a statement of their views saying what are their conclusions on the basis of the inquiry made by the Select Committee.
It is no use the Admiralty thinking that these are not matters in which they are deeply concerned. One of the biggest problems in Devonport Dockyard is the question to which the Admiralty representatives themselves referred: the appalling wastage of apprentices, as they called it. When the Committee went round, it asked questions wherever it went as to why there was this appalling wastage of apprentices, and why apprentices who had been through the schools had then drifted away from the yard in such big numbers as they had been doing.
The answer has been given on many occasions in Devonport Dockyard. We have known that this problem has been growing for years. The answer was given best by an eminent citizen of my city, Alderman Mason, who at page 271 of the report, when asked by Mrs. Middleton:
What is the reason for that trend away from the yard?
replied:
Largely because the chances of promotion are very limited, particularly in some departments.
He went on to describe in detail how in his view—and he has been in Devon-port Dockyard for many years—that lack of chances of promotion affected every

body's prospects. That was a view from the side of the workers.
But later, at page 283 of the report, the deputy manager of one department was also asked a similar question and came to a very similar conclusion, suggesting that this lack of promotion was one of the main reasons for the growth of this problem of the loss of apprentices. This, therefore, is a very serious matter which the Admiralty have to consider, even from their own most limited point of view.
What do the Committee recommend? They recommend, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton has already described, a drastic overhaul of the general structure of management in the Royal Dockyards. In some ways I do not think their proposals go far enough, but at any rate their suggestions would give better prospects of promotion and would have the other advantages which have been stated by my hon. Friend.
But what are the Admiralty doing? Instead of accepting, or going even timidly in the direction suggested by the Select Committee, they are going in the opposite direction. They are proposing to introduce into other departments in the dockyards, such as the electrical department, the system which the Select Committee condemns. They are proposing to do away with civilian management and to introduce the same kind of structure as that which has been so strongly criticised by this Select Committee.
This is one of the main issues which has been raised by dockyard workers for generations. They have said, "Let us have more civilian control in the dockyards and more possibilities of promotion." That has been one of the main points put by them for many years past. It was put forward by myself and others during past debates on the Navy Estimates, but, as I said before, it was never regarded as a serious matter for debate. But here comes a Select Committee and one of the first things it does is come down conclusively on the side of the workers in the dockyards on a matter which they have been advocating for so many years past.
I hope that the Admiralty are going to look at these matters in a much more serious light, and are going to give us a full statement on what they intend to


do about the proposals in the Report of the Select Committee. The fact is that most trade union leaders or organisers from other industries, should they go and see the conditions and many of the provisions that apply in our dockyard, would be surprised to learn how out-of-date and inadequate they are.
A start was made during the past five or six years in trying to overhaul this system, to bring it up-to-date and to give it a more modern atmosphere. I sincerely hope the Admiralty are now going to take the matters seriously, since the answers to many of them have been submitted very forcibly by the Committee.

7.13 p.m.

Mr. W. W. Astor: I wish to suggest to the First Lord that the time has come to implement an undertaking which his predecessor, now Lord Alexander, gave during the war, that they would consider some system for the better appointing of R.N. retired officers at the outbreak of war. I think many of us know that many of the R.N. retired officers are some of the very finest elements we have. They are people who were passed over for promotion, who had been bored by peace-time sailoring, or who had gone into industry or other forms of activity, and who, when they returned, were fully the equals of those who remained in the Service.
There were others who, by age, by health or by the life they had lived, either for physical or intellectual reasons, were not adapted to take the appointments they were given. Some were sent to hot climates when they were quite incapable of standing the physical strain. I could weary or even amuse the House with stories about some of the fantastic appointments we saw. But what we have to do is to think of some way in which these mistakes can be avoided in the future.
I suggest that the First Lord should appoint as Admiralty representative a retired officer in each county or other suitable district whose job it would be to keep in touch with all retired officers in his area, to see them once a year and to put in a report on their general condition—arrange a medical report if necessary—and what they were doing, and thus see that the dormant appointments which they hold on mobilisation should

be suitable for their capability. That was Lord Alexander's undertaking, and I think the time has now come when the Admiralty might consider fulfilling it.
I hope my hon. Friend will also reconsider the decision made before the last war that W.R.N.S. should not be used in the Admiralty. It was a great waste of manpower owing to the vested interests of the Civil Service. I hope that, should there be another war, no such undertaking will be given, and that considerations of efficiency will be the only criterion.
I am very glad that the First Lord is going to reconsider the age and methods of entry into the Service. I suggest that our only consideration must be to get the very finest type of naval officers. I think all sides will agree that in the past we have had them. I am sure that my hon. and gallant Friends who served in the R.N.V.R. will agree that, much as we groused about the R.N. officers on many occasions, we would not have changed them for any other body of officers in the world under which to serve.
It is taking a considerable risk with the security and future of this country to tamper with the machinery by which those officers were produced. Surely, it would be wise to maintain the old form of Dartmouth entry, and then add to it entry at 16 and 18. I think it is paying a very poor compliment to the elementary schools of this country to think that their pupils could not change at the age of 13 if they wanted to. At my old school, Eton, we now have boys from elementary schools who have been able to fit in perfectly well both on the intellectual and the personal plane. As I say, it is a poor compliment to the elementary schools to suggest that their boys could not adapt themselves at the age of 13 to Dartmouth in the same way as they have been able to do to the public schools.

Mr. Callaghan: It is not a question of whether they could adapt themselves. Obviously, they could. The question is whether this is a natural change point in the educational progress of a boy at an elementary school. It is a natural change point for the preparatory school boy. It is not for the elementary school boy; his parents would not understand it, and the normal grammar school master would not be in favour of it.

Mr. Astor: For people who talk like that, there would still be the entry at 16,


so they could take their choice. Surely, that is not a great hardship so long as they have the two options to serve their country in the naval Service one way or the other. After all, it would be a very sorry epitaph if England fell, if her fleet were sunk, and if future historians could say, "At least they had the consolation of knowing that none of their officers was recruited before the age of 16."
I was very glad to hear the First Lord's reference to the Suez Canal Company. Their officials gave us wonderful service during the war, as I know well, and I am very glad that the Navy have been able to help them in their great difficulties.
I hope that the First Lord will pay particular attention to the different suggestions made about the training of the Reserves, and that he will not give us a snap answer at the end of this debate, but will consider very carefully the points raised by my hon. and gallant Friends and perhaps make a statement some time in the future.
I would pay the Admiralty one compliment and say how glad the Reserves are that the post of Admiral Commanding the Reserves is no longer considered a terminal job for distinguished officers on the eve of retirement, but that in future those appointed will be from among the young officers who will have the opportunity to rise to the top of the Navy with all the knowledge of the Reserves which they possess. Unlike the former Parliamentary Secretary, I hope the First Lord will stay for many years in his position, and, in view of the way in which the Opposition's main fleet was being torpedoed by their not so light coastal forces yesterday, I am willing to bet very high odds that he will.

7.20 p.m.

Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: I was one of the light coastal forces of last night to which the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. W. W. Astor) referred. Not for the first time, I have got myself into trouble with my own party. That particular vote last night was not a vote against any arms at all but against the proposed level of armaments, suggesting it was much too high and that too much of our resources was being put into arms and too little into other instruments for the preservation of peace.
Having taken that stand, I must now approach these Estimates from the point of view of trying, without interfering with the efficiency of the Navy to do the job it is given, to see how the maximum possible economy can be secured. I was delighted that the First Lord—who, like everyone on this side of the House, I wish to congratulate on his appointment—in his opening remarks set himself the same aim of seeing how we can economise in the spending of money without interfering with efficiency. But I was a little disappointed with the results of his efforts.
So far as I could see, the only reference in his speech to anything that would produce an economy at all was to the Admiralty staff, and it was a fairly guarded reference in comparison with some of the attacks he used to make about that organisation when he was a Member of the Opposition. The best he was able to say was that he hoped to restrict the increase in staff and that he hoped—I think it was in 12 months' time—the figures might be somewhat lower than they are now.
I was disappointed also that in his search for economies he made no reference whatever to the dockyards. Referance has been made for him, and I have enough on my plate without following what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot); but clearly, if one is looking for economies, one of the most fruitful fields of search would be in the dockyards.
There is another field which might well prove equally fruitful, a field to which I have referred on a number of occasions in these debates, that of the Royal Naval barracks. There are a great deal better, I believe, than they were during the war. That is due, in part, to the last Administration and in part also to an excellent series of commodores. But these barracks were wasteful in many ways. Being so large, they could not be supervised properly and leakages of Admiralty stores from those establishments was even greater than the leakages from private Parliamentary party meetings in this House. I wish to save the public purse at the expense of private gain in that respect.
It is also a fact that a great deal of time is wasted, quite apart from


materials. These places are so enormous that adequate supervision of them is not possible and the amount of halftime and part-time that goes on in naval barracks is, unhappily, literally nobody's business. There is also great wastage of morale.
I am concerned not only with immediate economies, but also with the long-term economies and long-term considerations in regard to barracks. In that connection, by far the most serious objection to having big Royal Naval barracks is that if, unhappily, we get ourselves landed into another war, those barracks will be vulnerable. In the last war they used to contain perhaps 15,000 officers and men, and nowadays the whole lot could be wiped out by a single bomb.
It is no new thing, but it is a matter of desperate importance, this danger that arises from the fact that we have large concentrations of naval officers and ratings in one particular spot. I very much hope that, from the point of view of the safety of the men and the efficiency of the Navy over a long period of years, from the point of view of economy and the proper use of money, the First Lord will see to it that this question is considered and will perhaps devise some means of distributing the depots, about the country, or splitting them up.

Commander Pursey: Perhaps on Huddersfield football ground.

Mr. Mallalieu: No, we have other uses for our football ground. One argument for large concentrations has been that it is a convenience to be able to draw on a large complement of men at very short notice. That may possibly have been a fair argument years ago when we were manning up battle wagons, but the possibility of battle wagons being manned up suddenly or even over a long period of months is receding into the mists of the past. It should be possible even with smaller depots to be able to man up modern ships with sufficient speed without having these large concentrations.
Another argument which has been put forward has been that from the point of view of the ratings themselves the barracks must be in towns where there are reasonable amenities. Frankly, I think that argument is overdone. I am

not sure whether it was used by the former Civil Lord in the debate last year. I had a spell in naval barracks during the war and I used to go out and search for the amenities which were said to be provided in the City of Portsmouth.
I can assure the First Lord that those amenities were very few indeed. There was the "Aggie Weston," the British Sailors Society and others which were, comparatively, amenities because the naval barracks were so loathsome. There were "pubs" and cinemas—but it is possible to find those in smaller towns—and there was a third type of amenity which perhaps it would be irrelevant for me to mention because I cannot find a Vote which covers the ladies in question. It would be possible to provide amenities for the contentment and certainly for the greater safety of the men, and, on the whole, for the greater efficiency of the Navy, if barracks were more widely dispersed.
From the long-term point of view—because I cannot see the problem of arms lessening for some years to come—I think we should all be considering to a much greater degree the integration of the three Services. We have three separate debates on three separate sets of Estimates, and the tendency, particularly since the end of the war, has been more and more to put each Service into a watertight compartment. I believe that the real future of the Services is going to be increasingly in the form of combined operations. We have already in existence a prototype, of the kind of combined operators we really need, and that prototype is in the Royal Marines.
The Royal Marines, I think, are the most remarkable body of Service men I know. They get abused occasionally by the title of "soldier," but the word "soldier," when applied to a marine, is really a badge of honour, because he can do anything the Army can do, and do it a great deal better. And when it comes to seamanship Marines are very often better seamen than are the so-called Regular sailors themselves. I say they are a remarkable body, and indeed they are. When it comes to "spit and polish" they cannot be beaten; and when it comes to really dirty work, they cannot be beaten either. They are first in and last out. They are the prototype, the epitome of the combined operator.
I should like to see very much greater thought being given by politicians and


administrators, and by Service men themselves, to the extent to which we can get a closer integration between the three Services in the future, roughly along the lines of the Royal Marines, than we have had in the past.
Now I turn to a political point. The efficiency of any particular Service must depend in part on the job it has to do. The First Lord told us how during the past year the commitments of the Royal Navy had substantially increased. I believe that, at any rate in one particular respect, the commitments of the Royal Navy could be diminished, and I refer to the Suez Canal. It is my view that it is altogether wrong today for these great waterways, which we describe as international, to be regarded as pieces of national property. They are vitally important to the peace and welfare not merely of one nation, but of the whole world.
That being so, it seems to me to be altogether wrong that one nation should have the burden and responsibility of keeping that waterway open and protecting it, whether it be the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal. I believe that the duty and obligation of keeping those open and of protecting them should not be national but international, under the aegis of the United Nations. If we would really put into practice the kind of things we sometimes preach on platforms about the possibilities of the United Nations and the duties it should perform, I believe we might be able to relieve the Royal Navy of a commitment which, in my opinion, it is no longer its duty to perform.
I have emphasised the question of economy. It is no longer true that the safety of our Realm chiefly depends on the Royal Navy. It is not true even in a limited military sense, and it certainly is not true in a political sense; because in addition to any arms we may have to deter aggression, if we want to preserve peace for ourselves we have to do much more than merely have arms. We have to provide at home a satisfactory basis of production and a society in which people are really content and have a sense of justice. There is nothing like a sense of justice for making peace and for increasing output.
Beyond that, we have to see what we can do to better the position by getting at

what might be one of the causes of war, by attempting to deal with the trouble spots, the backward areas which, if they remain in a state of poverty, might be likely to be causes of world unrest. Because we have to bear in mind those considerations, we must be very careful in dealing with the Estimates of our own particular Services.
Nobody who has ever served in the Royal Navy, even for as short a time as myself, can fail to have a great admiration and indeed an affection for that Service. It was, and is, a wonderful Service. But the Royal Navy is not an end in itself. It is simply one means to an end, the end, as I see it, of trying to deter aggression and to preserve peace.
So I would say it is important that, while we maintain the Navy at as great a pitch of efficiency as seems necessary for the jobs it has to do, we should bear in mind that there are other instruments of peace which equally require attention—social, economic and political instruments. I have a feeling that at the present time we are neglecting those, and I feel that we shall continue to neglect them only at our peril.

7.36 p.m.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: I suppose that the feeling which runs through the whole of a debate like this is that one is struck, as one sits on these benches, by the change that comes over hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Front Benches. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), the former Parliamentary Secretary, made some complaint, as was his right, about some words used by the Prime Minister a year ago. I shall have to say a few words at a later stage about the change in the attitude of the hon. Member. After all, he was complaining of the poacher turned gamekeeper and I can point in some instances to where the gamekeeper has turned poacher.
The points I wish to raise are directed to one section of the Navy, the Fleet Air Arm. I make no apology for repeating now what I have said on previous occasions when the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East was sitting on the Government Front Bench. I repeat these things and shall continue to repeat them until some satisfactory answer is provided.
The Fleet Air Arm is suffering at the moment from a lack of publicity. We look at the daily newspapers and see advertisements by the Air Force and the Army and, from time to time, we see advertisements on behalf of the Fleet Air Arm. I think I am right in saying that the Royal Air Force spends about £60,000 a year on advertising, trying to get the aircrews which it finds necessary to man its aircraft. I also think I am right in saying that during the same period, largely as a result of the example of the Air Force, the Fleet Air Arm spends only one sixth of that amount.
All of us who have studied publicity and the recruiting campaigns, and also the recruiting figures, find it interesting to note that whenever publicity of a recruiting nature appears in the Press, recruiting figures immediately rise. For the Fleet Air Arm this is the advertisement, "Learn to fly in the Royal Navy," which invites one to fill in a form for further particulars. I am quite convinced that there is a direct relation between publicity and recruiting. It is also true to say that the Navy is almost invariably six to eight weeks behind the Royal Air Force.
The First Lord did not mention it today, but I think it is right to say that the Royal Navy are getting between one half and two-thirds of the aircrew they require. I should like to see a greater emphasis upon publicity and recruiting. If the Fleet Air Arm were to be provided with only an additional £50,000 from other funds which the Admiralty have, they would be able to carry out a campaign and get sufficient aircrew for their requirements. That would be at the cost of approximately one and a half aircraft which they are not able to man at present.
They have tried other methods. They have tried the short service scheme, and this is where I want to refer to the gamekeeper turned poacher. It was some years ago that I mentioned to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East and his predecessor the subject of short service commissions. Today he appeared to show some sense of realism when he talked about the approach of a person who leaves a secondary school. Such people are looking for a career.
Four years ago I said that the short service commission was not the answer

for aircrew. The First Lord in his remarks introducing the Estimates pointed out that further schemes of short service are to be introduced. He added that up to 20 per cent. will be given permanent commissions. I say from experience that that will be very little encouragement to pilots and observers joining the Fleet Air Arm who for years have been offered just that sort of inducement with no result whatever. I would far rather that he said not less than 10 per cent. than that he should say up to 20 per cent.
The Army started a system of short service commissions, but there the problem is completely different. The Army introduced three-year short service commissions to induce men who are required to serve for two years to stay for one year longer. In exchange for two years at a certain rate of pay they are offering three years at a higher rate of pay.
But that is not the situation in the Fleet Air Arm. What happened after the war? It is within my own knowledge that at the end of the war probably hundreds of pilots and observers would have been happy, if not delighted, to have stayed on in the Fleet Air Arm if they had been offered any security of tenure. But, of course, they were not. They were told that they might stay on for a year, two years or four years and at the end of that time they might get a permanent commission if they were found suitable. So, of course, large numbers left the Service. They were not interested in that type of bargain.
If the Admiralty could get those men back today they would be in a very much better position than they are at present. All these trained pilots, observers and aircrew left after the war and that did irreparable damage which it will take many years more from now to overcome
Another matter which I raised with the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, was the production of aircraft for the Navy. He himself mentioned the G.R.17. I wonder if he remembers how in the last Parliament I put to him Question after Question week after week. I asked what time it took to produce an aircraft from the drawing board and put it into squadron service. It is no coincidence that the full reference number of the G.R.17 is G.R.17/44, which seems to indicate that that aircraft started its career in 1944.
It is not in service now and the First Lord could not say when it would be, but I am prepared to bet that it will not be in service by the end of next year. It may be, I do not know. We might as well get it out of our heads that the only potential enemy—Russia—is miles behind us in aircraft, because that is not so. There is nothing to indicate that the Russians will lag behind in any time in the foreseeable future.
The First Lord said that the Government would provide the Fleet Air Arm with the best aircraft. All I can say is that the Fleet Air Arm has never had the best aircraft. It has always been what one might call the poor man's Royal Air Force. They have never had the best aircraft and, of course, they have been most conscious of that. I hope that the First Lord will do everything he can to speed up the procedure from the drawing board to the squadron. If he does he will be doing the greatest service to what he has called the striking part of the Royal Navy.
We have a Ministry called the Ministry of Supply. On the question of supplying aircraft to the Royal Navy the Ministry of Supply performs very little service which cannot be dispensed with. I think that the Ministry of Supply act as a brake rather than as a supplier. The Admiralty themselves are not blameless. One must be fair. The Admiralty are too fond of altering what is known as a staff requirement. They produce a staff requirement for an aircraft which will be required to perform certain functions. After the requirement has gone to the aircraft manufacturer, the Admiralty change the requirement from a two-seater aircraft to a three-seater. That leads to an intolerable and impossible situation for the manufacturer, however hard he may try.
An aircraft, the design of which has been changed half way through its incubation, is never of the same standard as one produced when it has been known from beginning to end exactly what it should be like and what it should be required to do. One of the results of this type of action is that today in the Navy we have the Barracuda still flying. To my knowledge it was rejected in 1943 as being unsuitable for first-line duty. That is a kind of situation which will continue just so long as we have this system of

delay, muddle and inefficiency which goes on in the production of aircraft.
There is nothing new in this. It is a very old problem. I hope that the First Lord will direct his attention to it. I think it was the First Lord who said that every officer now realised the vital importance of the Fleet Air Arm. As one of the people who started when the Fleet Air Arm was young, when it first came right into the sphere of the Royal Navy, I can remember the indifference, if not the antagonism, with which one had to cope.
We were young. We were a new branch in a very old service and we were conscious that we were not ideal material in every respect. I do not think that any body of people provide ideal material in every respect, but I know that of the 52 officers with whom I started the war on flying duties, there is only a handful alive today. They performed a service and met a fate which might have happened to anybody. They sought to achieve something and achieved it, and I think that now that we have the realisation of the vital importance of this part of the Royal Navy we will not let it wait.
Finally, may I say this? It may be considered as being comparatively unimportant, but it is a matter which I tried to press on the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East when he was in office, and it is the question of the name of the Fleet Air Arm. During the time in which I was in that Service, Admiralty Fleet Orders changed the name of the Fleet Air Arm so often that it came to resemble a paper chase. It has been changed to Naval Aviation, and I do not really know what its name is supposed to be now.
I want to ask the First Lord if he will seriously consider the effect of these changes on such things as recruiting, and whether he will not make the final change and get back to the name by which it has always been known and is known today among those who have served in it—the Fleet Air Arm. After all, the Prime Minister did not call it Naval Aviation, but Naval Air Arm.
The name which I am suggesting is the natural name which people have used for a branch of the Service which only received the name of Naval Aviation because of the fact that it was under Admiralty administration. It leaves a nasty taste to remind them of the days


when the Fleet Air Arm was part of the Royal Air Force, and they are trying to forget it. This Service will always be known in my lifetime by the name of the Fleet Air Arm, and I suggest that, from the point of view of recruiting, of history and of tradition, it would be far better if the First Lord were to revert to that old and well-tried name.
In conclusion, I have been discussing a very important matter, which is, nevertheless, only one part of one Service. As has been pointed out, there is much inter-dependence in all three Services, and I believe that the Royal Navy is not in itself sufficient to provide the defence of our country. I hope that the idea of the inter-dependence of all the Services will go forward.
The hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) felt that, as the result of the last war, this interdependence of the Services has received a setback. I disagree. I think that it became greater as the result of the last war than it was before, but I am sure that, in that build-up of our defences, the Royal Navy has a vital part to play, but that, if it is to play that part, it must turn its eyes not only all round it, but must look back as well as forward, and be prepared to change its views and to admit all those ideas of initiative and ingenuity without which no country can be secure.

7.54 p.m.

Mr. Richard Adams: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), I have the feeling that this debate so far has proceeded very calmly and unruffled, and for my part I have no intention of stirring up the calm waters if I can help it, although I must say that I cannot guarantee what will happen when my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) starts firing his broadsides later on.
Like all other hon. Members, I should like to offer congratulations to the First Lord both on his appointment to his position and on the broad review of events that he gave us this afternoon. After all, if we have to have a Conservative First Lord, we might do a lot worse than the right hon. Gentleman. I would only say this to him. He should only try to do sufficiently well at the Admiralty to stay there, otherwise he may be

pulled out of his present office in order to rescue the housing drive or solve the steel muddle. At any rate, we all wish him well in his present position.
Perhaps I ought to start by explaining that I have no vested interest in naval matters, and that I well understand the feeling of my hon. and gallant Friend behind me, who spent so much time below deck, and, later on, on the quarterdeck. In the last war I served in the tanks which suitably bore the name of the present Prime Minister, and the only time when I came in touch with the Royal Navy was on occasions in tank landing craft, when we always seemed to receive much more courtesy from the members of the Senior Service than we did from the sea itself.
I do not, however, apologise for intervening briefly in this debate, because I only want to put one or two simple and direct questions to the First Lord which I think are of considerable interest to the ordinary man in the street, and which certainly affect the future safety and security of the country.
The First Lord spent a good deal of his time this afternoon in drawing attention to the preparations which are being made for safeguarding the defences of this country, and, in particular, safeguarding the shipping lanes. As I understood him, he devoted a good deal of his speech to explaining that there was going to be a considerable development in anti-submarine frigates and a good many more new minesweepers. He also said that the Air Arm was to be improved in order to deal with the submarine menace. All that was set forth clearly in Cmd. Paper, 8476, where, in dealing with minesweeping under the heading "Policy," it says:
Particular attention is being given to the need to build up anti-submarine and minesweeping forces and to the expansion of Naval Aviation.
A little further on, it states:
The new ships of the re-armament programme are principally frigates and minesweepers.
On the next page, under the heading "Modernisations and Conversions," it is stated:
The main purpose of the conversion programme is to turn fleet destroyers into fast anti-submarine frigates and thus to provide a speedy supplement to the anti-submarine new construction programme.


In other words, the whole emphasis of the policy outlined by the First Lord, both in the White Paper to which I have referred and in his speech today, has been concentrated upon the need for defending the approaches to this country.
In the light of that, I should like to put this simple question to him, and I should like an immediate and unequivocal answer, if I may have the right hon. Gentleman's attention. The question is: Were these Navy Estimates prepared before the decision was taken to cut strategic reserves or after that decision was taken? I will give the right hon. Gentleman a little more time to think about it by repeating the question. Were the Navy Estimates which we are discussing today prepared before the decision was taken to cut strategic reserves, or were they prepared after that decision was taken? I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman if he wishes to answer.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: They are part of the overall programme.

Mr. Adams: That is surely a most evasive reply. I want to know whether these Navy Estimates were prepared before the decision was taken to cut our strategic reserves, or whether the decision to cut our strategic reserves was taken first and these Navy Estimates were prepared in the light of that decision? I should have thought that was a simple straightforward question to which I could have got a simple straightforward answer.

Mr. Watkinson: The hon. Member was talking a moment ago about frigates and minesweeping. Now he is talking about strategic reserves. Does he connect the two? Does he think that a strategic reserve is a bit of steel? I do not quite understand the point.

Mr. Adams: I was hoping I might get an answer or two from the First Lord so that I could proceed with the point that emerged from his reply. I should have thought, however, that it would have been clear even to the hon. Member and to the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) that this is the problem of guarding the shipping lanes to this country, and it is completely locked up with the question of strategic reserves. The two things go completely hand in hand. That is why I still press the First Lord, yet once

again, to give me an answer, which I am sure we all want to know, and that the country wants to know. If he does not give an answer I must proceed to make a number of assumptions which may not be so pleasant as getting an answer from the First Lord himself. I will repeat the question, for a third time, slowly.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I heard it, but still, let the hon. Member go on with his point.

Mr. F. A. Burden: This really has nothing to do with the situation. These are the Navy Estimates—the amount of naval equipment and the number of vessels we have in order to guard the waterways and to get troops, munitions and food to this country, even if war were declared, just as we got them here in the last war.

Mr. Adams: I am very glad to have the assurance from an hon. Member of the Conservative Party that, in his view, the problem of defending this country against possible attack, and the problem of maintaining the strategic reserves in this country, have nothing to do with one another. I think I have put the hon. Member's point quite clearly.

Mr. Burden: I said nothing of the sort. I said that the naval vessels and the size of the Navy must enable us to get the goods and the food and to convoy the men we need to this country, even if there were an intensified attack on this country.

Mr. Adams: The hon. Member has put his own views twice to himself. I should have thought that even he must see from what he has said that there is a connection between these two problems—that they are very closely inter-related. We cannot discuss Navy Estimates which are largely designed, as the First Lord said today, to safeguard the shipping lanes to this country, with no reference at all to the strategic reserves which we have already in this country, and which do not require to be exposed to the dangers of those shipping lanes. But that is what the hon. Member for Gillingham has tried to deny. That is why I ask the First Lord whether these Estimates were prepared before or after the decision was taken to cut down the strategic reserves.
Since he cannot give a clear answer, let me put this proposition to him. If the


Navy Estimates were prepared before that decision was taken to cut the strategic reserves, obviously these Navy Estimates are not sufficient. On the other hand—and I should have thought that he could have seen this clearly—if these Navy Estimates were prepared after the decision was taken to cut the strategic reserves, obviously, if those strategic reserves had not been cut, the amount of preparation outlined in the Navy Estimates would not have been necessary. The right hon. Gentleman must face that clearly.
I will put another question to the First Lord. He cannot answer the first, so I will give him a second question. Will he, as head of the Admiralty today, guarantee the safe arrival of shipping coming to this country in the event of war breaking out in the next six months? If he cannot give that assurance, what right has he, as a member of the Cabinet, to agree to—

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (Commander Allan Noble): He is not a member of the Cabinet.

Mr. Adams: The more pity. We gather from the Parliamentary Secretary that this decision in regard to strategic reserves was taken at a Cabinet meeting without the head of the Admiralty being consulted?

Commander Noble: I did not say anything of the sort. The hon. Gentleman really must not make these accusations. He referred to my right hon. Friend as a member of the Cabinet, and all I said was that he was not a member of the Cabinet.

Mr. Adams: I should like to get that matter clear. The First Lord is here himself. Was the First Lord present at the Cabinet meeting at which these decisions with regard to strategic reserves were taken, or not? Surely he could give an answer to that? [An HON. MEMBER: "He does not want to."] Surely the First Lord knows his own affairs and what he is doing each day? Cannot he tell the House simply yes or no? Was he present at the Cabinet meeting at which the decisions were taken to cut our strategic reserves?

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I have no intention of saying what happened at any Cabinet meeting. That would be a Cabinet secret.

Mr. Adams: In other words, the right hon. Gentleman leaves to the Parliamentary Secretary to deny what I was suggesting; yet when I am giving him an opportunity to state the matter himself, he refuses to give an answer. Surely, we could argue the matter much better if the right hon. Gentleman were to give a simple clear answer now, instead of leaving it to the end. I will put another question to the First Lord. I have four questions to put to him. He has failed to answer two. I will give him another chance. The third question I want to ask is this. Was the Admiralty consulted over the cuts in strategic reserves? I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman, to give him a chance to answer.

Mr. Thomas: Answers to questions such as these are given at the end of a debate. I cannot get up every few minutes to answer each individual point of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Adams: I should have thought that a simple answer would have enabled us to make better progress with the debate. However, I am glad to hear that the Parliamentary Secretary is going to tell us—

Commander Noble: Not necessarily.

Mr. Adams: In other words, the First Lord refuses to answer me while I am on my feet and in possession of the House, and when I give up possession of the House, and the Parliamentary Secretary replies to the debate, he is still not going to answer these questions. I want to know whether the Admiralty were consulted in regard to the cuts in the strategic reserves.
Finally I want to ask the First Lord, as my fourth question whether he accepts his increased responsibilities in charge of the Admiralty following these cuts? Does he accept the increased responsibilities? Perhaps we can have an answer to that. Will the First Lord himself give the answer now? Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will tell us before the debate ends whether the Admiralty accepts the increased responsibilities attaching to this duty to safeguard our shipping lanes because of the cuts in our strategic reserves which, up to now, have been safely harboured in this country itself.
I think the people of this country want to know whether the Cabinet as a whole has a proper regard for their safety and security and their food in the coming months, or whether, as the hon. Member for Gillingham has suggested, the Admiralty are busy building up an increased armament programme whilst some other part of the Government is busy cutting down the strategic reserves which are just as essential to our defence as ships themselves. I hope that the hon. Member will go home and work that one out for himself.

Mr. Burden: There is much more to work out on the hon. Gentleman's own side.

Mr. Adams: Now I want to draw the attention of the House to what is going to happen as a result of Cabinet policy announced by the Chancellor in January. In 1950–51 the Labour Government made a start with the re-armament programme, and, as a part of the necessary defence measures, they built up in that year strategic reserves amounting to £14.2 million. In 1950–51, when the situation was far more difficult than it is today, the Labour Government made a start with building up essential strategic reserves.
The Board of Trade collected £3.3 million in that year; the Ministry of Supply, £7.9 million; and the Ministry of Food £3 million, making a total, as I say, of £14.2 million. These stocks, up to a few weeks ago, were still being held in this country. Then in the following year, 1951, still under a Labour Government, the Board of Trade built up further reserves of £2.5 million; the Ministry of Supply, £3 million; the new Ministry of Materials accumulated strategic stockpiling reserves of no less than £105.5 million; and the Ministry of Food collected strategic reserves amounting to £78 million. In that first real year of rearmament, as an essential part of our defences, the Labour Government collected together a total of £189 million worth of strategic stocks. What will the new Tory Government do? In the first place, they are cutting down these accumulated strategic stocks by no less than two-thirds.

Mr. Burden: On a point of order. Are we discussing the Navy Estimates or the

strategic supplies of food and raw materials?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris): The Question before the House is the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Adams: Although I am unable to explain the matter to the hon. Member, I have no doubt that I have made it perfectly clear to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the whole problem of the Navy Estimates is intimately wrapped up with the question of strategic reserves. It is criminal folly, which we could only expect from a Conservative Government, to have these two arms working in opposite directions. We have the First Lord today saying that we must build up our armaments in the Navy, and of course in the Army and Air Force. How can it possibly make sense to build up material preparations for a possible war while at the same time running down our fourth arm of defence, which is the strategic reserves already accumulated in this country?
I invite any hon. Member opposite, or better still a Member of the Cabinet, to explain to our people that the Government are not playing with their safety and security in order to balance the Government's financial Budget. These strategic stocks which the Labour Government accumulated, amounting to over £200 million, are vital for our defences in the coming months, yet the Tory Government, in order to avoid imposing harsh burdens on their supporters, are deliberately running down those stocks which we accumulated. If anyone doubts my word, I will refer to what the Chancellor of the Exchequer told me in answer to a Question on Tuesday, 4th March—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The strategic reserves come under the Civil Estimates, and they can be debated in detail on the Civil Estimates. They cannot be debated in detail on the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Adams: I am not debating them in detail. I am now referring to a Question which I asked the Chancellor the other day, namely,
on what grounds the decision was taken to run down our strategic reserves"—

Mr. Burden: On a point of order. I do submit that this has nothing whatever to do with the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I have already pointed out that the strategic reserves can be debated when the Civil Estimates are dealt with.

Mr. William Ross: Further to that point of order. Surely it is in order to refer to the task of the Navy and to the extent to which these Navy Estimates will equip the Navy to perform that task?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That would be in order, but that is not what the hon. Gentleman is doing at the moment. I gather that he is discussing the strategic reserves.

Mr. Adams: My experience in this House, in the short while I have been here, has been that when hon. Members opposite find themselves in difficulties with the case being presented against them, they immediately resort to points of order in an endeavour to try and put the speaker off the point. The other day, referring to these stocks, the Chancellor said:
it is more important to reduce our overseas expenditure."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 29.]

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I have already ruled on that. The hon. Gentleman must not refer to it again.

Mr. Adams: I submit to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the size of our Navy Estimates and of our armaments preparations is directly related to the strategic reserves we have or have not accumulated in this country. It is fantastic and unreal to talk about the need to increase the size of our Navy if it is not related to the task the Navy has to undertake, and I submit that in order to discuss whether these Navy Estimates are adequate, or too big or too small, they must be related to the problem the Navy has to undertake. In the words of the First Lord this afternoon, their primary task is to defend the country against attack, and to defend the shipping lanes along which goods would come into this country.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I have already pointed out to the hon. Gentleman that he may refer to that but he cannot on these Estimates discuss in detail the strategic reserves. He can illustrate the point with reference to the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Adams: I thought that was all I had done so far. I was illustrating a point in order to satisfy some hon. Gentlemen opposite. It was not my fault that they failed to appreciate my first illustration, and that I have had to go to greater lengths in order to make the position clear to them.
When I was interrupted, I was on the point of saying that the Chancellor has made it clear—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is going back to this the whole time. He really must observe the Ruling I have given. He cannot now return to what the Chancellor said.

Mr. Adams: You will observe, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that when you first called me to order I had the Chancellor's statement in my hand and was proposing to deal with it. I am now on a different point. It is pure coincidence that I happened to refer to the Chancellor on both occasions.
The point I want to make clear, and which I think will be acceptable to some hon. Members opposite, is that the Chancellor has made the case that, although strategic reserves are necessary, he regards it as more important in the present situation to devote our resources to increasing exports overseas. Surely it is apparent, even to hon. Members opposite, that that same argument applies equally to the rearmament programme. If it is necessary to cut into strategic reserves because he wants to maintain our overseas exports, it is just as necessary to cut down our armaments preparations in order to maintain our exports. The same argument applies to both. I see that at least the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Beresford Craddock) seems now to be following me.

Mr. Beresford Craddock: I am trying to.

Mr. Adams: Even he must see that armament preparations are the same thing as unrequited exports, and that if the armaments programme is to be increased, as is suggested in these Navy Estimates, we cannot at the same time cut down strategic reserves and use them to maintain our export trade, because strategic reserves are just as necessary to the lift and safety of the country as are naval armaments.

Mr. Craddock: That is all very well, but it depends upon the size of the strategic reserves. That is the important point which neither the hon. Gentleman, nor I, nor any other hon. Member knows.

Mr. Adams: If the hon. Gentleman cared to look through the Estimates he could work out for himself the size of the strategic reserves.

Mr. Craddock: For the Navy?

Mr. Adams: Strategic reserves for the country as a whole; not strategic reserves for the Navy. I should have thought he would have followed that.
The position in a nutshell is this. The Tory Government propose to cut our existing strategic reserves almost in half, and in the preparations they intend to make in the coming 12 months while they are increasing the size of the Navy, as well as of the other Armed Forces, they propose to cut our future accumulation of strategic reserves by two-thirds. If that makes sense, then I will get out of politics altogether. Hon. Members opposite need not take that too seriously, because before I do so I shall want to be convinced by the party opposite.
It is obvious I shall not get a reply from the First Lord; and I do not think the Parliamentary Secretary is capable of giving it; but I will sit here in the desperate hope that some hon. Member opposite will explain why it is logical to build up naval armaments to protect these shores from a possible attack while at the same time running down the reserves of strategic materials that the Labour Government have already accumulated in this country.
When we debate the Civil Estimates, I shall go into that in greater detail because I am convinced that at the moment the people of this country do not realise the jiggery-pokery the Cabinet are up to at the present time. It is nothing more than jiggery-pokery of the worst kind because they say to the people, on the one hand, that the situation is so desperate that we have to increase our armaments—and the Government are saying that today—and accept cuts in our standard of living in order to maintain and improve the armaments necessary to defend this country against attack; and at the same time they say we are going to cut down the strategic reserves which the previous Government have accumulated in this country.
I say that it is playing with the lives, the security and the safety of the people of this country to cut down the strategic reserves, because I am sure that we can have no guarantee from any representative of the Admiralty that they will be in a better position in the event of a war in the next 12 months to ensure the safety of the shipping coming into our ports than they were 12 months ago. Then the Labour Government started building up over £200 million of essential reserves. Today it is proposed to slash them almost by half and to fail to make the necessary preparations in the coming 12 months. Then the Ministry of Food—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member really must not pursue this subject. If he pursues it again, I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

Mr. Adams: I think that you will appreciate, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that it is almost impossible to have a proper discussion of these matters by keeping them in water-tight compartments. That is what the Government would like us to do—to discuss the Navy on its own, the Army on its own, Civil Defence on its own, and the Ministry of Food—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Motion before the House is the Navy Estimates, and the hon. Member must really confine himself to that subject.

Mr. Adams: That is what I have been devoting the whole of the time that I have been on my feet to doing, by trying to convince some people, at any rate, that in discussing the preparations that ought to be made to increase the size of our Navy there must be regard to the job that it has to do; and the most fundamental job the Navy has to do today, in the light of a possible future war, is to do all it can to ensure the safe arrival of food and raw materials coming into this country. I say that it is criminal for any Government to claim that they need increased armaments to achieve that task, and at the same time, in order to balance their own financial affairs, ruthlessly to cut down the strategic reserves which have already been accumulated in this country by a Labour Government.

8.23 p.m.

Mr. Harold Watkinson: I think that the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Mr. Adams), must have spent rather a long time in his Churchill


tank during the war and did not often pop out to survey the world outside. Had he been in one of the tank landing craft and done that, he might have had a clearer idea of what the Navy Estimates are all about.
He expressed a burning desire for some one to deal with his point about strategic reserves. I think that I can manage to do that, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, without trespassing outside the Rules of Order, because I will do it strictly in relation to this naval programme. I think that the first thing to be considered is this.
I have been wondering throughout this debate when we were to hear a statement from what, I believe, is known as the "Tribune" group on the other side of the House as to how they might justify a reduction in the Navy Estimates. I think that we have just listened to a rather ingenious theory as to how some reduction in the Navy Estimates could be justified. I think that I heard the hon. Member correctly when he said that if these strategic reserves had been maintained the Navy Estimates could have been reduced.

Mr. Adams: If the hon. Gentleman will take the trouble of getting a copy of HANSARD of last night's debate he will find that his reference to any "Tribune" group is completely out of place in talking about me.

Mr. Watkinson: I am afraid that so many people abstained on the other side last night that it is rather difficult to tell the sheep from the goats.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: What happened last night is certainly not in order in this debate.

Mr. A. C. Manuel: Tell us who were the sheep and who were the goats. The nanny-goats are over there.

Mr. Watkinson: Let me make one point. If the justification for any reduction in the Navy Estimates, or any increase for that matter, is a matter of strategic stocks, let us put it in perspective by quoting a figure given by one of the hon. Gentleman's colleagues in this House this week, and that is that our food bill this year is £1,000 million. We had nothing like that amount of strategic stock and, before I put myself out of order, let me relate that to naval construction.
We cannot build any kind of naval vessel, even the most simple form of escort vessel, in under three years. That, I think, is a fair estimate from the time we start the drawings. If our annual bill for food is £1,000 million a year, and all that the hon. Gentleman was arguing was £100 million of stocks, how long does he think that is going to last us? Not for a week. We are relating that against a naval construction programme of three to five years. So where is our security? The whole thing is one of those strange political statements which sometimes come from the other side, which they think will look well in their literature for those people who go about the country trying to misrepresent the rearmament policy of this or any other Government.

Mr. R. T. Paget: May we take one single item of stockpiling that has been raised? To make good the raid on the stockpile of timber, which we would have to do in war, would occupy 60 ships for four months. They could not go in one fleet because of the load. It would take about eight months to do that job, and it would occupy, I calculate, eight or nine destroyers for eight months.

Mr. Burden: Has this really anything to do with the Navy Estimates, Mr. Deputy-Speaker?

Mr. Paget: The task of the Navy is what we are discussing. In deciding how much Navy we want we have to relate it to the tasks. That single timber raid on the stockpile put something like eight or nine destroyers out of action for eight or nine months.

Mr. Watkinson: The matter we are discussing is the naval construction programme in the general framework of the Navy Estimates, and the point made by the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central was that this Government by raiding the stockpile, as he claims, which incidentally is quite untrue, was, in fact, making the naval construction programme less effective. If that was not the point—

Mr. Adams: Certainly that is the point.

Mr. Watkinson: I gathered that the hon. Gentleman was trying to make some point. I will merely repeat what I said before. I am merely quoting the figures given by a right hon. Gentleman on the Front Bench opposite this week.
The figures alone for food in one year are £1,000 million. Therefore, to keep this country alive for one year during war, even if we grow half the food needed, it means that we have to bring in £500 million of food alone. If we have a stockpile of £500 million of food alone, which certainly was not allowed for by the hon. Gentleman, it would not give us time to add a single frigate to our armament programme. So his whole intervention, in my view, was entirely unrelated to this debate, and was one of those things said in this House, as I said before, because it is thought that it sounds good on the doorsteps for purely party political purposes.

Mr. Paget: rose—

Mr. Watkinson: No, I will not give way. Perhaps we may now return to the Navy Estimates. I thought that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) was a lot too complacent about the past record of his party in regard to the Navy.

Commander Pursey: You wait till you hear what is coming in a minute. You will get something better.

Mr. Watkinson: As I and my hon. Friends said when we were on the other side of the House, I think that we have been in grave danger in the past six years of achieving the kind of Navy which would fight the next war with the weapons of the last—

Commander Pursey: We have the biggest Navy in our history.

Mr. Watkinson: —and that would be about the most fatal thing to do in any modern war. Let us look at a few practical points to see whether or not that statement can be substantiated. I am sorry now to have to go into the nuts and bolts of the thing, but I should have thought that that was our job today, to satisfy ourselves as far as we can that the sum of £330 million is being spent to the very best advantage and to give us the very best insurance against attack.
We have started a programme of what are called "fast frigates," They are, in fact, old R-class destroyers cut down to the water-line and rebuilt and fitted with a great deal of new and very efficient gear. That gear has yet largely to be proved.
I have great suspicion about this programme after the stewardship of the past six years, and I want to ask the Parliamentary Secretary: Are these fast frigates designed to cope with the completely submersible submarine? I do not mean the submarine fitted with a "snort"; I mean the submarine which need never surface at all from the time it leaves port to the time it returns home. That is a practical proposition today. There are two building.

Mr. Shackleton: No such animal is in existence or is likely to be until the atomic-powered submarine comes on the scene.

Mr. Watkinson: In a previous debate the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), interjected in my speech the remark "Jules Verne." We have moved a little nearer Jules Verne since we had that debate. The hon. Member knows as well as I do that we do not need to have an atomic-powered submarine in order to achieve this. With a hydrogen peroxide type of engine a submarine can be almost completely submersible.

Mr. Shackleton: rose—

Mr. Watkinson: I would give way, but if I am interrupted it is only further delaying the proceedings. What I want to know is whether in designing this class of frigate, which I imagine will be the mainstay of our anti-submarine defences for years to come, account was taken of a submarine which is either completely submersible or very nearly so. That is a very important point.
The next subject with which I wish to deal is the general anti-submarine problem. The hon. Member for Cardiff. South-East, knows that I have always taken a great interest in this subject because I asked him many Questions about it. I am not sure whether the last Government realised that the whole problem of naval strategy at sea has been entirely altered and worsened for us by the developments in submarine technique and also by the atomic bomb.
There are two reasons for this. The developments in submarine technique mean that a submarine, even if it is the ordinary standard production fitted with a snort, can maintain itself almost completely submerged and is thus a very difficult target. The advent of the atomic


bomb means that convoys must be dispersed over a far wider area of ocean than they ever were in the days when I plied the Western ocean in the last war, and that makes the task of the escorting vessels 20 or 30 times more difficult.
If the Parliamentary Secretary cannot give me a reply on this point at the end of the debate I shall understand, but I hope that the point will be noted. Consideration ought to have been given and ought to be given to the greater dispersal of convoys, the greater under-water speed of submarines, the much greater difficulty of detecting them, and, I am afraid, the much lower efficiency of Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm because of the difficulty of detecting the snort-fitted submarine which does not lie on the surface so conveniently as its predecessors used to do. That may well call for a complete re-orientation of our convoy policy in the event of another war.
I was never able to get an assurance from the Socialist Government that these points were receiving utmost consideration, but I hope I shall get such an assurance from the Parliamentary Secretary. It is upon this sort of thing that our survival in war depends and not upon some phoney story about the stockpile. These matters are important if we are to satisfy ourselves, as I certainly believe it to be my duty to do, that this money is spent to the best possible advantage.
The next matter is the general defence against aircraft. Obviously, the best defence is the carrier-borne aircraft. I shall not deal with that, because it has been well and adequately dealt with by my hon. Friends. But the second line at the moment is the anti-aircraft gun. I believe I am the only qualified R.N.V.S.R. gunnery officer in the House, and I believe that today the gun is a completely outmoded weapon. With all the force I can command I wish to ask: At what rate are we pressing on in the Navy with anti-aircraft rocket development? Have we adequate facilities at the Ministry of Supply range at Woomera in Australia? Is this generally regarded as a matter of great priority? As the First Lord said today, the position has already arrived when an anti-aircraft shell cannot even catch up a modern aircraft.

Commander Pursey: Put salt on its tail.

Mr. Watkinson: That is the general attitude adopted by the hon. and gallant Member towards naval affairs. While we very much enjoy his speeches we sometimes think that they are perhaps a little out-of-date.

Commander Pursey: Wait till you hear what I have to say about you.

Mr. Watkinson: I shall listen with the greatest interest.
I wish to press very hard for the utmost priority for the development of anti-aircraft rockets and on general rocket development in the Navy. In all our research and development that should be receiving the greatest priority.
There is a small point which arises from the First Lord's very able and enjoyable explanation which accompanied the Navy Estimates, which I should think was certainly produced in the First Lord's time, and not in the time of his predecessor, because it gives such a clear and accurate picture of what the Navy is trying to do. My right hon. Friend talked about the production of valves. I take it that he means not the ordinary metal open and shut valves but thermionic valves.
These valves are the heart of our antisubmarine measures, the heart of our radar and the heart of all our gunnery control system. It is about the most fragile and delicate thing that one could have. What will happen to such a valve when a ship suffers a near miss must be borne in mind when we are considering the seaworthiness of ships in battle conditions. Are we sure that we have an adequate production line so that enough of these valves can be produced? When I went to look at the "Relentless" before she joined the Fleet, I noticed an interesting notice on a lot of gear, which said "Don't repair. Fit the spare." If those are the tactics which it is proposed to adopt, a lot of valves are going to be required.
I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to look into this matter and to make sure that adequate reserves are available with adequate production behind them, so that we shall have the flow of valves that will keep us going in the event of active hostilities.
There is one other point which I should like to mention briefly. In America they are working on a new type of crystal


valve, which is more robust, and if that is so I hope we shall have access to that design and be able to make them ourselves.
One last point. At the beginning of the last war I found myself in D.E.M.S., the Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships. We have all paid tributes to what is called the Silent Service, and I should like to pay one to the men who fought and died in the Merchant Service in the last war with inadequate weapons. They had Lewis guns to fight modern aircraft and a type of degaussing to protect them from acoustic mines. I remember on one occasion meeting the commodore of a convoy after we had both been sunk together. Already he had been sunk three times, and at the age of 70 his only desire was to go to' sea again with a convoy at the earliest possible moment. That is something which we should remember, and is perhaps the best corrective that I know to certain gentlemen who were sitting on the other side of the House last night.

Mr. Ellis Smith: That is unfair.

Mr. Watkinson: The practical point I want to make is this. Are we building up sufficient reserves of gear to equip our merchant ships with armaments against mining in the event of war? Depots require to be placed all over the country. I want in this connection to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, who, I think, has been active in this matter and who has seen that something has been done. But I hope it will not be lost sight of, because it is most important to fit out our merchant ships quickly in the event of war or the threat of war.
I am sorry if I have detained the House too long, but may I conclude with the motto of the establishment in which I was trained in the last war as an R.N.V.S.R. officer—and I hope I can say that its doors are always open to R.N.V.S.R. officers who want refresher courses—"If you want peace, prepare for war." It is our duty in this debate to make sure we are preparing for war in the Navy as efficiently as possible in order to be able to keep the peace.

8.43 p.m.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: I do not intend to talk about strategic reserves, except to mention in passing that I think a useful job has been done in educating Members on the other side of the House, who spent a great deal of their time during the war risking their lives in order to carry food to this country, that strategic reserves are part of the defences of this country. Indeed, the Admiralty has a division called the Trade Division which is specifically concerned with this problem.
Let me turn to some of the remarks of the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson) on the subject of submarine warfare. I hope, incidentally, to set a good example and keep my speech short. I want to refer to one remark made by the hon. Member when he said there was today the possibility of a submarine which need not come to the surface at any time even on its way to or from its patrol area. He had in mind the hydrogen peroxide submarine on which the Germans were experimenting, and there is evidence that the Soviet Union has got a specimen.
I can assure the hon. Member that the risk from this submarine in the near future is not as serious as he anticipates, and he should remember that a submarine with this type of propulsion depends a great deal on conventional Diesel and on electric power for the greater part of the time, in particular on its passage to and from the patrol area; and all it will do is provide a special burst of exceptional speed at the time of greatest operational need We have rather hoped that when the Conservative Government came into power we should see the end of too much scare talk which they favoured about the Russian submarine menace. I am sure that the Parliamentary Secretary is well aware of the facts. We know there is a danger and that it is one that has to be met and prepared against.

Mr. Watkinson: I should like to make this point plain. I said that as we were considering a new class of frigate that would be with us for a great number of years, it would be rather wise to look to the future and to envisage the kind of submarine that they might be called upon to hunt.

Mr. Shackleton: I quite agree, but I am always a little scared when the question of the submarine comes up from any


quarter because it can be such a distraction from the real strategic problems that face us in the world.
I wish to turn to one subject which was raised by the hon. Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt), who urged that the Admiralty should spend more money on publicity for recruiting. That was also the point mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). It is a fact that there has been a cut in this item, as we see when we look at the Estimates, as compared with last year.
I would ask the Minister whether he has made any representations to his colleagues, or has concerned himself with the cut that has been made in regard to the Central Office of Information. In the desire of the Government to give some evidence of the economies which they promised the country they would carry out, they have cut the Central Office of Information, which is doing a vital job in this field, by £17,000 in the money which has to be spent in the current year on publicity, most of which will be concerned with recruiting. This is one of the inconsistencies, like the cut in the strategic reserve, that we observe in the performance of the present Government.
I recall during the war that we had a number of reports from aircraft flying over the Bay of Biscay and out to the West of a strange disturbance on the water. They brought back photographs, on which we found a number of foam patches and lines which appeared to have no relation to any known condition. We thought about it and wondered whether there was a new type of submarine. We studied the charts. At last a consistent pattern began to appear, and we realised that it was the 100-fathom line drawing attention to itself, in readiness for the day when the present Prime Minister should establish this completely inconsequential boundary for the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic.
If there is one boundary which bears no relation to naval problems, except the mining one, it is the 100-fathom line. We were all relieved on this side of the House that the Prime Minister should have seen some wisdom in this matter and should have climbed down from the completely intolerable position that he had taken up before, but the 100-fathom

line is nothing but a mock victory. If it is to mean anything, it will be confusing to operational commanders.
The 100-fathom line in the Bay of Biscay goes in a great circle and will be crossed every day by aircraft, if they are on patrol, and by ships. It will not be very easy to see the significance of that line. I suggest, in the interests of administrative efficiency on the part of the Command, that they drop this meaningless line and try to adopt a more logical one even if it be the three-mile limit.
There is a question I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. But first, in view of the many tributes that have been paid to the new First Lord, I should like at this point to say how glad I am to see the Parliamentary Secretary occupying that position. Even though he did not enter the Navy through Dartmouth at the age of 13½ years, I have other reasons for knowing his capacity.
May I ask him how, under the new set-up of the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic, the various command headquarters are to work? The situation is becoming very complicated, and we should like to have an explanation. We should like to know that the system which worked extremely well during the war—and I have had an opportunity of seeing it working since the war when I went back and did a few days' service last year—is still to be operated.
I hope that we shall not get caught up in too much of a multiplicity of commands, which will confuse the issue. The important thing, as the Parliamentary Secretary knows, will be that there should be clear-cut lines of communication to Coastal Command and the Admiralty, and it is on the area combined head quarters that operational control will rest so far as protecting this country and its trade from a possible submarine menace goes. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will give careful attention to this point.
I wish to turn briefly to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Shrewsbury. He referred to Naval Aviation. I strongly support him in suggesting that the term "Naval Aviation" should disappear and that in future the Fleet Air Arm should again be called the Fleet Air Arm. At the same time.


although the Fleet Air Arm—I will continue to call it that—is at last beginning to get some aircraft of which it can be proud, I am horrified to hear that the "Barracuda" is still in first-line service. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] I think it was the hon. Member for Shrewsbury who said that it was. This is a very serious matter. I hope, however, that this monstrous statement can be denied.
The whole position of the supply of naval aircraft is confusing. There is a great multiplicity of types, and while I do not believe that the problem can be solved by cutting out the Ministry of Supply—that would lead to grossly uneconomic production of aircraft—I hope that there will be a greater concentration on established types and that if possible the Navy will not carry so many different types of aircraft, all of which have different maintenance problems and all of which make it more difficult to maintain an efficient air service.
While on this subject I wish to make a point about the handling of Fleet Air Arm personnel, particularly aircrew. In the past and during the war we found that the Navy was so security-minded that when Fleet Air Arm squadrons came into Coastal Command stations they had often been denied essential operational information. In the latter part of the war the Navy decided to appoint intelligence officers to carriers, and set up little intelligence libraries, etc.
1 should like to know if they are continuing with that policy, because it is of great importance to see that the people who fly the aircraft, the aircrew, are given the maximum information they can be given. It all helps to bring the job alive, and they are tackling what, next to the submarine service or equally with it, is the most dangerous task that confronts the Navy. They are entitled to special consideration.
This brings me to a rather serious point. The hon. Member for Shrewsbury and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East, discussed the question of careers in the Fleet Air Arm. It has always been a great problem to ensure that the Fleet Air Arm and the aircrew were given a proper opportunity and were not treated as a kind of lower class in the Navy. I am horrified to learn, however, that there is what I can only call a plot

between naval Members on both sides of the House to enlarge the career opportunities for the Fleet Air Arm by raising once again the question of the status of Coastal Command. I know that the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) and one of my hon. Friends on my own Front Bench are concerned in this activity and are intending to raise the matter on the Air Estimates.
One of the great services which the Parliamentary Secretary could render to another Service in the cause of friendship and peace would be, when he replies tonight, to deny once and for all that the Admiralty has any intention whatever of pressing for an alteration in the status of Coastal Command. I can assure the Minister and the House that if this matter comes up it will cause grave anxiety and will increase the friction which always tends to exist between the Services.
Coastal Command and the Navy have today a fairly happy relationship. They understand their position. The system of command worked admirably during the war, though there were minor points of difference. I urge that in this case the matter shall not even be submitted to discussion and to inquiry and that we shall hear, once and for all, that the question of Coastal Command is not at any point at issue. I regret greatly that there should be this plot across the Floor of the House between the naval Members to render grave disservice to the Royal Air Force and to the security of this country.

8.56 p.m.

Mr. F. A. Burden: I know that the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) will not mind if I do not follow him at any length, though I should like to say how much Iagree with his request to the Parliamentary Secretary to ensure that at all times the Navy shall have access to any aerial photographs that may be necessary for their operations. It is a very important matter.
Some hon. Members opposite have been in rather difficult circumstances today. I was wondering whether we should be treated to the annual visit to this Chamber on Navy Estimates day of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) in view of recent events. However, since he represents a dockyard constituency, which mine also happens to be


to a large extent, I was not surprised that he came here today, because he found it expedient to talk about the dockyards. I noticed, however, that he was most diffident in talking about the re-armament programme and perhaps that is understandable to many of us at this stage.
The position was made rather more difficult by the fact that the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) stated that some of his friends last night had voted against the rearmament programme only on the basis that it was too big. If it were too big, it seems to me extraordinary that they could come here today and not say that the naval re-armament programme is too big. Probably in the interests of their constituents they avoided that point, because undoubtedly the dockyards are dependent for their living upon the naval re-armament programme.
It is always interesting to listen to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), though I thought he was in difficulty at one stage today when he twitted the present Government on its likely period of power. Presumably he thought that he might be standing in the shoes of my right hon. Friend in another year. I cannot really think that he was hoping that that would happen, because it has been made perfectly clear that if it were to happen he would have much more difficulty in carrying through the naval part of the re-armament programme than has my right hon. Friend.
I cannot help feeling that he was being just a trifle naive in making that suggestion. Indeed, if the present portents are followed through, he would have the utmost difficulty, before the programme was finished, because he might not find nearly as much support from among his hon. and right hon. Friends as from this side of the House in carrying through the naval re-armament programme.
If I may deal with a rather parochial matter, hon. Members will remember that in the 1950 debate on the Navy Estimates the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, announced that the Royal Marines were to be removed from Chatham. There was considerable consternation and dismay among many people in the Medway towns at this abrupt rupture of what had come to be looked upon as an unbreakable and permanent association.

The marines had become almost a part of the Medway towns since they first went there in the 18th Century.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, as is usual with him, made a very good case for the transfer of the corps, to Portsmouth and Devonport on the, grounds that they could not be properly trained at Chatham and that living conditions were much more satisfactory at Portsmouth and Devonport. The argument that they should be moved on the grounds of efficiency and economy made it extremely difficult to contest very seriously their transfer, despite the very strong reasons that could be given for their retention on sentimental grounds. Also there was the fact—and this was very important to the Medway towns, and particularly to Chatham—that the transfer of the marines meant a loss in rates of £4,000 per annum, and in view of this no doubt the Government at that time felt that some palliative was necessary.
After making the announcement that the marines were to leave Chatham, the hon. Gentleman said:
The accounts section of the Royal Marines will still be maintained at Chatham, so that there will still be a link remaining, but it is with very great regret that we have to take this step. The Marine establishment that is being closed down will be replaced in due course by a naval establishment, H.M.S. "Ceres," which is the Training Establishment of the Supply and Secretariat Branch of the Navy at present stationed in another part of the country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1971.]
The people of the Medway towns felt sure that that undertaking would be honoured, but on Monday last, as the right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley) has already said, the mayors of the three Medway towns and the two Members of Parliament were asked to proceed to the Admiralty, where it was announced that "Ceres" was not now to go to Chatham.
I believe that this decision was arrived at because, whereas the first estimates for repairing and restoring to a proper modern state the barracks that had been occupied by the marines came to a figure of £135,000, it was later found that it would necessitate an actual expenditure of £250,000: and in July last year the decision was arrived at, I believe, by the predecessor of my hon. and gallant Friend that that promise to send "Ceres" to Chatham would not now be honoured.
I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman on the Front Bench opposite knew of this decision last July. If he did, I hope he registered a very strong protest, because it was he who came here and promised that "Ceres" would go to Chatham. We do not want to make points which are too much of a party nature on these questions, because always there must be applied to this transfer the question of whether it is expedient, whether it is economic and whether efficiency will be impaired, but I imagine that the hon. Gentleman and the previous First Lord had looked carefully into the matter before the promise was made in this House.
I ask my right hon. Friend to look at the matter once again and even at this late stage to consider whether it is now possible to send "Ceres" to Chatham. Failure to implement the promise is a very serious matter for the Medway towns. It means that there will be a loss of rates and a loss of civilian employment—which may not be very important at the moment. It means that small shopkeepers and small traders—and most of them in Chatham are small shopkeepers and small traders—will lose business as a result of the failure to carry out the promise.
But the matter goes very much deeper. At the moment there is plenty of work in the dockyards and undoubtedly this will continue whilst the re-armament programme continues at its present level. But there must come a time when the spate of orders for new ships and re-equipment will drop off. Then the question of employment in the dockyards must arise and the towns rely for prosperity more than ever on establishments such as "Ceres." The decision not to send "Ceres" to Chatham because of the cost of modernising the barracks takes the matter very much further. It implies that those barracks will be used only in the case of a great emergency and if at this time when there is large expenditure on re-armament it is found not possible to spend £250,000 on modernising existing barracks, the implication is that those barracks will at no time be modernised and used to bring in new establishments which are essential to the Medway towns when the rearmament programme begins to fall off.
I ask the Minister to look at this question because the decision and all that it implies are very much bound up with the prosperity of the Medway

towns. If he cannot now undertake that "Ceres" shall come to Chatham, I ask him to bear the matter in mind and see whether some other unit can be sent there to compensate for the loss of this land-based ship. I also ask my right hon. Friend to take care to ensure that, as a result of the removal of the marines and the decision not to send "Ceres" to Chatham, there shall be no falling off of employment in the workshops making uniforms for the Services. At the moment very many highly skilled needle-women are employed in that capacity in Chatham. I hope there will be no question of their removal to any other quarters.
The second point I would make is on the question of dockyard workers, of whom we have a number in the Medway towns. As the re-armament programme gets under way, we have to consider the question of skilled and unskilled labour and the provision of a balanced labour force in the dockyards. Recently there has appeared in the area an alternative form of employment. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are erecting a huge refinery on the Isle of Grain not very far away. They are offering very high wages to skilled men and also to labourers. I ask the Minister to look carefully into the matter to see whether the Company are skimming off some of the best workers from the dockyards at Chatham. This is a matter which must be watched very carefully, because it is obvious that unless we have a balanced labour force in the dockyard, the re-armament programme will lapse.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Does the hon. Member mean to say that the re-armament programme can be carried out only if there is a reduction of wages?

Mr. Burden: The hon. Member misunderstands me. There was no question of the reduction of wages. These men are at liberty to go to the Isle of Grain if they wish. There is no direction of labour and there is nothing to stop them leaving the dockyards and going to the Isle of Grain, where perhaps they will earn higher wages for a short period, but when that project is finished these men will be looking for other employment. I suggest that it should be emphasised that employment in the dockyards is long-term employment whereas on the Isle of Grain, while they may earn higher wages


at the moment, when that project is finished their employment will cease.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Will the hon. Member permit me—

Mr. Burden: No, I have given way already, and there is not much time—

Mr. Paget: The hon. Member is assuming unemployment.

Mr. Burden: If the hon. and learned Member wishes to put a point, I will give way if he rises.

Mr. Paget: The hon. Member is assuming unemployment. I suppose, therefore, he is assuming the continuance of the Conservative Government.

Mr. Burden: I am assuming nothing of the sort. I said that when the refinery was finished these men would have to leave that short-term employment and that would be the case whether a Socialist or a Conservative Government is in office. I was pointing out that it is short-term employment at the refinery. When it is finished—and under private enterprise it will certainly be finished more quickly than if it were a nationalised undertaking—they will want to go back to the dockyards but I do not want them to leave the yards.
There were one or two other points which I wished to mention, but in view of the comparatively late hour and the fact that there are other hon. Members who wish to speak, I will conclude by asking the Parliamentary Secretary whether he will tell us more particularly about the circumstances resulting in the fact that the "Ceres" is not now going to the Medway towns.

SIMPLIFIED ENGLISH SPELLING

9.14 p.m.

Mr. M. Follick: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House is of the opinion that a great advantage would accrue, in the sending of despatches, signals, orders and messages, if some simplification of the English spelling were introduced.
It is not my wish to divide the House on this Amendment, but unless the Minister can give a satisfactory assurance that not only will this matter be given serious

consideration but that he will call in his experts and consult other Departments, we shall take the matter to a Division.

Commander Pursey: The hon. Gentleman is the only one who says so.

Mr. Follick: Which side is the hon. and gallant Gentleman on?

Commander Pursey: Not the hon. Gentleman's.

Mr. Follick: Thank goodness the hon. and gallant Gentleman is not on our side. I am afraid that if he were, we should not get any votes at all.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The hon. Gentleman will not in any case

Mr. Follick: As there are no Whips on for this Division, Members in all parts of the House can support us in this—

Mr. Callaghan: Crusade.

Mr. Follick: Yes, in this crusade.

Commander Pursey: The hon. Gentleman will be the only teller.

Mr. Follick: We have now got away from controversial matters and we are discussing a question on which most of us agree to a certain extent. This Amendment is not the same as the Bill I brought before the House on 11th March, 1948. That was a Bill for spelling reform. This is not a question of spelling reform: it is only a question of some simplification of spelling. Sir Alan Herbert, who opposed that Bill, afterwards told me that if I would agree to a moderate step towards the simplification of spelling, he would support me. Not only that, but when I was fortunate in the Ballot some days ago and was reading out the Amendment which I proposed to move, I heard the Prime Minister whisper, "It is a very sensible proposal." The Prime Minister knows something about the English language and about the Navy. At the start of both world wars he was First Lord of the Admiralty.
I should have preferred to move a similar Motion to this on the Civil Estimates, but as I drew the second lucky chance, had to take the second opportunity. Instead of moving an Amendment on the Civil Estimates, I move this one now.

Mr. Percy Daines: Tell us what it is about.

Mr. Follick: I will take my time. I have waited and I will take my time now.

Mr. Ellis Smith: My hon. Friend has got another supporter coming in.

Mr. Follick: We are in process of building up a naval organisation composed of 11 nations, and I believe that there are eight different languages spoken in those 11 nations, but the over-ruling language is to be English. In signalling, it may be possible, and probably will be, that people of different nationalities will have to signal messages in English. To take an extreme case, we may have a Greek signalling to a Dutchman a message in English. [Laughter.] It is no laughing matter; it is true. It is just as well that we should envisage this fact, and try to simplify the difficulties of English spelling in that respect, so as to make it easier for them and make it less likely for mistakes to occur.
Naval people in the Service have been most progressive in the question of language reform and spelling. They have, in this respect, done much that is far from their usual duties and responsibilities. I will give a few examples. The old-fashioned spelling of "boatswain" has now been transformed into "bosun," and that is the spelling given in the dictionary. The old form "bolework" has been transformed into its ordinary spelling according to the pronunciation, and has become "bulwark." The old form of the word indicated that it was a bole work, as opposed to earthwork, because the boles were trunks of trees. The Navy changed the spelling to accord with the pronunciation.
The Navy also changed words for other reasons. They formerly had the words "starboard" and "larboard," but, as there was confusion between the two, they changed the word "larboard" to "port." The Navy has shown much progress in this matter, and it is for that very reason that I am trying to see if it will not be possible to extend this way of acting in the Royal Navy to a great number of other words.

Mr. David Renton: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to interrupt? Why does he not set an example by dropping an "I" and a "c," and, possibly, a "k" from his own name?—[Laughter.]

Mr. Follick: There is nothing to laugh at in this matter; absolutely nothing. Although I have not belonged to the Royal Navy, I am raising this question on the Navy Estimates. There are other words the spelling of which the Navy have changed. There is "gunwale." That appears in the dictionary as "gunnel."

Commander Pursey: Not in the Navy.

Mr. Follick: In the dictionary and referring to the Navy. There is no reason why "coxswain" should not be similarly written "coxon." There is no reason why "rowlocks" should not be spelt according to the pronunciation.

Commander Pursey: Rowlocks!

Mr. Follick: There is a man who comes from the Navy ! I am using this opportunity as a means towards my spelling reform. It might be called the thin end of the wedge. [Interruption.] My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), is as tiresome to me as to hon. Members on the other side of the House—and no advertisement to this party or to this Parliament.
I am going to suggest that, taking the overall view of the position, we should seriously think of simplifying the words that to foreigners cause difficulties, because we are going to have a tremendous number of other than English-speaking people in this great naval set-up that we are now organising.
We should consider as a start accepting all those American innovations of Professor Matthews. There are 300 of them altogether, and they have become part and parcel of the American side of the English language. They were introduced by Theodore Roosevelt into Congress, and Theodore Roosevelt actually ordered the Government printer to use those 300 innovations in all public documents. I should like to read from Theodore Roosevelt's view of these. He said:
It is not an attempt to do anything far-reaching or sudden or violent or, indeed, anything very great at all. It is merely an attempt to cast all the slight weight that can properly be cast on the side of the popular forces which are endeavouring to make our spelling a little less foolish and fantastic.
That was the view of Theodore Roosevelt, and that is the view of any person who has had dealings with foreigners either in teaching them the English language


or examining them on the subject of the English language. So I am going to deal more or less with the foreign aspect of the question. I hope that my seconder will take the English side and deal with that.
One of the most important of these 300 American innovations was the dropping of the "u" from all words ending in "our," like "labour," "rumour" and "colour." Actually the Americans are much more correct and nearer the true etymology of the word in their acceptance of the spelling than we are, because they go right back to the Latin origin of the word. They write "color," which is exactly the true etymology of the word—coloris; labor, laboris, and so on, right through that long list of words ending "our." Even over here on the British side of the English language, in the extension of the word we drop the "u." "Labour" we spell with a "u," but we drop the "u" in "laboratory" and "laborious." We spell "honour" with the "u" but in "honorific" and honorary "the" "u" is dropped.
That is one instance in which it would be of great benefit in signalling to simplify the whole thing. Where there is a dropping of the "u" in the extension of the word, the original root-word ought to be spelt without the "u" as well. It will be very difficult indeed for, say, a Dutchman who is signalling to an American or a British ship to know whether he shall use the American form or the British form of spelling. It would be much better to accept these innovations as they are, as the Americans have accepted them, into the Navy for signalling purposes, and then they will come slowly into the English language as part and parcel of our English.
We could drop all mute letters, because the majority of them not only are not pronounced but ought not to be there at all. Let me give the House an example. Take the word "receipt" spelt r-e-c-e-i-p-t. We do not spell "deceit" d-e-c-e-i-p-t, or "conceit" c-o-n-c-e-i-p-t, yet they are the same root. In "reception," "deception" and "conception" the "p" is retained right through. "Receive," "conceive" and "deceive" all take the same form. But in this one exception, "receipt," for some reason or other the letter "p" is shoved in. Now that provides a terrific difficulty for a foreigner who has to learn it. The first thing he asks is "Why have you this letter

'p' in 'receipt' and not in 'deceit' or 'conceit'? "If it is dropped from all the other derivations, why retain it in this one word?
Take the word "double." Why have an "o" there when we do not pronounce it? In the original etymology of the word there was no o." It comes from the Latin duplus. There was no "o" there at all; yet it has crept into the language. It would make it much easier for the foreigner who has to be in this naval set-up, and who has to signal in English, if all these small things were attended to, because they are very small really, and they do not greatly affect the language. All that they do is to make it easier for those who have to learn the language.
All the words ending in "ough" could be put into their proper spelling. There is no reason why "plough" should not be written "plow"; "cough" as "coll." As a matter of fact, the Shakespearean use of "cough" was "coll." This form of "ough" is only in the language because of Dr. Johnson's dictionary. These are all simplifications that could take place very easily. Take the word "biscuit." There is no reason why it should not be written "biskit." [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but in other words we do use that form of spelling.
In the word "kitchen," which is exactly the same derivation, we do not write it "cuitchen," but "kitchen." In the word "navvy" a different spelling has been accepted. "Navvy" was a naval word, and to distinguish it from "navy" a second "v" was introduced.
There is nothing static about the English language. It is a very mobile language. The English language is always being changed. To introduce these small changes would not alter the language drastically. It would only make it easier for a foreigner to learn. In English, "ce," "ci," "ti," "te," "si," and "se," are all pronounced "sh," like "malicious," "contentious." Where there is "ci," "ce," and "ti" there would be no difficulty at all in writing "sh" and having done with it. The foreigner could learn "sh" for all "sh" sounds and it would not make any great difference to the language.
To show how the English language has changed, take the word "thumb." When


we talk about "fumbling" something, it is the same as saying, "He is all thumbs." There we have actually changed the spelling to accord with the pronunciation. The word "thumbling" has become "fumbling." We can do this with the majority of these irregularities in pronunciation. We do not only change spelling but we change words, and get different meanings. The word "intrigue" does not mean the same thing as it used to mean. In my lifetime, the word "alibi" has taken on a different meaning. In my lifetime "alibi" used to mean that one was somewhere else at the time that something happened. Today in 99 cases out of a hundred "alibi" means an excuse

Mr. Speaker: I do not like to interrupt the hon. Gentleman but these are the Navy Estimates. The hon. Member must try, if he can, to remain afloat.

Mr. Follick: With the greatest respect Mr. Speaker, I said that the Navy Estimates are acting as a sort of vehicle for explaining all these changes. The word "alibi" can be used in the Navy. A sailor explaining something can give an alibi or an excuse. With great deference to your learned opinion, all the words that I have used can be used in the Navy. I admit that they can be used elsewhere, but they can certainly be used in the Navy.
Even the Leader of the House gave a different meaning to a word recently. In his first speech from the Dispatch Box as Leader of the House, he made a big song about "the skeletons in the cupboard" and said that they were hanging like candelabra. I have never known a candelabra that hangs. A candelabra sticks up. It is a chandelier that hangs down and not a candelabra.

Captain Ryder: On a point of order. May I point out that we have ceased using candelabra or chandeliers in the Navy for some time?

Mr. Follick: I was referring to Nelson's day when candelabra and chandeliers were used in the Navy.
You have been very tolerant, Mr. Speaker, and I have only a few more examples that I should like to give. A messenger in the Navy may have to send a telegram and he may not know whether "telegram" has to be spelt with "mme"

at the end like "programme" or whether be should leave off the final "me". Would it not be better if all words ending in "gram" or "gramme" were spelt the same way? Even people of our standard of education have to look at a dictionary to find out whether "programme" is spelt "program" or "programme".
If the Minister will promise to give this matter careful and sympathetic consideration, we shall be greatly indebted to him. If he refuses to do that, we shall have to carry this Amendment to a Division. Although many hon. Members are sneering and jeering and interrupting very stupidly, I would remind the House of two hon. Members who sat in the House for years trying to convince hon. Members of certain necessities. It took a Great War to bring in daylight saving. Plimsoll drew the attention of hon. Members to the value of the Plimsoll Line for 20 years before a great disaster caused Parliament to adopt his recommendations. I beg the House not to treat this matter of spelling reform as these two geniuses were treated.
There are Members in this House who believe that some simplification of spelling would be of great service to our language; it would spread our language throughout the world, and would make peace come nearer through the use of a language that, because of its simplicity, would spread everywhere. I commend this Amendment to the House.

9.45 p.m.

Mr. I. J. Pitman: I beg to second the Amendment.
I think the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) and all of us who take seriously this question of spelling in the interests of the Navy are greatly complimented that the First Lord of the Admiralty as well as the Civil Lord should be here during this debate, together with the Secretary of State for War, the Under-Secretary of State for Air and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, because, although this matter is of very grave and great importance to the Navy, it is perfectly clear, mutatis mutandis, it refers to all three Services because the whole issue is one of coordinated defence. I want, in speaking particularly in terms of the Navy, to bring home how terribly important are rapid and accurate communications. Modern


fire power, particularly since the rocket, is of such weight that almost a split second counts, and if the enemy get in that devastating weight substantially ahead the issue is over and finished.
I would say that in a big European war effort the efficacy of communications within the armed forces is exactly comparable to the reacting speed in a boxer's ability. The ability to react quickly and communicate between one part of the body and the other is the real science of a supreme self-defence in the boxing ring, and I would say in terms of our war effort and of the Navy that it is also the very -essence of communications that they should be rapid and accurate. Therefore, the subject is worthy of the attention of this House.
As the hon. Member for Loughborough—and here I might add that he would spell "Loughborough" with far greater economy—has raised this matter in the context of many national languages being spoken by those engaged in the common defence effort of N.A.T.O. It is by intercommunications that the body will become effective. As we know, English has been accepted as the conventional common vehicle of inter-communications, and that in itself is a very successful first-step in providing for more effective communications. The Navy is the Senior Service. Moreover it has its own air force—the Fleet Air Arm. The Royal Navy, as such, ought to set a lead amongst the other Services in co-ordinating communicating efficiency.
Moreover, Britain is the senior country because it is the parent of the English language, and I think that as between Britain and America the Royal Navy is clearly the right unit to initiate any consideration of this kind.
I want the House to get clear in their minds that there are two kinds of communications. There is signalling which is international and signalling which is national. An example of international signalling is a flag at half mast. It is independent of language altogether. When we see the "Blue Peter" at the masthead, we understand it everywhere because it is an international sign. Again, when we are on the road and see a torch-sign by the side, we know that we are approaching a school. We do not have to speak the language of the

country in which we are motoring in order to know that.
I want to make it clear that we who support this Amendment recognise that, in the majority of instances, signalling from ship to ship is of this "international" and not of a national character. I look back to the R.A.F. where I was trained in a Link trainer at one stage. I know that such signs as "O.D.M. and" Q.D.F." are definitely international. They have meaning; but not through any language, because they are not linguistic. Most ship-to-ship signalling in war and in peace admittedly takes place in this way without the necessity of a common language at all.
I hope that the Civil Lord, when he replies, will therefore leave out altogether the international aspect of this problem, because it is not about international signalling that we are talking at all, only about national language signalling. Any of us on a railway platform in a foreign country, having got out to stretch his legs, if he saw a man blow a whistle and wave a green flag would know that he had to get back into the carriage, notwithstanding the fact that he did not speak the language at all. Do not let us, then, have anything from the Civil Lord in his reply about the international field, because that is irrelevant.
National languages each have three kinds. One is the spoken language, and that is ephemeral. It is in the medium of time. Even when it is on a tape record, in the groove of a gramophone record, or a sound track, it is nevertheless operating in time. The visible language, the second, is however operating in space. We can operate in space and can control space, whereas we cannot control time. The essence of this debate is the system of relationship between the ephemeral spoken word and the recorded visible word. There is, I must mention, a third national language, a tactile version of any language. All of us in this House have the greatest admiration for our hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Sir I. Fraser), and great admiration and sympathy for all those whom he so well stands up for, but let us face the fact that that form of signalling, Braille, is out of it, so far as speed is concerned. We are considering tonight only two forms of one national language, the visible in relation to the audible, versions of English.
We put forward this Amendment in a context in which we have already agreed to make certain very considerable reforms in what is the real English language. I understand that we have definitely decided that in communications and signals we will not use the word "lorry" but will use the word "truck," and not use the word "petrol" but use the word "gas." We will not use "sleepers," but we will use "ties." We will not use "post"; we are going to use "mail." We will not use "valves," but going to call them "tubes" in our signalling.
I have here a list of 45 such pairs of English words, and I note that already a considerable standardisation in the form and essence of English has been accepted without anybody raising an objection. The English language as spoken is the primary form, and it is extraordinary that whereas we should accept willingly fundamental alterations in what is really the primary English language, we should kick at what is the secondary of it, and that is the form in which it is recorded.
We would none of us object if Western Union changed their form of recording of the English language by a new system on the sound track of films. Why should we object at all if, for the purpose of better communication and reproduction, we had a better and more sensible form of communicating in terms of another visible representation of our spoken language? We have that need, and a similar and greater need to cause a similar disturbance of spelling in the same cause.
But to establish this view I need to show why the visible recording should be, efficient. The context is that many people who will be using these visible signs will know no English at all. The Greek whom the hon. Member for Loughborough contemplates will often be a Greek who knows no English. He may find himself handling a list of stores which for standardisation purposes is printed in English, and he has to use the telephone, it may be the radio-telephone, to deal with it, and possibly speak to a Dutchman who equally may or may not know English.
It is very important that there should be this complete two-way traffic so that people can understand clearly. What the Greek thinks the letters say must be as

nearly as possible what the English word sounds. We naturally cannot change the form of the English language, nor do we want to, so we have to fall back on changing the form in which it is represented visibly on paper so that sound and sight may be in relation so that there can be the two-way traffic of reading sound from sight correctly and recording sounds correctly, which is the very essence of all alphabetical writing.
It will be necessary to show to what extent the present spelling interferes with that double signalling efficiency, the two-way traffic from paper and to paper. It not only fails the Greek but it misleads the Greek.
It so fails in two ways. The best way to demonstrate that is first to deal with practice and then with why it fails in theory. If I said to you, Mr. Speaker, "Abblay bakker" you would think I was out of order and not speaking English. In point of fact, "able, baker" is the very alphabetic essence of the conventional signs with which theoretically, when not being understood, we make our English language more comprehensible over the telephone. I should say that anybody picking up a printed document, who does not know any English and who has to use the telephone would, seeing "able, baker," be fully justified in speaking into the mouthpiece "abblay bakker."
Again I have here as examples only two vowel sounds, "I" as we have it in the word "I" and "i" as we have it in "is." There are 14 spellings of that sound—in "I," "i-e" in "die," "i-n" in "wind," "i-g" in "sign," "i-g-h" in "high," "i" plus consonant plus "e" in "like," "y" in "cry," "y" plus consonant plus "e" in "type," "a-i-s" in "aisle," "a-y-e" in the "aye" which we use when we vote here, "e-i" in "seismic," "o-i" in "choir," "u-i" in "guide," "u-y" in "buy," and "e-y-e" in "eye."
In the case of "i" in "is," I will read them quickly: "wind," "sieve," "abyss," "forfeit," "meteor" and "lettuce," and "o" in "women." So that we get this extraordinary spelling. Then there is w-i-n-d which represents both "wiend" and "wind." Then there is "ui" in "guide" and "ui" in "build" and "of" in "choir" and "o" in "women."
All this arises from the theoretical point that we lack the necessary tools for a system and are trying to do a job which requires fundamentally 40 different sounds. We must have a system of 40 different visible signs either in combinations or new ones, where we have at present 26, of which three, "c," "q" and "x," are repetitive and are doubles and therefore are of no use.
I would say that English is clearly the ideal language for communication. It is easy to learn, it is fine to use and it is simple in its syntax and rich in meanings. And it is in spelling alone that it pierces the hand of those, particularly foreigners, who work from paper or who work to paper.
We have a tremendous failure here at home because of our lack of system in our use of the alphabet. I do not know if anybody has read the Ministry of Education publication, which I have in my hand, called "Reading Ability"? It shows that 30 per cent. of the 15-yearolds are backward readers, and backward readers are really defined as illiterate. After all, if we English have this difficulty and we are brought up from the cradle to hear our spoken language and to relate it later to this written version if we have this appalling failure, how much more is that so in the case of foreigners who are working solely from paper and have not been brought up to hear English as their mother tongue. What an awful mess they must inevitably make of it. Which proves the point that if we wish to have an efficient signalling system, we must have a new alphabetic system giving a really close relationship between the visible form and the spoken form.
Now, how does this Amendment we have on the Order Paper help communication by improving this two-way traffic? I would point out that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Loughborough leaves it absolutely open to the Admiralty to choose and introduce what for their purpose may be found to be the best system. It is up to them to find it.
They could, it seems to me, use the International Phonetic Alphabet. I personally think that there would be a grave disadvantage—

Professor Sir Douglas Savory: Hear, hear.

Mr. Pitman: In principle the hon. Member is absolutely right. The practical difficulty, however, consists in the need for special type which the I.P.A. necessarily involves in such signalling work, but it ought to be considered because, after all, it is largely in the printed literature that we want the new forms used. Then the hon. Member for Loughborough has a first-class system which ought to be considered. It is particularly suitable for foreigners.

Commander Pursey: Is it any good for backing horses?

Mr. Pitman: Then the Simplified Spelling Society in England and the Simplified Spelling Association have worked out and agreed between them such a system which has been shown to be practical, and the American Government have introduced their own simplification which the Admiralty might follow.
Man's greatest gifts are really these three: language, which then got to writing through picture writing, and then through the alphabet. We in English are midway between the Chinaman, with his writing which has not become alphabetic, and the true use of the alphabet. The extent to which any foreigner is misled in any signalling by our spelling may be measured by the degree of shock which an Englishman receives on reading any passage in simplified spelling. When he sees "woz" for "was" it brings it home to him with a bump. The foreigner sees "has" and then "was," and says "waz." In speech read from letters and in radiotelephony, the thing simply goes wrong and the war is lost "for the lack of a nail,"
The English language is a really fine language. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] We have fine allies, all of whom want to learn English and to use it. Bismarck is said to have remarked at one time that the significant fact of the 19th Century was that America and Britain spoke the same language. [An HON. MEMBER: "Do they?"] It may well be that the significant fact of the 20th Century is that the whole of Europe and of the world wants to speak English, whereas not many want to speak Russian.
This combined naval effort which we have got is a wonderful opportunity for the nation and for the world. Let us face


it: making a defensive system of signalling more efficient is a negative approach, but we may get it by the negative approach; but in peace and in the development throughout the world, the simplification of the English language would be of enormous benefit, not only to this country but to the whole world.

10.8 p.m.

Mr. Ralph Morley: I am very glad of this opportunity to make a brief speech in support of the Amendment, which has been so characteristically moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) and seconded with such knowledge by the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman).
The whole country has a very great admiration indeed for the British Navy. For many centuries it has been the wall which has prevented foreign invasion of this country and behind which we have been able to organise our resources in men and materials, which have enabled us to make successful excursions from time to time in campaigns upon the Continent of Europe.
I suppose that this nation has fought more wars during the past 900 years than any other European nation, and it has been successful in every one of the wars which it has fought except one which it fought against our own kith and kin in the American colonies. That long record of success is due very largely to the work of the British Navy.
As an ex-teacher, I have a special reason to be grateful to the British Navy. In 1931, the Government of the day decided to cut the salaries of all public servants, including teachers, by 20 per cent. Then the Navy, with its usual gallantry and dash, came to the rescue. There was a mutiny at Invergordon, and the Government decided to reduce the 20 per cent. cut to one of 10 per cent. The British Navy has often saved the British people, and upon that occasion it saved the British teachers.
We are under a very great debt of gratitude to the Navy in the past for its many great and meritorious services to the nation. Now, we are suggesting that it should give us another service by being the first to lead in the simplification of

English spelling. I think it was Dr. Johnson who said once that the greatness of a nation depended upon its authors. I would not go as far as that, but I do think that the influence and prestige of a nation throughout the world depends to a very considerable extent on the number of people who can read, speak and understand its language. After all, it was the reasonable and august Latin which was largely responsible for the long endurance of Imperial Rome, and the past glories of France, I think, owe almost as much to French prose as to French arms.
The English language is widely spoken, widely read and widely known, but it would be more widely known were it not for one thing. In many respects the English language is a very easy language for the foreigner to learn. There is hardly any grammar at all and what grammar there is is taken little notice of by the English people. We are not meticulous in observing all the laws in English grammar even in this House.

Mr. Speaker: I have been waiting for the hon. Member to approach the question of the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Morley: Yes, I am just about to approach them. I was saying that the grammar of the English language is extremely simple and very easy for foreigners. The vocabulary is a combination of Romance and Teutonic words and is easily learned by the nationals of many countries. There are few compound or agglutinative words in the language and the vowel sounds are simple. I agree that the difficulty in learning the English language is its very strange spelling. It is difficult for the poor foreigner to see that d-o-u-g-h spells "dough" and c-o-u-g-h spells "cough" while t-h-r-o-u-g-h spells "through." If we want the English language spread and a greater use of the English language, we feel it is necessary in the first place to simplify the spelling, and we are asking the Navy, with its usual gallantry, with its usual forward-looking view, to take the initiative in adopting a simpler form of spelling for the purpose of naval signalling.
In the majority of cases the Navy has to be manned by men who have received their first education in our State schools. I know from my own experience what a tremendous waste of time there is in our State schools in efforts to teach scholars


how to spell the English language. Day by day lists of spellings are put up and day by day dictation tests are given and many hours are spent on them and on correcting mistakes of the pupils. When they leave school at least 40 per cent. of them are not able to spell the English language correctly and the other 60 per cent. who have been able to spell the English language usually have forgotten it about ten years after leaving school and have to use a dictionary when they write a letter of any importance.
A reform in spelling would save a great deal of time in our schools and would enable the schools to give further and more advanced instruction in those subjects which are particularly useful to members of the Royal Navy, such as mathematics. It would, I think, have the effect of increasing the efficiency of our already efficient Navy.
I hope, therefore, that when the First Lord or the Civil Lord replies, he may be able to give some sympathetic consideration to this question of simpler spelling for naval signalling. I am sure that if that is done it will give a strong impetus to a general reform of English spelling. Such a general reform would be one of the best means of promoting the learning of the English language and increasing the spread and influence of the English language throughout the whole world. That would undoubtedly he a great factor in the promotion of peace and would redound to the security and glory of our own nation.

10.16 p.m.

Mr. John Hay: I think we should express our appreciation to the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) on the ingenious method by which he has managed to ride his own particular hobby-horse right clean through the middle of the Navy Estimates. I can only express the hope that if next year the hon. Member is again successful in winning a place in the Ballot, he will move an Amendment drawing attention to the improvement in the health of the men in the Fleet which would accrue from the use of a revolving tooth brush, which I understand is another matter in which he is interested.
I wish to talk about the Amendment as strictly related to the Navy Estimates. Both the hon. Member for Loughborough and my hon. Friend the Member

for Bath (Mr. Pitman) have dealt with the subject more widely than I had expected. The Amendment calls attention to the advantages which would accrue if a simplified system of spelling were introduced into the manner of signalling and sending messages in the Navy. I think we should ask ourselves what are the advantages.
It is clear that it is only in respect of written messages that any advantage could be expected. The English language as spoken is understood by those who understand the language simply by listening to it. If any advantage is to be gained it must be in connection with the written language. Not all messages and signals in the Navy are written. Some are visual and some are oral. The visual form is first by a system of flags, and I suggest that a simplified form of spelling would not assist in that way.
Manœuvring and formation signals in the Navy are indicated by flag hoists which, when they are pulled down, are the signal which initiates action. There is, for example, a form of manœuvre in the Navy known as "a blue turn." That is a particular hoist of flags easily understood by every ship, and obviously no advantage from any simplified spelling would accrue.

Commander Pursey: What about "Splice the main-brace"?

Mr. Hay: That is a form of signal with which the hon. and gallant Member is no doubt very familiar. I am afraid I have not that advantage.

Commander Pursey: The hon. Gentleman has made a personal attack and have met that personal attack from the other side of the House once before. It was suggested at one time from the other side of the House, and it is within the recollection of a number of hon. Members, that if I was not sober I should leave the Chamber. When I interjected to say, "What about 'Splice the main-brace?' "I made a perfectly good and clear interjection which everybody understood. The hon. Member then makes the personal attack that I may know something more about it. I wish to put it on record for the second time that I am a life-long teetotaller and total abstainer—[Interruplion.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Hay.

Hon. Members: Withdraw.

Mr. Speaker: I do not think that there is any cause to withdraw.

Mr. Hay: I made no personal attack upon the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He served for a great many years in the Navy. Obviously, he would have a great deal more knowledge of the splicing of the main brace than I whose service was only for three or four years. In all the circumstances, it was a pretty friendly remark. I hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not take it amiss. I did not mean it so.
The next point on signalling where this system might be of advantage is in connection with the system of sending signals by semaphore or light. The only saving would be in the time saved in writing down the message in the simplified form of spelling. I suggest that there would be very little saving of time. The only saving could be in the length of words, and neither the hon. Member for Loughborough nor my hon. Friend the Member for Bath gave any clear definition of precisely the system of spelling they want.
Until they can say that they would be able to save a certain number of letters or words and, therefore, that a general saving of time or labour would accrue, I do not think the House ought to entertain the idea very much. We have had a certain amount of information before in this House from the hon. Member for Loughborough, and the name of Sir Alan Herbert has been mentioned. Perhaps I might remind the House that on 11th March, 1949, he explained how the system which the hon. Member for Loughborough had in mind would save only one letter in some 400 or 500 when the whole thing was totted up.

Mr. Pitman: The words of the Amendment do not import the idea that there is actual saving. The purpose of the Amendment is that the signalling system should be understood and that the message should arrive. It is actually better to take more time in signalling and to have the signals understood. We made it perfectly clear that the international language signal was not relevant to this discussion at all.

Mr. Hay: I was not dealing with the the international language signal at this

stage. I was dealing with the matter strictly on the basis of national signals between ships of one nation.

Mr. Pitman: What about the "blue turn?"

Mr. Hay: The "blue turn" is not necessarily international. In the Navy it has a particular meaning. There is a similar type of term which has a meaning in the International Code.
The system of signalling in the Navy is already extremely abbreviated. There is very little waste of time and very little misunderstanding. Hon. Members who have any knowledge of the Service will no doubt be acquainted with the initials "T.O.A." which stands for "time of arrival." They will also be acquainted with the initials "R.P.C." which means, "Request the pleasure of your company" and also with "M.R.U." which means, "Much regret unable" which is usually the reply that one receives.
Savings are not possible in that connection. The same applies to radio messages and to morse. As to the oral type of signal, I would suggest that simplified spelling would not help very much. We are now using a system which was developed extensively during the last war which the Americans call T.B.S. or "Talk between ships." It is a local form of radio telephony which is of great value among groups of vessels in company.
I should like to say to the Civil Lord that I hope that he will resist one "American innovation," as the hon. Member for Loughborough termed it, which is being put about now and which I have no doubt will shortly be pressed upon us by our American Allies. It is a new pronouncing alphabet put forward by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. My hon. Friend the Member for Bath said that anybody speaking over the telephone and using the words "Able Baker" would be understood at the other end. Heaven knows what would happen if someone said "Alpha Bravo" because that is the new form of pronouncing alphabet which the Americans will shortly be asking us to use.
I remember the fuss there was in the Navy when we changed the pronouncing alphabet during the war, and many chief yeomen of signals almost died of apoplexy when they had to learn the


American system. Now, there is the subgestion that we must change again, which must mean constantly increasing the work and a great waste of time.
I will give only a few examples. Instead of "Charlie," we have "Coca," instead of "Fox" we have "Foxtrot," instead of "George," we have "Golf," instead of "How" we have "Hotel," instead of "Sugar" we have "Sierra," instead of "William"—and this may annoy the hon. and gallant Member—we have "Whisky."
In all the circumstances, if I may return to the Amendment, I would say that there is going to be no substantial saving in the simplified form of spelling. There would be a great deal of additional labour and time required and a great deal of trouble will have to be taken by many people in learning the new system, to say nothing of the international friction which would undoubtedly arise.
The hon. Member for Loughborough is not now with us, having gone off, perhaps, to dot the i's and cross the t's of his speech. I hope he will not divide the House on his Amendment but will decide to withdraw it.

10.27 p.m.

Mr. John Parker: I should like to declare an interest in this matter, because, like you, Mr. Speaker, and everybody present, I have learned the existing system of spelling and therefore find myself reluctant to go to a great deal of trouble in learning another system. In any literate nation, most people are supposed to be able to read and write, and it is very difficult indeed to make any important innovation in spelling.
I suggest that, in any international organisation like N.A.T.O., where we have to have collaboration between different navies or other bodies of that kind, some common simple language and a simple spelling is desirable. We could use an international language like Esperanto, but I think it would be much better to use a living language for communications between navies or other international bodies. Possibly because I am British, I feel that the English language is best as an international vehicle. It is very widely spoken at present, and, as the British and American navies are two of the largest on the naval side of

N.A.T.O., it would be much simpler to use English as a medium between the different organisations on the naval side of N.A.T.O.
That being so, it is up to our Navy, as being the most famous and the one having the longest record in N.A.T.O. to take the initiative in trying to simplify the English language and make it a more useful vehicle for communications between the nations.
In other countries, we have seen very radical changes in the spelling of the language. For example, Mustapha Kemal scrapped the whole of the existing spelling in the Turkish language and at the same time introduced the Latin script. In doing so he helped bring about a revolution in the nation. This very important change reduced by two years the time required in school to learn to read and write and made it much easier to make his people literate.
We do not need to do anything so drastic in reforming our spelling we should make gradual changes along the normal lines of development of our language. That is what I would suggest. I do not think anyone here wants a completely new system of spelling invented and imposed on the people, but I do think there is a case for making changes gradually and for this country taking the initiative along the normal lines of our language, simplifying the spelling and seeing that exceptional words are brought into line with that general rule. That is the line of development which I suggest should be followed.
In doing this, I suggest that the Navy, in taking the lead, should approach other Government Departments and others interested in order to try to get set up some advisory body to advise the Navy itself, other Government Departments, and people like publishers and editors in their work. If there were set up some kind of advisory committee under the initiative of the Navy, it could advise the Government, and its advice could be adopted in printing all Government publications. I would suggest that the editors of certain newspapers, such as "The Times," might be asked to sit on the advisory committee, with representatives from the Ministery of Education together with teachers and publishers, and then when agreement was reached on any change it would be


found that most of the publishers, newspapers and Government Departments would be willing to follow the Navy's lead in adopting these various proposals.
I do not suggest that any attempt should be made to dictate to people how they should spell. If any author has a fancy sort of spelling of certain words, obviously he would go on using that spelling. But I do suggest that a great deal would be gained if we had a general understanding amongst publishers, Government Departments, and so on, so that as recommended changes came forward they could be adopted and taught in the schools.
It is up to us as a nation to take the lead in making these changes, and not to leave it to the Americans, Australians or others. As we are the centre of the English-speaking peoples, we should be the nation taking the lead. Let the Navy give the lead in this country, and let us give the lead to the English-speaking peoples; then we shall make the English language a far more suitable vehicle for communication than it is at the moment, and we shall find it being more widely spoken throughout the world than at present, which I am sure is what we all want.

10.32 p.m.

Professor Sir Douglas Savory: I am extremely glad to have this opportunity of supporting my hon. Friends the Members for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) and Bath (Mr. Pitman). I cannot help remembering that my hon. Friend the Member for Bath is the grandson of a very distinguished man, to whom we are all under a very great debt of gratitude for the invention of shorthand. If only his grandson could succeed in carrying through this great reform in spelling he would, I am certain, earn a reputation equal to that of his grandfather.
I am very glad indeed that it is proposed to begin this reform with the Senior Service, because I speak from personal experience. In the Navy during the First World War, I very often had to use the word "buttress." Now the word "buttress" in our barbarous spelling, which we have slavishly adopted from Dr. Johnson's dictionary of 1755, we spell with two t's and two s's. If only we had studied the real etymology of the

language, of which Dr. Johnson was, completely ignorant—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh"] Yes, completely ignorant—we should know that this word "buttress" is simply derived from the French word bouterez, which had only one "t."
When a friend of mine asked me upstairs, "Are you going to support this Amendment?", I said, "Most certainly." He said, "You must be a Bolshevik." I replied, "No. I am a true Conservative. I wish to conserve the English language by removing from it its obvious defects in spelling."
When I was in the Navy we very often used the word "allow" in the sense of "approve." Now, why should we in the Navy write that word "allow" with two "l's" if only we knew the real etymology, it is derived from the French word alouer with one "l," and the Latin word ad-laudare? This superfluous letter gives an immense amount of trouble to those who are trying to signal correctly. Or again, let us imagine that a sailor is saying a sentence of this kind: "I am delighted to drink the health of my sovereign." Now there, if he uses our present English spelling, he is making two very serious mistakes. To write the word "delight" with a "g" is absolutely wrong, absolutely false—it has no connection with the word "light"; it is the French word déiter the Latin delectare. Why should we follow Dr. Johnson in inserting the superfluous "g"? I ant not a Bolshevik, I am a Conservative. Why not adopt the spelling of Milton and the spelling of Shakespeare and write "delite"—correctly, etymologically.
What does the word "etymology mean? It means a correct account—the Greek etumos meaning "true" and "logos" account. In order to give a true account of the language as it exists, we are proposing, therefore, to cut out these corruptions which have been wrongly inserted. In that sentence I gave just now—" I am delighted to drink the health of our sovereign"—I want to deal now with the word "sovereign." The word "sovereign" has nothing to do, as Johnson thought, with the word "reign." The word is derived from the French word souverain, the Low Latin word superanus. There is no "g." Why should we force our unfortunate sailors to learn to spell it with a "g"? Let us be true


Conservatives. Let us adopt the spelling of Milton and Shakespeare, both of whom used the spelling "souveran." This is no Bolshevism. This is true conservation of the English language, making it simpler for our sailors in their signalling and enabling them to communicate with one another with infinitely greater ease.
What have other nations done in this respect? In my lifetime I have had to learn three different German spellings because the spelling has been reformed. The Minister of Education issued a decree saying that henceforth such and such a word would be spelt in such and such a way. As a boy I had to learn the verb "to do"; thun, that and gethan. Now the Minister of Education issued a decree that from 1st January in a certain year the "h" should be eliminated. Think what an advantage the sailors in the German navy had over ours in being able to communicate with one another in simplified spelling.
Take again the superbly practical Spanish language—it is absolutely phonetic.

Mr. Follick: Manana.

Sir D. Savory: You have only to know what each letter signifies and a child can spell the words.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrew): This Amendment deals only with the English language.

Sir D. Savory: I was only saying, by way of comparison, that if we could make a similar reform we would render a great service not only to the Navy but to the public. I appeal to the Ministers who are on the Treasury Bench to bring this matter before the Prime Minister.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Another Bolshevik.

Sir D. Savory: He has recommended, as the House knows, and has actually published the Atlantic Charter in Basic English. I ask the Ministers on the Treasury Bench to ask him to adopt a simplified spelling. That would add to his glory more than almost any other reform.
In conclusion, may I remind hon. Members of the last words of Napoleon when he was exiled to the island of St. Helena. He said:

My friends think that my glory consists in my victories of Jena and Austerlitz. On the contrary, my glory consists in the Napoleonic Civil Code when I ordered the lawyers who came before me to cut out their jargon and use clear and sensible language.
I appeal to our Prime Minister to begin applying a corresponding reform in spelling to our Senior Service and to leave behind him what will be a blessing to succeeding generations.

10.43 p.m.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Wingfield Digby): I should like to congratulate the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) on his good fortune in the Ballot and on the way he presented his case. We know well his interest in this matter and we can all admire his perseverence even if we cannot all share his enthusiasm. I must confess that I am in difficulty in replying to the debate. I feel that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education would be better qualified to answer all these arguments about spelling.
This is not, of course, primarily a naval question. The hon. Member has been frank and admitted that it is the thin end of the wedge. We have to look at it as it affects the Navy, and although the Navy has always been willing to show the way, I am not sure that it is reasonable to expect us to do so and follow some of the suggestions which have been made tonight. There appears to be something like an attempt to make a guinea pig of the Royal Navy with regard to spelling. We are somewhat loath to sail these uncharted seas of spelling reform.
This is primarily a national question It was fully discussed three years ago, when the Bill which the hon. Member for Loughborough introduced was brought before the House. The Minister of Education of that time gave the views of his Ministry on the matter fairly fully, and I would still commend that particular speech to the House. He went on to point out that spelling reform was one of those things where it is necessary to carry public opinion with you before you start to use compulsion. If that connection he quoted words of the late Mr. Bernard Shaw himself, who was not unsympathetic to spelling reform.
Perhaps one might go even further and point out that, if there is to be spelling


reform, it is most desirable that there should not only be uniformity in this country but also in the English-speaking world generally. Therefore, it would be necessary to convince a body of opinion in the rest of the English-speaking world on this matter.
I quite realise that this is just the thin end of the wedge as far as the hon. Member is concerned. But I must say to him that, as he has been at pains to tell us how he would spell "cough," I am surprised he has not gone to his own constituents and persuaded them to spell the name of his constituency differently. And if he had been able to do that in the first place, I think that we should have been rather more impressed with the case that he has put up to us this evening.
The Amendment before the House refers to the great advantages—and I stress the word "great"—which it is said would come from the simplification of spelling. We had the authority of the hon. Member himself when he spoke in the debate three years ago for saying that there were some 50 or 60 different spelling systems. We have had no indication tonight as to which one he suggests for the Royal Navy.

Mr. Follick: I pointed out to the House in my opening remarks that this was not spelling reform; it was only recommending certain spelling simplifications. I gave a list of the different simplifications that would be advantageous even in the Navy.

Mr. Digby: It is a little difficult to know exactly what simplifications the hon. Member has in mind. As far as I recollect, he quoted only one system of 300 words. Apart from that, I think he left the matter fairly vague. As I understood him, his idea was to get shorter words, to get fewer letters in each word; that was the chief advantage which would flow—and as I understood my hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman), the importance of this was with regard to N.A.T.O. communications in particular. But, of course, if a system were adopted for N.A.T.O. we should also have to consider the implications at home, because we could hardly have two different forms of spelling within the Royal Navy.
It is quite true that in peacetime about two-thirds of the messages passed to and fro are in plain language and that there

might be some advantage in brevity if there were a system of spelling which had fewer letters to each word—

Mr. Follick: No, there was no mention of that. It was a question of dropping letters that were not pronounced, like "p" in "receipt" and "b" in "doubt."

Mr. Digby: If it would not make the signals any shorter it is difficult to see, when the signal passes between two English people who are used to the old spelling, how a new form which they would have to learn would make it any easier for them. In point of fact, a tremendous number of these messages do not go in word form at all. For example, when two flags are hoisted it means "Proceed to sea with all despatch." It is only in a comparatively small number of cases that verbal messages are sent out which are received by foreigners.
I should make it absolutely clear to the House that there seems to have been the greatest misunderstanding by all those who have advocated this change in spelling as to how communications are carried out between the various N.A.T.O. navies. What, in fact, happens is that a complicated system has already been adopted whereby a given group of numerals or numbers can be looked up by member countries of any nationality and there they find the answer in their own particular language. So the point about sending out letters in English, which are received by other foreign nations, arises on comparatively few occasions. I think that fact alone destroys most of the case which has been put this evening.

Mr. Pitman: These are the very instances which we gave of international signalling. There is no linguistic content, but the opportunites for such signalling are definitely limited. If one gives 5,000 or 50,000 different messages, to which one has to allot each a different code signal, one has reached the limit. After that, one has to use language. If one is operating 11 different languages, one needs signalling in language.

Mr. Digby: I think my hon. Friend misunderstands me. There has been a special code worked out by N.A.T.O. so as to arrange that all the ordinary tactical signals can go out in this form, and the question of language occurs at sea only in a very small number of cases. For


instance, by a very simple combination one can send out a message like this, which may appeal to the hon. Member, "Make a smoke-screen by all possible means, in accordance with the plan indicated." That could be looked up in the book, and understood by any of the member countries.
There are obvious disadvantages, of course, to the proposals which have been put forward by the hon. Member. They would achieve very little, as I have shown. First, there is the obvious difficulty about manpower. The Royal Navy needs all the manpower it has at present, and to send people back to school to learn some new form of spelling would take up a great deal of time. Again, it would lead undoubtedly to considerable misunderstanding if messages sent out by the Royal Navy were in different spelling from those of the other Services, although I should point out to the hon. Member one matter which, perhaps, will give him some encouragement. The English version of the N.A.T.O. signal book, to which I have referred, is, in point of fact, printed in America and, therefore, in American spelling, as used in the American Navy.
Lastly, there would be the question of expense. If all naval publications were to be re-written in the new spelling, it would require a great deal of labour and a certain amount of expense. Apart from these considerations, whereas the Royal Navy would be very willing to follow—if public opinion demanded—simplifications of this kind, it would be very difficult for us to start. We have got our own traditions and there is a tradition of brevity, which means that already naval signals are extremely short and to the point. We also have naval expressions, to which considerable importance is attached. I can see that some things could be said more simply. It is true that, instead of using the time-honoured phrase, "Splice the main-brace," it could be spelt "Rum"
I do not think that that is the kind of reform which would be justified or which would appeal to many people in this country. I say to hon. Members that they must go out and convince public opinion that there is no real short-cut to that. So far as we are concerned in the sending of messages and signals in the Royal Navy, we are quite prepared to

look into the question whether there can be any simplification on the lines the hon. Member suggested, but I cannot hold out any very great hope that we can take the initiative in new forms of spelling until they have been adopted by the country as a whole.

Mr. Follick: I quite understand, after listening to that reply, that the hon. Gentleman is not well acquainted with the difficulties I have put before the House. Will he refer this matter to the educational departments of the Navy and ask them to advise him? If he will do that, I will withdraw the Amendment. If he will not, I must divide the House.

Mr. Digby: I am quite prepared to give that assurance.

Mr. Speaker: Does the hon. Gentleman desire to withdraw his Amendment?

Mr. Follick: Yes, Sir. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

10.57 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: We now return to the main debate. I believe that these Estimates are far too high and that the Navy has obtained far too large a slice of the funds and effort available for defence. We are engaged, when we consider these Estimates, in providing a contribution to Atlantic defence. These Estimates are not designed to provide us with a private force that will act independently. They are part of a larger whole. Their purpose should be to make the best possible contribution to Atlantic defence, and that is done by providing those things which Atlantic defence is short of and needs most.
We are not, or at least we should not be, engaged in a contest for prestige with our allies. It may be nice for us to see the flags of our admirals worn in particular seas, but we cannot afford at the present juncture to maintain ships whose main purpose is to provide a flagstaff for our admirals. That is not defence; it is inter-allied jealousy. That is the first proposition, the first background fact, which we must consider in this defence problem.
The second proposition is that the rôle of this country in Atlantic defence has become primarily Continental. In the old


days we were an oceanic power. The Continent bore the first shock and it was our function to supply the reserves and keep the supply lines open. Today we must bear the first shock. The Channel is somewhat wider than the Rhine, but not very much wider in modern strategic terms. Today we are a Continental Power and have to look at Atlantic defence as a Continental Power.
I think that the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) put this question very well yesterday. He said:
There are two alternatives before us. We can attempt to build up round these islands a barrier in such depth and thickness that we hope it will keep out any modern missile that may be thrown at this country. That seems to me to be the basic plan behind the Continental strategy. On the other hand, we can hope or attempt to sustain and maintain an organisation throughout the world, of which this country is the centre, which is so powerful and united that it must be clear to all that whoever might contemplate making a venture upon these islands must face the fact that a fearful retribution will follow from our friends all over the world, and that it will be sure and remorseless and will achieve the utter defeat in the long run of whoever may attempt ambitions in that direction. It is the power of the deterrent rather than the pinning of one's faith in a barricade."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 518.]
I think that puts the dilemma before us extremely well. The hon. and gallant Member seemed to indicate that he preferred the latter alternative, the power of the deterrent. Of course, that is substantially what we have been relying on. It is the power of the atom bomb, and there is a perfectly good case for saying that we should only have token forces on the Elbe and should say to the Russians, quite clearly, "If you invade that territory it means the atomisation of your cities."

Mr. Emrys Hughes: May I ask—

Mr. Paget: No, I am sorry. That is substantially what the position has been during these last years.

Mr. Hughes: May I ask the hon. and learned Member—

Mr. Paget: No. The atomisation of cities—

Mr. Hughes: I am thinking of our cities.

Mr. Paget: What I am saying is that that is the policy which is put as the alternative to the Continental policy, and it is a policy that involves thinking of our cities, as the hon. Member observes. It is a policy of relying basically on the atomic threat, and it is a policy which certainly ought to be adopted by those who are opposed, for instance, to German re-armament. Because without German re-armament it is only a token force on the Elbe. Equally, without a British military contribution it is only a token force on the Elbe.
What hon. Members must realise is that the draw-back of this atomic policy is that it involves a total surrender of the control of our destiny. It involves us in the position of saying that if the Russians do invade then we can do nothing but commit suicide, because our country will be totally and utterly devastated.
The hon. and gallant Member referred to us being the heart of a great world Commonwealth or organisation, but unfortunately that is not where geography has placed us. It has placed us on the periphery of that organisation, in a position where in modern war we should be totally destroyed by a force which could reach the Channel and the rocket bases there. The Navy which we might have built up would have to leave these islands and go to other bases, because bases here would be untenable. It involves putting our destiny utterly beyond our control, and that is a responsibility which I am not prepared to face.
As the hon. and gallant Member pointed out, there are only two alternatives here. One is to adopt the alternative of leaving the Continent open, which, in substance, means leaving these islands open, too, because they are untenable if the enemy gets as close as that. That is one alternative, and the only other one is to adopt the responsibilities of a Continental Power and realise that our defence is on the Elbe.
The defence programme today is probably rather larger than our economy can support, and almost certainly rather smaller than our immediate needs for security requires. Therefore, we should, look at these Estimates very jealously to prune everything that is unnecessary in the general picture of Atlantic defence, not merely to relieve our economy


of burdens which it can barely bear, if it can bear them at all, but in order to increase defences, air and land, which are more essential.
Therefore, I look at these Estimates in the light of what can be pruned, and the first things that I look at are capital ships. What are capital ships required for? First, to fight an enemy fleet. Well, there is no enemy fleet. Secondly, to clear raiders off the seas. Well, let us realise this. The day of the surface raider is over. The surface raider has no kind of chance today. Long-range aircraft can search all the oceans in the world. On a clear day, a single aircraft flying at 40,000 feet can search more sea than 1,500 ships disposed over the ocean. The aircraft today will inevitably find the raider, and the air strike will dispose of it. Surface raiding is a thing of the past, gone and over.
Finally, these capital ships can support assault landings, but there are not going to be assault landings in the early stages of a war. If these capital ships were put into reserve, they could easily be brought out again if required for these bombardments.
Of these capital ships, for which it is difficult to find a purpose, what is the supply? The supply available to the Atlantic Powers is as follows. The Americans have three battleships on the active list and 12 in reserve; 17 aircraft fleet carriers on the active list and 19 in reserve; 10 escort aircraft carriers and 56 in reserve. To these, we add one battleship and four in reserve; five fleet carriers and two in reserve; four light fleet carriers and two in reserve.
I would say at once that the maintenance of these capital ships by Britain is totally unnecessary for our defence. We do not require the Vanguard in commission, nor the four fleet carriers. These capital ships can make no contribution whatever in an anti-submarine or an anti-minelaying rôle. On the contrary, they are a heavy liability because they require protection. Put all these capital ships—the Vanguard and the carriers—into reserve.
At present we have in the Atlantic a vast superfluity of capital ships. If my suggestion is carried out, not only shall we save a great sum of money but release enough men to form a naval division. What a good professional division that

would be; we have known how good naval divisions are. The Atlantic Powers are desperately short of divisions and they have a gross superfluity of capital ships. We have 12 cruisers and four light aircraft carriers in commission. That is ample for our colonial job and our commitments; but capital ships are a luxury we cannot afford.
Secondly, the building of these capital ships should stop. The Prime Minister pointed out yesterday that exports have become so important that they are to be given priority even over defence. Shipping is as good an export as we have got; we can sell every ship we can build. Building these superfluous capital ships is in direct competition with an export which we most urgently require. Switch that defence work on to export; it will give us better service.
Finally, there are the aircraft carriers. They were only a transition weapon until we got adequate range on shore-based aircraft, which we now have got. They will very soon be obsolete, if they are not obsolete already, and we should not concentrate on them.
Then there is the anti-submarine rôle of the Navy. We had in the past, particularly from the Prime Minister, the most alarmist accounts of the danger we ran from Russian submarines. In previous Navy debates, I suggested that these fears were exaggerated. The Prime Minister has now put the danger from submarines as second to the danger from mines, which would appear to indicate that he, too, has become convinced that this submarine threat was grossly exaggerated. The Prime Minister has also said—I do not know what his authority is—that the Russians have very few of the modern type. One must remember that in submarine warfare it is not merely the technical excellence of the weapon; it is overwhelmingly the courage, devotion, and professional skill of the crew. We have little reason to expect that high degree of professional skill from the Russians.
The Russians have had many excellent weapons. In the MIG 5 they possibly have the best aeroplane, but in fighting results it is worth about one to four of the American fighters because it is badly handled. They probably had the best tank in the last war, but they used to lose about three to one to the Germans


because the German tanks were better handled. All one's experience with Russians was that, although they had excellent equipment, on many occasions they did not handle it very well. That would be a fatal defect in submarines.
Therefore, I feel that we need not give too high a priority to escort and antisubmarine vessels, and that where shipbuilding could be switched to export, then, in so far as any switch has to be made from armaments to export, the switch of shipbuilding capacity would do least damage to our total defence.
The most important measure of antisubmarine defence is stockpiling. When you fear that you are going to be besieged, surely to goodness it is commonsense to get as much across as possible while the oceans are open. It is not merely a question of raiding the stockpiles, but of a failure to build them up. We were building them up on this year's basis to £300 million. They ought to have gone up at a rate of £200 million a year until we were stocked with supplies for at least six months. To raid them while increasing the Navy Estimates seems to me a piece of frivolity.
If a war starts, it starts in Russia's time, when she chooses, and when her submarines are at action stations because they have been sent in anticipation. What we would desire to do would be to empty the seas by ordering the ships back to port so that we could bring the most against the submarines while the seas were emtpy. We deny ourselves that possibility if we have not adequate stockpiles.
I indicated in an interruption what I have worked out with regard to one raid on the stockpile—the timber raid. Timber has to come from the west coast of Canada, which is a four months round trip. It would involve 60 ships for four months to make good in war-time the rundown in timber we were expecting this year. Convoys would be necessary in both the Pacific and the Atlantic and would probably occupy eight or nine destroyers for eight or nine months. That is a single item, not of total requirements but of the run-down in the stockpile. I warned the First Lord on this question. Can he give us any indication of what it will cost in shipping to make good the £150 million run-down in stockpiles and what it will cost in naval vessels? That

is something this House should know when holding these debates.
I have said that I believe it is quite frivolous to spend large sums of money to build up a force to keep the oceans open when we do not use them when they are open. This policy of stockpiling, so far from being in competition with our economic efficiency, can be the basis of our economic efficiency. By running heavy stockpiles we can guarantee the supplies that will keep our industry in production. Surely it is not beyond the wit of financiers to use those stockpiles as reserves behind the sterling area. Does it matter so much whether we have the value behind the currency here in gold or in all the things that are essential here? Why cannot we have our sterling balances in stockpiles and goods? Why cannot we persuade the Americans, who in the event of war will have to transport their goods here, to build up stockpiles here? That would relieve the Navy of a vast amount of their commitments.
I say this generally with regard to these Estimates. I believe they could be cut by at least £100 million without endangering any empire—except the one over Admiralty Arch. The difficulty one has is that the political power, the power of persuasion, the power of bringing Ministers into their organisation, at which the Navy has been so incredibly skilled, injects everybody who has been into the Admiralty with the mystique of the Navy.
So this force of capital ships, this expansion of that which is superfluous, whilst we are desperately short in the air and on the land, is maintained year after year. We could cut these Estimates by £100 million, and we could release enough men to provide us with a further first-class division, which we desperately need—that ought to be done. We must remember that these times are too serious to allow our defence needs and our defence production to be distorted by inter-Service or inter-allied jealousies.

11.24 p.m.

Dr. Reginald Bennett: I do not suppose that I am alone in detecting in the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) more than a slight trace of that doctrine of a certain aberrant group with which I observed him to associate himself last night.

Mr. Paget: Is the hon. Member objecting to the fact that I declined to vote last night in favour of the proposition that his Government were too incompetent to carry out a defence programme?

Dr. Bennett: I should be more than alarmed if I felt that we were earning that particular hon. and learned Gentleman's praise, because I feel that his judgment has been amply demonstrated in this evening's speech. I must confess that we may have—if I may use an Irishism—certain common ground when we are on the water, but I do not feel that we have very much in this House.
I should like to make a few short comments on some of the points the hon. and learned Member has raised. I entirely agree with him that the capital ship, that is, the battleship, is a fantastic piece of anachronism. It is entirely obsolete. If we wish to do heavy bombardment we can do it with a lesser outlay of capital than that, and I feel that the battleship really is, as I have certain personal reasons to have learnt, more of a liability than an asset to naval forces.
I can remember a number of these vast mammoths lying sheltering in Mombasa for a lengthy period during the last war because no one could possibly afford to escort them to sea. I can see little justification for our continuing to run battleships; but as to aircraft carriers, I feel the hon. and learned Gentleman is possibly running a bit ahead of time. The carrier he declares to be obsolete. I would not go quite as far as that. I would suggest that its days are certainly numbered, and no doubt it will soon be rendered unnecessary—and not very long from now.
I shall be interested to discover whether, in fact, it is ever necessary for us to lay down any new aircraft carriers. I would say the carriers we have built, or are building, should be kept up at present while the very long-range aircraft steadily becomes more truly worthy of its name and while aircraft are developed which will keep the seas by patrolling from the air as well as surface craft did in the past.
It is significant that one of the newest aircraft to be taken on by the Navy—the G.R.17 or Gannet—is equipped to fly on cruising power rather than on the majority of its complete horse-power all

the time. We are now beginning to get aircraft with a wide speed-range, having a slow cruising speed on one engine; then the pilot can bring in more engines to make it faster for combat if called far away from its base. I am quite convinced that there is no justification whatever for de-commissioning the aircraft carriers we now have.
If the need for a naval division is what the hon. and learned Gentleman says it is, I suggest that that could be met by expanding the Royal Corps of Marines. If the suggestion to decommission the battleships is adopted, I feel the best use that could be made of these men would be to employ them elsewhere in our naval service and to allow the release of some of the old chaps who have been kept on beyond their time and look like being so kept for a further time. That is a piece of hardship about which I feel very strongly. They are men whom the Admiralty has no right to keep beyond their time. Per-hats the de-commissioning of one or two battleships would allow a certain easing in that respect.
I have noticed the hon. and learned Member tends to cry down the possible potency of the Russian U-boats. It was a suggestion he made in common with the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton). Even in my short time as a Member of this House, I have noticed the consistency of that attitude, and whatever preparations for war are being made the same attitude seems to be taken towards the threat. The arguments the hon. and learned Member used to justify his group's policy do not seem to me to be entirely sustained.
If the Russian U-boat is not a menace, then why should he need to advocate stock-piling so much? Surely if the Russians have even as many U-boats in commission as we have escorts—and that is precious few—the danger is simply colossal. Furthermore, if the hon. and learned Member says that we ought to go ahead with stockpiling as a first line of defence—and I hope that we shall be in a position to do so again soon—it seems odd that he should be at the same time advocating smaller anti-submarine forces. What I suggest is a better long-term investment even than stockpiling is the creation of adequate anti-submarine forces.
I have one or two brief observations that I hope will be acceptable to the House. One or two of them deal with the manning of Her Majesty's ships. I feel it is a good thing that we have a further extension of permanent commissions for the officers who have been held on after their extended service commissions have nominally expired. That is a welcome step. But I must match with that my great concern at the hardship and domestic dislocation which will continue to be inflicted upon the senior ratings who ought to be coming out of the Service.
There is one point I should like to make about the branch of the Service which is now known as the branch officers. These are men promoted from the lower deck who must, I imagine, be pretty promising chaps or they would not be promoted and made commissioned branch officers. But my contention is that after promotion they are finding themselves in the doldrums, and if they are promoted to senior commissioned branch officers and have hopes of retiring with a lieutenant's rank, if not with the pension of that rank, they may have to wait anything up to 20 years. In modern jargon, that is the most absurd disincentive which could be invented.
I appeal to the Parliamentary Secretary to investigate the possibility of employing more of these expert men—and they are valuable men—in the rank of lieutenant and giving them some prospect of reaching the rank of lieutenant-commander, rather than that that should be the rarest of events. I say this with feeling, and with personal knowledge, because I know that the officers of this branch are not happy in their work. I should like to see them happy.
Another point is closely allied to manning. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) referred to the desirability of providing beer for the men in Her Majesty's ships. I am not, as many hon. Members know, much of a mathematician, and although I should be the warmest supporter of the suggestion with regard to beer, I was alarmed when I tried to work out what would the result of providing, or trying to provide, beer.
If each man is to have a bottle of beer a day, 1,500 men on board a carrier or a large ship will need 125 crates a day,

which, at two cubic feet a crate, amounts to 250 cubic feet. That, on the nautical reckoning of tonnage, means two-and-a-half tons a day. If a ship is to be away from its home port for 30 days it will have to carry 75 tons stowage of beer. That would be a major operation and not one that could be guaranteed in such places as the Indian Ocean, where I seem to remember a drought of that commodity during the war.
I feel that if what corresponds to the contents of an average-sized barge or Brixham trawler had to be put on board every time a ship reached port, it would be an insuperable difficulty. Although I wish my hon. Friend the best of good fortune in his investigations, I submit that unless all the men can have beer it is not much use providing it for some, and therefore it appears to be impossible of solution.

Mr. Shackleton: Carry it in tanks.

Dr. Bennett: In H.M. ships before the war, when we nearly always tied up to the dockyard wall, we had draught beer, but the result of trying to carry beer, which is a live substance, in ships and yachts is disastrous. It becomes as turgid as pea soup. Therefore, I do not feel that draught beer has any hope of being carried at sea.
I want to mention a point about naval aviation. I have used the conventional phrase of the moment, although I am just as emphatic as my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) in my support of the term "Fleet Air Arm," with which I was originally conversant. The First Lord said this afternoon that aircraft were the principal striking force. I endorse that emphatically, and I would say that during the late war, even as early as 1941, when we were on the Western Approaches, we had an aircraft with a catapult in a ship armed with guns. I used to annoy my shipmate and now fellow Member, the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson), by referring to the guns as our defensive armament. I feel that all the other weapons, apart from aircraft, are defensive and that the aircraft are the only offensive weapon the Navy has.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East referred to the importance of the R.N.V.R. squadrons and the necessity for


re-equipping them. I heartily agree. The First Lord mentioned the advent of the helicopter to the Navy. I should like to make this sugestion: that the helicopter is a most peculiarly suitable weapon for the Navy, much more so than the conventional fixed-winged aircraft, and especially as an anti-submarine weapon. It is inevitable to my mind that there will be a fast expansion of the use of helicopters at sea in time of war, especially for antisubmarine work. There will also be a fast expansion of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, especially in the air. That is equally inevitably in the event of the warfare against which we have to guard.
I am not qualified as a pilot of a helicopter. I have not succeeded in persuading any of my friends at the Gosport Naval Air Station to teach me to fly those things, although I have every hope. But I have had the opinion from a number of people that the conventional flying training given to pilots of ordinary winged aircraft militates considerably against the techniques required of a helicopter pilot. Different senses need to be ingrained into the pilot.
Therefore, I suggest that there is an unequalled opportunity for the establishment of Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve helicopter squadrons, wherein people can be trained as helicopter pilots without any of the vast outlay and completely unnecessary and, in fact, contradictory outlay on training them as conventional pilots. I hope we shall see some of these established, because there is a definite future for them.
We have had a very long discursus into the realms of education today. I notice that Vote 5 is not down for discussion although there have been one or two points raised. The 'Press suggested that there was a misuse of the words "wearing the flag" in regard to the admiral wearing his flag in H.M.S. "Liverpool." But I think the Press was quite wrong to criticise that, because there can be found in dictionaries a reference to that very usage in the days of Elizabeth I.
There is one thing I hope: that the Navy educational services will have progressed sufficiently this time next year for us not to have to endure, as we have on page 13 of the Statement accompanying the Estimates, the spelling of H.M.S.

"Apollo" in the form in which we find it there.

11.40 p.m.

Commander Harry Pursey: It is one of the traditions of this House that one should take up the speech of the previous hon. Member and engage in the cut and thrust of debate. I assure the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) that I will do so later on in my own time on the question of Russian submarines. I might help him, as a teetotaller, about his beer problem. What he wants to ask the Admiralty is, are not they going to manufacture the beer on board, the same as was done on some ships? The hon. and gallant Gentleman dealt with other matters, including the branch officers, and I shall have a word to say about that, having passed through the grade myself. But, generally speaking, I do not want to engage in controversy with him at this time of the night.
However, the hon. Member with whom I do want to get into controversy—and I warned him—is the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson). There may be agreement with a lot of his speech. Obviously there is agreement in paying tribute to the Mercantile Marine, and we need not he worried about electronics, valves, and so on, particularly as the radio and television industry is going down, where it has not turned over to armaments. The hon. Gentleman, too, tried to inject some heat by complaining of the criticisms made on this side of the House about the Prime Minister when he was in opposition and was dealing with naval affairs.
Let me take one specific point that was dealt with by the hon. Member for Woking. He referred to hunting submarines. If I got it right, he was arguing that if a submarine had not got a schnorkel she could not be detected. That is absolute, arrant nonsense of the first order.

Mr. Burden: indicated dissent.

Commander Pursey: I see the hon. Member's colleague, the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) is waving his head as if I have it wrong.

Mr. Burden: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is quite wrong in suggesting that my hon. Friend said that if a submarine was not equipped with a


schnorkel it could not be detected. He made no such statement. A submarine can be detected by asdics and other antisubmarine devices.

Commander Pursey: As the hon. Member has now come into the Chamber, I will repeat the question, although he has the advantage of reading it in HANSARD tomorrow. I repeat that while there are certain points in the hon. Gentleman's speech to which exception could not be taken, I never heard such arrant nonsense talked about the detection of submarines. He referred to the detection of submarines if they had a schnorkel, and then he made' the point, on which his hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham has attempted to correct me, about submarines without a schnorkel. The argument, as I understood it, was that if the submarine had not got a schnorkel and was using the new power, she could not be detected. Is that the point the hon. Gentleman made? If not, will he explain what his argument was about not being able to detect a submarine?

Mr. Watkinson: I will correct the hon. and gallant Gentleman by saying what my point was. It was that in designing a new class of vessel, especially a fast frigate, one had to look some years ahead and to envisage the possibility of a submarine which was completely submersible at high speed and one, therefore, had to consider whether the ships had, or had not, been designed to cope with that class of submarine.

Commander Pursey: As regards detection? Then, how does the hon. Gentleman account for the "Affray" being detected on the bottom of the sea when there were asdic echoes everywhere?

Mr. Watkinson: I referred to that in my speech when I mentioned Jules Verne.

Commander Pursey: The main point was the difficulty of finding submerged submarines at high speed. So far as speed is concerned, it does not matter. As long as the surface ship has speed she will find the submarine. In the First World War the problem was that one could not detect the submerged submarine. Once we had asdics the sub

marine lost its main advantage in not being able to be detected when it was submerged.
If it is possible to find the "Affray" on the bottom among other wrecks and rubbish, what is the good of arguing that with the advance of anti-submarine measures there is any difficulty in finding one? There is no difficulty whatever. That is by way of the cut and thrust of debate prior to getting into my stride.
I would congratulate the right hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas), on becoming First Lord of the Admiralty and so providing another precious example of poacher turned gamekeeper. I would recommend him to take a few exercises in mental gymnastics by reading the speeches made on the Navy Estimates in the last six years and the fast and furious attacks he made on the naval policy of the Labour Government. He will then find, if he is honest with himself, that they were all largely shadow boxing and a case of putting up his own skittles to have the fun of knocking them down. How does he attempt to justify what he said in previous debates, when he attacked the policy of the Labour Government, after the speech he made at that Box today, which practically contradicted everything he has ever said before in criticism of that Government?
The attacks by the present Prime Minister and his Tory supporters on the strength of the Navy during the last six years were notorious and yet, as proved today, were largely without foundation. Take personnel as an example. These official figures were given to me yesterday in a Written Answer to a Question by the right hon. Gentleman in column 54 of the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I am glad I helped the hon. and gallant Member.

Commander Pursey: The right hon. Gentleman would not have helped me if I had not asked the Question. He then gave the same figures to the Prime Minister so that he could use them in his own speech for a different argument and for another purpose.
In July, 1914, the number on active service was 156,000, with 64,000 in the reserves. In July, 1939, it was 129,000 and 65,000, and at the end of 1951 the


numbers were 147,000 and 73,000 respectively. That is 10,000 more than in 1914 and 26,000 more than in 1939.
So the wicked Labour Government, which has been falsely accused by the Tories, including a large number of hon. Members opposite tonight shouting in unison, of not providing adequate defences for this country, did, in fact, in peace-time provide a stronger Navy than did the Liberal Government of which the Prime Minister was the First Lord at the outbreak of the First World War when the Navy was the first line of defence. They also provided a stronger Navy than that provided by the Tories for the Second World War when they were not certain which was our first line of defence or what they ought to do with it.
Then, compare the cost. If any how Gentleman wishes to interrupt, I am prepared to give way, but if, on the other hand, they like to carry on a barrage of complimentary support, in the same way as drowning men sing in order to keep up their spirits, that is O.K. by me.
Then compare the cost. In general terms the last Labour Government provided for the Navy three times more money than in 1914 and about twice that of 1939. And this at a time when we also spent far more on the Army and the Air Force than in 1914 or 1939. So how does it lie in the mouths of hon. Members on the other side of the House, and particularly the Prime Minister, to criticise the Labour Government in an argument that we had provided only inadequate naval defence? It was a lie from beginning to—

Hon. Members: Order!

Mr. Speaker: The hon. and gallant Member ought to withdraw that expression.

Commander Pursey: Naturally, in deference to you, Sir, I will withdraw that expression and substitute the Prime Minister's own previous expression of "a terminological inexactitude."
In spite of these and similar facts, the Tory Party and the Tory Press consistently crabbed the policy of the Labour Government, thus giving comfort to our only possible enemy, Russia, and causing alarm and despondency among our allies, particularly in America, where we had been accused of dragging our feet. Yet

Great Britain today is the only country in the world which, under a Labour Government, has fulfilled her obligations to her allies, an achievement not reached even by America with her financial and material resources.
What is the overall naval position as regards the United Nations and Russia? Actually and relatively, from whatever point of view, ships, aircraft, men, bases or supplies, we have overwhelming strength. Consequently, as the major effort of America and ourselves as maritime Powers must be by sea, then sea power is obviously the Achilles heel of Russia. Why then all this untrue and unnecessarily blood-curdling war hysteria—which question I should have thought would have had the support of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) instead of him continuing a barrage on my left. Why all this untrue and bloodcurdling war hysteria about Russia's superiority and strength without considering her naval weakness?
The Prime Minister said yesterday:
There is, of course, no potentially hostile surface battle fleet afloat.
Later he said:
…it is not likely that this situation will be altered in, let us say, the next five years.
So on that point, although I disagreed with practically all of his speech, I conform with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget).
The Prime Minister even told a totally different story this year from that told in previous years about the Russian submarines, and that again is where I support the argument of my hon. and learned Friend and take up the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham, who dealt with the Russian submarines. Previously the Prime Minister talked of the threat of 400, or it might have been 500, Russian U-boats. [Interruption.] I am corrected on the higher figure of 500. In other words, "You pay your money and take your choice." I only want my hon. Friend's interventions when they are helpful.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I was really meaning to be helpful to my hon. and gallant Friend, because I wish to point out that on the last occasion when we had an estimate of Russian submarines the right hon. Gentleman who wound up the debate for the then Opposition, who


is now the Minister of Housing and Local Government, quoted an estimate of 1,000.

Commander Pursey: Previously, the Prime Minister had estimated that there were 500 Russian submarines. His only reference to numbers yesterday was that, in the new fast submarine types, which is what the Opposition have been trying to scare us about:
…the Soviets have, happily, at present only a few."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 440–441.]
Last year, the hon and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith), who wound up for the Tory Party in the debate on the Navy Estimates, said there were only a couple of dozen Russian submarines in the West. Why, then, all this previous Tory blood-curdling hysteria about the mythical masses of Russian submarines and the threat to our Atlantic convoys? This well help me to get the lead in. It is now taken up by certain amateur strategists on this side of the House.

Dr. Bennett: I am obliged to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for giving way. If he recollects what I said, he will re- member that I did not myself give any estimate of the figures, although I said that if the number of Russian submarines were equal to our small number of escorts that was bad enough.

Commander Pursey: I am not arguing the strength of our anti-submarine measures; that is not the point I am making. I am dealing with the unnecessary blood-curdling war hysteria created by the Tory Party and Press about the Russian submarine menace, and last year I asked some half-dozen times where they were and the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok told us that there were only a couple of dozen in the West. So the answer is that they must be in the Far East and, therefore, the responsibility of the American Navy, and we need not be worried about the Russian submarine menace.
That is the answer to this argument about the Russian submarine menace; it is that as far as the numbers of modern craft are concerned they are mythical and a Jules Verne story. Well, let us get the thing in proper perspective. If by far the greater number are in the Far

East, they are not a headache for us, but for the American Navy. Let them face up to it.
The naval position today, therefore, is one of woeful Russian weakness and overwhelming Allied naval strength, and the main Soviet naval threat is in the Far East. That is the naval story to tell our own country, the Americans and the whole world in other words, tell the truth and let us have none of this nonsense about Russian submarines from now onwards.
Why did not the Prime Minister give this picture in his address to the American Congress and show that the Labour Government had provided a stronger British Navy than we had ever had in peace-time in the whole of our long maritime history. Can anybody on the other side deny that?

Brigadier Clarke: When did we have conscription in peace-time before?

Commander Pursey: Conscription in peace-time has nothing to do with it.

Brigadier Clarke: That is why you have so many sailors.

Commander Pursey: That is not the reason. Everybody has said that recruiting for the Navy is better than for the other two Services. There has been no question, except in regard to technical branches, of a scarcity of recruits, and there are only 2,000 conscripts in the Navy today.

Brigadier Clarke: What about the reservists called up?

Commander Pursey: I spent five weeks in the United States last summer trying to put this story over to the Americans by television, radio, meetings, and public discussions. There was immense surprise because, since they are allergic to believing what they want to believe, they had been swallowing hook, line, and sinker the scare stories about Russian submarines circulated by the Tory Party and the British Press.
I now pass to a constituency point. The omission from the First Lord's speech that surprised me was that practically nothing was said about the private building and repair yards, which are both playing an important part in the development of the Navy. This is of particular interest to my


constituency, because just after the First World War private enterprise closed down the only building yard in Hull. The rearmament programmes of the first war and the second war brought nothing to Hull. In fact, under a Tory Government in August, 1939, we had 12,000 unemployed.
Last year we brought the unemployment down to an almost negligible figure under a Labour Government. Now it is going up. Yesterday I put a Question to the First Lord on what contracts had been given last year and what were to be given this year, and he gave me no information at all. I warn him that I shall pursue him till I get some information. I did get some information from the last Government.
Now there is an increasing Admiralty programme of repairs, and the number of repair jobs that have come to Hull are pinches of salt in the ocean, simply chicken feed. At the same time we have other Departments lacking in coordination, and as a result merchant ship repairs which could be done in Hull are being sent to the Continent. I want to know what is to be done about sending more Admiralty repair jobs to Hull. It is the third port in the country, and one of the largest cities, and as far as I can see little or no consideration is being given to it.
One point in the First Lord's speech that alarmed me was his reference to the shortage of officer entries and the steps to be taken to deal with it. One of the reasons for the difficulty is the Labour Government's policy of full employment. Today, with the Tory policy of creating alarm and despondency in the City and on the Stock Exchange, it is doubtful whether the sons of individuals there will he as keen on going into offices, and therefore, we can hope for a switch into the Navy.
The possible remedies referred to by the First Lord are a matter of great concern in view of the Tory record in keeping the Navy a close preserve for preparatory school boys at the ludicrous age of 13 and their opposition to bona fide promotion from the ranks. The bush wireless or whispering campaign before the General Election was that the Tory Party had made promises to return to the good old days of the Dartmouth, policy of early entry. For over 50 years the

main entry of officers has been by the early entry scheme of selecting young boys, before they knew their elbows from their thumbs, from the preparatory schools and then providing them with a secondary education which they ought to have got in the schools of the country. What is the result? They go into a monastic institution where they are isolated from their contemporaries, and later in life they find that instead of having been been at school with air marshals and generals and so on they have been brought up in a greenhouse and isolated from people whom they should have mixed with.
This early entry scheme applies to only one of the State services in this country, and to practically no other profession anywhere else in the world. In fact, the general argument about education is mainly the other way; that it is better for a man to have sailed round the Horn in a sailing ship, or to have done something in a lumber camp in Canada, before deciding what his career is to be.
The Admiralty argument is that unless these boys are caught young they will not enter the Navy. That is the most arrant nonsense. The Army, the Air Force and other professions have no such early entry scheme, so there must be something wrong with the Navy and with its appeal to boys from public schools, or under the Labour Government scheme of entry at 16 years of age.
Fifty years ago Sir John Fisher, who later became First Lord of the Admiralty and Lord Fisher, said in his book "Records':
Officers will be trained exclusively from well-to-do classes. Democratic sentiment will wreck the present system in the long run if it is not given an outlet. But let us have the far higher ground of efficiency. Is it wise or expedient to have our Nelsons from so narrow a class?
Then 40 years ago the present Prime Minister, then First Lord of the Admiralty but only because he was then a good democratic Liberal and not, as he is today, a good reactionary Tory—said when introducing the Navy Estimates for 1912:
These are the days when the Navy…should be opened more broadly to the nation as a whole."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 18th March, 1912; Vol. 35, c. 1570.]
Now, he was responsible for the introduction of the special entry scheme under


which, as we heard this afternoon, the Parliamentary Secretary entered at a late age. Moreover, that scheme now, after 30 odd years, has gone right through to fruition, and for several years we have had admirals on the active list; and, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), one cannot tell one cadet from another.
One of the arguments about Dartmouth College and running it—not only at present but previously—has been the cost. But because the cost and the building of an institution are wrong, that does not make a bad principle good. Therefore, there can be no argument if the Admiralty attempt to come forward with a suggestion for reviving the 13 age entry, arguing that cost is a factor. If cost is a factor, then the buildings are wrong and the answer is to move the boys away from those buildings altogether. They were built in the sumptuous years at the beginning of the century when cost was not considered. [Interruption.] I am ready to give way if anyone wants to interrupt.
Now I wish to say a word about branch officers. Under the Labour Government certain reforms were carried out for branch officers. First of all, they were given other titles, which even yet are not satisfactory. Secondly, the warrant officer mess as such was abolished and these officers were put into the wardroom mess with the so-called pukka officers.
While these officers were warrant officers they had cabins; they were on the cabin list; they had selected cabins, whereby they were by themselves and, where possible, they were given cabins with open ventilation. As regards the abolition of their mess and having a separate part of the ship allocated to them, they are now far worse off for cabin accommodation than ever they were before. I am told that in the "Eagle" the branch officers are now in cabins under worse conditions than they have ever been in their history, and remember the warrant officer came before the commissioned officer, so that they go back a long time. I beg the Admiralty to go into this question of cabin accommodation for branch officers.
Now I pass on to deal quickly with the question of promotion from the lower deck to, the rank of sub-lieutenant.

Yesterday, in the figures the right hon. Gentleman gave me, he gave a total of 425 executive officers commissioned last year, 130 from Dartmouth under the old entry scheme, 57 from special and direct entries, and only 18 under the upper yardmen scheme, with another 89 branch officers. One of the policy points decided upon by the Labour Government was that at least a quarter of the officers should come from the lower deck by one scheme or another. Where are the Admiralty falling down over the upper yardmen scheme? The First Lord said this afternoon they could not get enough officers, but surely they could increase the number of candidates to be selected from the lower deck for promotion under the upper yardmen or other schemes?
I will not go over a lot of other points I wish to controvert in statements made by the First Lord and other hon. Members, but I should like to deal with the question of married quarters. Until the Labour Government started the married quarters scheme for the ordinary rating as distinct from those previously or lodging and compensation allowance—they were a very small number—no one ever knew what it was. Through the long years of Tory Government nothing was ever done. This was one of the major points made by the other side when they were in opposition, but today we hear that very little is going to be done.
Another major point was the criticism of the strength of the Admiralty staff, and in the White Paper the First Lord states that the number of staff at Admiralty headquarters has gone up by 4.6 per cent. This afternoon he said he was going to go into the matter with the idea of making various reductions, but if hon. Members will compare their speeches with what has been said today, it will be rubbed into them—they knew all along—that they were building their case up on wistful imagination. The facts were not there to justify the arguments that went on to the detriment of the Navy, to the detriment of this country, of recruiting and of our standing with America.
This House, whatever the Government, will always support the Navy, be proud of it and vote the necessary Estimates for it. Never in the history of the Navy has a Government met such unmerited and irresponsible criticism as was made by the Prime Minister and other hon. Members opposite of the Labour Govern


ment in the last six years. Never has a Government eaten its own words to such an extent as the present Government, and never has an Admiralty been composed of politicians who, in opposition, have have promised so much and in Government fulfilled so few largely worth while promises.

12.19 a.m.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: I know I shall be excused if I do not follow the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) in all the ramifications of his speech. Many of us heard this speech last year and the year before, but he left out his usual vituperations against the British Legion, and we are glad to have been spared them this year. After hearing many naval officers speak tonight, I was diffident about getting up, but I have some points that do not clash with what other hon. Members with more experience of the Navy have said. I propose to deal with the cold war rather than the hot war.
We have heard from the First Lord how our Navy will perform if we once more have the misfortune to suffer a hot war. But it is the cold war which worries me most. We have been losing the cold war. We have lost the initiative. The Communists have been winning it all round the world. I regard our naval personnel as our best ambassadors, and as probably our best bulwark against Communism. Therefore, it is essential that we keep our sailors contented. If they are not contented, they will not be the ambassadors which I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House would like them to be, and which they have always been in the past.
The Navy, in my opinion, has been treated rather badly during the last five years of Socialist Government. I have no wish to be controversial. The former Parliamentary Secretary complained that the present First Lord had no complaint to make. I thought he made a non-controversial speech, but I am prepared to believe that had he wanted to say some of the things which might well have been said, the late Parliamentary Secretary could not have made his complaint. After all, we had never before seen the Navy so run down in ships and personnel.
We finished the war with an excellent Navy, and the men were demobilised. Pay was bad, and they left the Navy. It

was the same with the Army and the Air Force. It was only recently, after considerable pressure from the Conservative Party while it was in opposition, that the pay was raised. Again we began to build up our forces. If that is not a discredit to the Socialist Party, I do not know what is. Hon. Members sitting opposite asked for that. I had not got it in my speech, but I do not think that it ought to go unrecorded.
The Navy is again being built up, and it will become a force upon which we can rely for the defence of our shores. The enemy which I fear most is the enemy within our gates. That enemy is Communism and Communist propaganda. We have to see that this enemy is held at bay. Yesterday we saw a split among hon. Members on the benches opposite. We do not know which way that side is going, but I do not feel that the split means any movement to the Right. I am sure that even the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) will agree that that split was rather an ominous sign, a nasty sign.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: No, not a nasty sign.

Brigadier Clarke: I thought he would disagree with me. I have actually foreseen him as the future Minister of Defence, for when there are no defences left in this country a pacifist would make an excellent Minister of Defence. But who is to succeed to the position of First Lord of the Admiralty, the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East, or the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), will have to be settled by the former Parliamentary Secretary, whom I would prefer to see in the job.

Mr. Callaghan: indicated dissent.

Brigadier Clarke: However, it is nasty to see hon. Members in these difficulties, and when they move to the third bench back and take the third seat I feel that there is a lot of competition for the job.
Men in the Navy cannot be happy if they are conscripted. I am anxious to see the end of the calling up of reservists in peace-time. I am told that these are times of peace, although I have always said that they are not. If the Navy had not been allowed to run down, these reservists would not have had to be called up.
There is quite a lot of discontent amongst the men now being called up. I know, because they come and see me regularly. We had a promise from the late Socialist Government that the maximum service would be 18 months. That is as long as one can expect a man who has entered civilian life to give up everything he has been doing to go back into the Navy. I hope, therefore, that the First Lord will do everything he can to improve the recruiting of the Navy so that reservists will not be called up for so long.
If we increase the pensions and look after the widows, we shall get more recruits. I know that recently pensions were raised. I am referring more to the pensions of those people who served in the first world war and who served in the second world war and went out afterwards. They and their widows are at the moment on the bread line. They have had no increases in any way comparable with the rise in the cost of living.
We have been told by our Prime Minister that these things are being looked into. I hope we shall see that these people are once more raised to a status which they enjoyed in earlier and better times. Sailors breed sailors, and we shall not get men to go into the Navy, Army or Air Force if the Services are not looked after. I do not mean only those serving today but those who served before. They are the fathers and grandfathers of the future Navy.
I have a number of points which I particularly want to stress tonight. They are points which I have been raising over the last two years. Over some of them I have achieved a certain amount of success; over others I have been partly successful; over others I have had no success at all. But because one does not achieve success the first time, that is no reason why one should give in, and I propose to go on with these as long as I am a Member of this House.
My first point concerns the extended service men. There are a certain number of men who were called upon to extend their service in 1950. These men were asked to stay on in the Service and they did so through patriotism. They could well have signed on after

1st September in 1950. If they had done so, they would have received a bounty of £100 but, being patriotic sailors, interested in serving their nation, they signed on in July and August and some of them have still not had their £100. I want to draw the attention of the Parliamentary Secretary to that fact. Others 'have had it. In certain cases naval officers made a mistake and told a man that, if he did not sign on, he could not go on a certain course. Because that information was given to a rating, it was considered that he should get his £100. Others who did not receive that information have still not had their £100. The total number of sailors to whom that applies is 300. Surely we shall not allow a handful of sailors to be discontented. We should see that all receive the bounty.
Then there was a batch of naval personnel who signed on for three years voluntarily. I reckon that they were particularly patriotic in doing so. Those men are held for a further 18 months, whereas less patriotic men who had gone out of the Service have been called back for 18 months but have only done 18 months altogether. If one signs on for three years, one makes a contract and expects it to be kept. The sailor has to keep his contract and the Admiralty should keep theirs. I do not think that those men who signed on for three years to help the Admiralty out should be called upon to continue in the Service for a further 18 months. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will give an answer to that one.
I have had a certain number of complaints about destroyers in Korean waters where the men are on active service and get very little or no leave or recreation. The climate there is bad. In summer it is hot and in winter it is cold. Just the odd day of going into port is not what a man requires to keep himself fit. In war one has to put up with every inconvenience and discomfort. I know there is a war in Korea, but we ought to have enough destroyers there to give these men the relief they deserve.
These days in a destroyer—and hon. and gallant Members and hon. Members who served in the Royal Navy in the last war will know—can be very uncomfortable for the ratings. These destroyers are simply full of every sort of gadget


and machinery and there is less and less room every time a new model is produced. I have seen complaints by sailors when they have written home to their wives of the discomfort they have to suffer. In bigger ships it is not so bad. These men should have more leave and more recreation ashore when they are bound up in these small ships under particularly bad conditions.
Then, there is the question of prize money. There are certain sailors who early in the war served in H.M.S. "Undine," H.M.S. "Swordfish," and one or two other ships, but who were not 180 days at sea, which is the requisite period to qualify for prize money. These men could not do more for their country than get sunk and be taken prisoner and kept behind barbed wire for four or five years. For some time they could not even get the Atlantic Star, although recently that has been granted to them, and now I appeal that they be granted their prize money.
I know cases of two men who were serving in these ships and who have had their prize money, but some of them have still not had it. One cannot give prize money to some men and not give it to others. The prize money these men are entitled to is £5 to £10, and it is not worth cheeseparing over that. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary would look into this matter as there is a surplus of undistributed prize money.
Finally, as far as Service personnel problems are concerned, there are questions of Service pensions to widows, war widows, and disabled sailors. I have a letter here written by one of my constituents regarding the pension payable to her mother. The lady herself is a war widow, having lost two husbands in the R.A.F. in the war. She writes:
I am enclosing a copy of a letter from my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in which, as you will see, they graciously grant my Mother £120 per annum to live on for life.
I must say that that is a lot of money! This lady is the widow of a rear-admiral. The letter continues:
I am writing to you in rage, indignation and utter frustration, hoping that in some way you will be able to help. The circumstances are these: my father, a Rear Admiral, died last December at the age of 72, after fighting two World Wars, and a lifetime of faithful service to my Lords of the Admiralty. Heaven knows his pension was little enough, but just

sufficient for himself and my Mother to live in very moderate comfort. He himself had no private income and it was impossible on his pension to save. My mother has, quite literally, no income of her own at all. You will understand my feelings I know, as my grandfather and great-grandfather before him served in the so-called Senior Service. It bitterly brings to mind Kipling's words 'If blood be the price of Admiralty, Lord God we have paid in full.'
I am a war widow myself twice over, as both husbands were killed on active service. The Air Ministry are generous and I am allowed £170 a year, and for the rest have to work hard to earn enough to live on and taxed to the hilt for doing so. That is neither here nor there, being still young and able to fight my own battles. The right thing for me to do is to help my mother financially, but how can I? As I said, I am just keepng my own head above water, but some day I must grow old too. The girl who typed my Lord Commissioners' letter earns more to spend on nylons than my mother will have for food.
That is the way we have treated the widows of our senior officers in the past, and if that is what we can do for rear-admirals, one can understand the pension the wife of a petty officer or ordinary rating gets. I must ask the Parliamentary Secretary to do his utmost to see that something is done for these widows and war widows. There are many widows of the First World War who are only getting 10s. a week, and what will that do for anybody today? I hope he will give sympathetic consideration and all the energy he can to put this problem straight. There is also the problem of disabled sailors. They must have something done for them. If their pension was right in 1945 or 1946, it is not right today.
Finally, I wish to touch on the question of dockyards. I agree with a lot the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) said. He spoke about the merit award. That was an attempt to give the dockyard worker some incentive, but unfortunately he is dependent on his face fitting and on getting on well with the shop steward. That is not a good thing. I do not know a better way of giving him more money.
I believe the previous Civil Lord agreed to this award and the trade unions also agreed because they thought that by doing so they were getting a certain amount of money for the dockyard worker which he would not otherwise get. It was something to go on with as an interim measure and a palliative.
I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to see if he cannot think of some


better way of doing this and not leave a man who is a hard worker to prove that he is a trade unionist, or a non-Conservative, or whatever suits his particular boss. The man should get the award on merit and not have to join a closed shop, which is what it amounts to.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: The hon. and gallant Member is referring to my hon. Friend the Member for Devon-port and what he said about the merit award. My hon. Friend said something completely different. He said it was the union representatives who complained about the application of the award, so obviously I do not think the closed shop comes into it. The union representatives may be looking at it a different way from the hon. and gallant Member.

Brigadier Clarke: I am obliged to the hon. Member. I think we are both right and that the hon. Member for Devonport was agreeing with me to a great extent, as I think the hon. Member himself is.
That is the way in which they have to earn their living, and I am sure that the hon. Member would rather have some other system if he could think of a better one. I have had a Conservative trade unionist tell me, "Because I am a Conservative, that man I work under will not put me up for the merit award." Whether that is true or not, I cannot say. Some say it is true and some that it is not. The fact remains that that charge can be made, that it is a matter of whether one's face fits or not. I think the whole differential of pay in the dockyards requires examination. The lowest and highest paid workers are so close together that there is no incentive for a man to improve his status at all.
I think the dockyard worker could be given a better incentive to work. He is not as well paid as the agricultural worker and he has not half the amenities and facilities available to the agricultural worker. He lives in a town with expensive rents and no tied houses; in fact, he has great difficulty in getting a house at all. I am certain that if the dockyard worker were given more work and more pay and made to work harder he would be happier and the country would benefit as a result. At the moment he is underpaid, and there are many cases where two people are doing the work of one man, and sometimes three men doing the

work of two. Given proper incentives and a little more supervision and pay, these men would work harder and show better results.
There is a lot more which I wanted to say, but most of it has already been said by other hon. Members. I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for calling me before three o'clock, which is a thing that has never happened to me in a Navy Estimates debate before.

12.42 a.m.

Mr. Douglas Houghton: The hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) held the sympathy of hon. Members on this side of the House as well as on his own side when he referred to the position of the widows of naval officers and ratings. We all understand the difficulties which pensioners are facing under the present economic conditions, and we are expecting to hear from the Chancellor of the Exchequer next week the result of the Government review of the pensions of widows of Service men, and the pensions of retired Service officers and men and of civil servants and others.
But at the beginning of his speech the hon. and gallant Member rather trailed his coat by suggesting that it was to the discredit of the Labour Government that the Navy had been allowed to run down. He knows as well as every other hon. Member of this House that the convulsions through which the Labour Party are now going are due mainly to the courage of the Labour Government in deciding on needful but unpalatable measures to strengthen the defences of the country. I will tell the hon. and gallant Member that the political fortunes of his own party will hang in the balance of its re-armament programme. So it ill becomes him, or any other hon. Member on that side of the House, to suggest that there is any discredit attaching to the actions of the Labour Government in strengthening our defences.
We have shown as much courage as any political party could have done in the circumstances, and I think time will show that there has been nothing whatever to the discredit of the Labour Government in that matter.

Brigadier Clarke: The hon. Member will admit that the Labour Government had every assistance and encouragement


from the Opposition to see that our armaments did not run down. Every speech I have heard from those benches during the last two years, and every speech I have read for the last four or five years, has encouraged the Government to try to keep the Services up to strength. They were strong at the end of the war and would be now if we had not disarmed dangerously. The late Government did disarm, and now they have to bear the brunt of it.

Mr. Houghton: I am sure that any Government ought to be grateful for the support which it gets from the Opposition, but that support sometimes makes it much harder, and not easier, for it discharge its duties.
I rise to refer to a matter affecting the civilian staff of the Admiralty. I think only two speeches in the whole debate have referred to the civilian staff, and the earlier one was from my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), who said that after five years of making much the same speech about conditions in naval dockyards he had this year got a new speech. It was new because it seemed to be supported by the evidence of the Select Committee that his charges made in previous years had been confirmed. For my part, I am making reference to matters which I dealt with in a short contribution to this debate last year and the year before, so perhaps I have several years to go before I can equal my hon. Friend's record.
I wish the Establishments Division of the Admiralty would stop dealing so shabbily with senior professional officers in Admiralty offices. I have referred to this matter on previous occasions, and both my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. W. J. Edwards) have had it drawn to their attention. The fact that there is still ground for complaint shows what a stubborn problem we have to deal with.
There is in the Admiralty, and covered by a Vote in the Supplementary Estimates, a department known as the Directorate of Electrical Engineering, and that department, in common with others in the Admiralty, and indeed the rest of the Civil Service, had to undertake a revision of pay scales with effect from 1st January, 1946. That was a general review date for pay scales throughout the

whole Civil Service. Various reviews have taken place of the scales of pay of the junior staff in this department, but the pay of the senior professional officers in that directorate is still unsettled.
It is an astonishing story of shilly-shallying and delay. Why is it that pay scales which should have been adjusted with effect from 1st January, 1946, are still unsettled? Why is it that the Admiralty have had a bad name for administration ever since the late Sir Oswin Murray ceased to be its Secretary? In the public service we hear constant criticism of the delay and mishandling of establishment problems by the Admiralty, which is in strange contrast to the tributes paid to the Admiralty, deserved as I feel sure they are, in naval matters. The staff association, in which I have no personal interest, which cares for the welfare and conditions of service of the staffs, has asked the Admiralty repeatedly, but fruitlessly, to bring the matter to a conclusion.
In the Civil Engineer-in-Chief's Department there is another story of delay. After I had raised the matter on 22nd March, 1950—in columns 2082–6 of HANSARD—I had a letter from the private secretary to the First Lord on 22nd May, 1950, saying that there was reason to hope that discussions were now in their concluding stage. But they have not finished yet. The adjustments, when they are made, must date back to 1st January, 1946.
In another branch of the Civil Engineer-in-Chief's Department some officers have been retired for 18 months and two years, and their pay has still to be adjusted from 1st January, 1946, and pensions have to be adjusted in consequence. This is shameful delay, which is not repeated in any other branch of the public service. I appreciate that with professional staffs some relativity has to be taken into account, since comparable officers probably work in other Service Ministries, but the matter should be brought to a conclusion.
Are the Treasury standing in the way? If so, is it not time the Admiralty dropped a depth charge in the Treasury? In the past, we have been told by the Treasury that the Admiralty always claim to be a law unto themselves; let the Admiralty be a law unto themselves now and settle these matters that have been delayed.
I finish with a reference to what the First Lord said this afternoon about civilian staffs generally in the Admiralty. Some time ago the Admiralty appointed an organisation committee. It is headed by the Permanent Secretary and is composed of distinguished admirals; indeed, I see among the members a distinguished ex-member of the General Council of the T.U.C. and others who have studied organisational methods and can contribute something to the work. Its terms of reference are comprehensive and relate to securing the most efficient conduct of Admiralty business. The staff side of the Admiralty administrative Whitley Council was properly invited to submit suggestions and recommendations and, anxious to help, they submitted documents in autumn, 1950, and March, 1951.
I hope that the First Lord, in his review of the size and work of civilian staffs, will have regard to the fact that the staff side has been anxious to help and so far has received little encouragement. So far as I know, this committee has not reported and the staff side possesses no information about the intentions or recommendations of the committee.
I shall understand if the Parliamentary Secretary, among so many matters, is unable to reply in detail to the questions I have raised. I shall be happy if he reads them and takes speedy and energetic steps to bring this lamentable condition of things to an end. If he does, it will have the virtue that I shall not have to trouble the House on this matter next year.

12.55 a.m.

Sir Jocelyn Lucas: My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) has already drawn attention to some of the welfare matters I was going to raise, and therefore I shall be able to cut my speech even shorter than it would have been. I want to raise the question of the 12-year men retained for another 18 months. They were entitled to gratuity of approximately £100, but then had to wait till the end of the 18 months before they got it. When I raised the matter with this Government they saw the position that many of these men had already promised the money as a down payment

for a business they were taking over, or for a house, and so the Government agreed that they could claim the money at the end of their 12 years, or leave it another 18 months as they preferred and get an extra bonus if they did so.
I thought this was very good, but a petty officer in Korean waters wrote to me and asked what happened if he left the money in and was killed during the 18 months; would his wife be able to claim it? I found the wife would lose it. She cannot claim it. The only thing for these people to do is to claim the money at once, and not—as the Admiralty wish—leave it for the 18 months.
The risk of loss is so small that it could easily be covered by insurance. Even if the Government agreed to cover the risk themselves, it would not cost more than a few hundred pounds. I think the Government should see that the money goes to the widow if a man is killed during that 18 months, or insure him. The excuse was also given that it was all right because the widow would get a pension. That does not impress me a bit. If the man had been killed before the 12 years was up she would still have got a pension, and it was a definite contract that the man would be entitled to this lump sum at the end of his 12 years.
Up to two years ago the chargemen in the dockyards had their own association through which they could negotiate with the Admiralty, but then the right was taken away from them by the late Government. The chargemen have to discipline the men under them, keep order, and see that the work is properly done. If they have to apply through these men's unions to get a rise in pay it is very awkward for them if they are strict disciplinarians, because these men can get their own back. I should like to know if the chargemen's association has been killed, or if it is to be allowed to negotiate as before, direct with the Admiralty.
Finally I should like to draw attention to the injustice felt by all retired naval officers, particularly those retired before 1st September, 1950. Those retired after that date received an increase in retired pay and a terminal grant. Those who retired before get a lower rate of pension and of course got no terminal grant, That


seems all wrong. Both have an equal need for and claim to the pension. In any event, the serving officer has very little chance of putting money by, and the pensions are now worth so little that I hope the Admiralty will do all they can to see whether they cannot help these people.
If the Admiralty want to attract a high standard of officer, they must remember that the pension is part of the pay; that is why these officers are not paid more, and most of them, if they are good, would earn a great deal more in civilian life. I do hope that the Admiralty will be able to help.

1.1 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I can hardly associate myself with the rather ferocious sentiments uttered by my hon. Friend the Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton), who expressed a desire, rather alarming at this time in the morning, to drop a depth charge on the Treasury. Even at this hour of the morning he must not expect any Member holding the views I do to approve anything so violent as that. But I do say this to the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Sir J. Lucas). If he wants to get the grievances of his constituents attended to, if he wishes to get any respect at all from the Admiralty, or anybody else, he will have to make a thundering nuisance of himself and persist until he gets some justice.

Sir J. Lucas: I have done that before.

Mr. Hughes: Well, if the hon. Gentleman has done it before it shows that he has not been so successful as he might have been.
I shall try tonight to represent the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because I believe that we should keep a very close eye on national expenditure at the present time; that we should do our best to urge upon the Government and their Departments policies which will eliminate waste. I see in this very large sum of over £320 million a great waste of national expenditure in the expenditure of money, labour and materials which could be well used elsewhere.
I remember the first occasion upon which I sat through a debate on the Navy Estimates, in 1948, when the pre

sent Prime Minister came down to the House in his most truculent and rampageous mood. There is one phrase of his that sticks in my mind in the attack he made on the naval policy of the Government, when he called the policy of the Labour Government in naval matters the "quintessence of asininity." I presume we believe that there is continuity of naval policy as well as of foreign policy, so that although the figureheads on the Government Front Bench change with a different alignment in the political situation, the policy of the "quintessence of asininity" will continue through the ages until we get some fundamental change.
I remember, too, that my right hon. Friend, the then Prime Minister, four years ago made a very eloquent speech in defence of the retention of the battleships—a view which I understand is completely contrary to modern naval thought. The late Lord Lloyd George once said of the present Prime Minister, "Winston is not an orator. He is a rhetorician." He uses words not for their meaning but for their sound."
I remember in the debate on the Navy Estimates four years ago the very great attack made upon Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who was then Minister of Defence. I confess I agreed, although perhaps I should not, with a good deal of the attack that was made upon the Labour Minister of Defence. After the change-over, I do not see a great deal of improvement, and I find in these Estimates and in this debate the same sort of casual acceptance of the traditions of the past just because they are traditions of the past without any real attempt to ask if the policy is in the interests of the nation.
Throughout this debate, except in one or two speeches, I failed to find- anybody attempting to deal with the broad aspects of naval policy and to justify the enormous sum of £320 million which we have been asked to provide for in these Estimates. I remember a speech of the present Prime Minister at that time, in which he made a very scathing attack on the Admiralty. He drew attention to the fact that the Admiralty was full of civilians who were finding jobs for themselves and for their relatives, and under the Labour administration the Admiralty was over-run by them. In fact, it was a sink of administrative iniquity.
When the Prime Minister came yesterday to outline his policy on the Navy, I thought he was going to translate into action some of the statements he made in that debate. But instead of that he came to the conclusion that, after all, owing to the complexity of the Navy at the present time, he regarded this staff as necessary and he accepted it in a mood of defeatism. But in that debate he threw out a suggestion which I believe was very pertinent, and I should like to repeat the very point he made in his criticism of Lord Alexander. He said:
The whole presentation of the Admiralty staff is a scandal which any House of Commons worthy of its financial responsibilities should probe, scrape and cleanse.
I want to see that process carried out, and I agree thoroughly with the statement of the Prime Minister when he said:
I would like to see a committee of the House of Commons have a look at these matters themselves, as they would have done in almost any other Parliament than this."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 833–5.]
I believe if we had a really independent committee of business men to examine the whole expenditure of the Admiralty on its merits, if we had some hard-headed Scottish business men, who did not have any superstitious reverence for the Admiralty, we should achieve the saving of a certain amount of money.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) came to the conclusion that we could save a lot of money by adopting the strategy he suggests, but I should like to see this impartial committee set up, say under the chairmanship of Mr. Hardie, who appears now to be out of employment, and I should be prepared even to have Lord Waverley as a member of the committee. I should like to have hard-headed business men who would look at this Admiralty business, not through the blind eye of Nelson or the romatic spectacles of the Prime Minister, but see how we can tackle this matter and save the money of the taxpayer.
I want now to turn to the case of H.M.S. "Eagle." I first became interested in this aircraft carrier after studying the report of the Select Committee on Estimates. I hope that hon. Members will read the document dealing with naval dockyards, for questions were asked about the cost of these ships mounting steadily

as they neared completion. When I asked the Prime Minister yesterday about the cost of the "Eagle" he said "Oh, that is the Socialist Government's," and he put responsibility for the expenditure of £15 million upon the Socialist Government. But this vessel was laid down during a time when the present Prime Minister was previously in office, namely, in 1942. So the Prime Minister did not know the date of the laying down of this expensive vessel.
I suggest that an item of £15,750,000 in an Estimate ought to be looked at carefully. The First Lord spoke with some pride of H.M.S. "Eagle" and gave us interesting details. When I asked him, at Question time some six weeks ago, about the cost of this naval monster, he said that I would have to wait for the Navy Estimates. A week later I find that the "Eagle" has been on her final trials on the Clyde. Information which was not given to him was given to 50 newspaper correspondents invited to spend a day on the ship so that they could tell us all about what we were getting for our money.
I have two accounts of the "Eagle" written by two correspondents of those very accurate papers, the "Scotsman" and the "Glasgow Herald," and I should like to supplement the information which has been given to the House. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman is going to invite Members to visit the ship. I hope that they will go. I shall be pleased to accompany the hon. Gentleman, and perhaps I will change my opinion when I see what we have got for this £15 million.
I am told by the correspondent of the "Scotsman" that the "Eagle" is Britain's latest, greatest, fastest, most expensive aircraft carrier. I am told also that she continued her machinery and manœuvrability trials in the Clyde accompanied by 50 daily and technical journalists who were duly entertained. The First Lord did not put his wares fully in the window, because it was far more interesting than he made out. For example, to appeal to the ordinary man in Scotland, the reporter told us that the flight deck was twice the length of the football pitch at Hampden Park and that inside the vessel 263 double-deckers could be stowed. He told us that more than 1,000 miles of electric cable were stretched throughout the ship, and that


the main generating machinery would supply a town of the size of Oxford. All this complicated machinery, and all this capital asset, is in a ship which might disappear in one bombing raid. The galleys are fitted with the most modern electric cookers and all the most beautiful labour-saving devices.
After reading that, I feel that once the people from the not-so-well-housed parts of Glasgow go to sea in this ship, they will never want to come home. Then there is a canteen and two ice cream and soda fountains, a barber's shop, a library and a cinema, while a small air-conditioned chapel provides a quiet place for meditation and prayer. I presume that on Sunday a chaplain delivers a sermon on the text "Thou shalt not kill." I have not quite finished the catalogue of this wonderful ship. It has an automatic telephone exchange with 500 subscribers and its laundry, with 31 workers, has a machine capable of washing 500 lb. of clothing in 17 minutes. Each man on board can have 10 lb. of clothes washed for 9d.
I am sorry that the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke), who has such a terrible fear of Communism, has left the Chamber. He does not realise that he has been in a Communist institution all his life—the worst kind of Communism, a military Communism—and here he is advancing the argument that we must support these colossal Estimates in order to keep out Communism. I presume his argument would be that if we doubled the Navy Estimates we should be sure to keep out Communism.
Well, here we have the Navy showing how useful it can be—turning out a magnificent bundle of washing for 9d. It shows what can be done by collective enterprise. Yet hon. Members opposite will all repudiate the suggestion that they are anywhere near believing in Communism or Socialism. I warn the First Lord not to bring that ship off the coast of Ayrshire. If the miners I represent, who live in far less salubrious dwellings than that, knew that the ship was anchored off the coast of Ayrshire, they would make a desperate attempt to capture it and use it for housing purposes.
What troubles me is that there has not been a sufficient realisation in the House of the enormous economic waste that is

going on at the present time in the Navy. The Prime Minister, who does not usually wander into the realm of statistics, gave us some interesting figures yesterday when he talked about the increased cost of destroyers. He said that the destroyers in in 1914 cost £150 a ton, in 1939 £325 a ton and they are now costing £700 a ton—nearly five times as much as they did in 1914.
Now these figures, when one tries to interpret them in terms that we can understand, deserve a little further examination. They contain the real argument which the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) has been presenting throughout this re-armament programme. I am not a Bevanite and I understand that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale would be embarrassed if he were associated with anyone like a pacifist. But I find that his argument is absolutely sound in regard to its economic consequences. It is that we are at the present time investing far too great a part of our national wealth in the production of armaments. We have a typical example in this aircraft carrier.
This aircraft carrier was built in Harland & Wolff's yard in Belfast. No business man would agree to give a contract in the way this ship has been built. I hope there will be a most searching inquiry into it and that the Select Committee on Estimates will pursue the inquiries, which were tentatively made at the first meeting. I would like to have the exact relationship between the Admiralty and Harland & Wolff, Ltd. These are not contract prices. It appears that these prices alter from week to week and month to month, and that, at the end of 10 years, the Admiralty is presented with a huge bill of £15 million.
I do not profess to know the costing system of this. All I know is that it is not a transaction which any businessman would consider, that the Admiralty has presumably a costing system of its own, and that the result is we have this enormous sum of public money being spent and demanded from this House at a time when we are practically bankrupt. I do suggest that the economic consequences of all this have not been fully realised by the House. Just imagine the large number of craftsmen of all kinds, all the joiners, electricians, technicians, and all kinds of skilled people, who are


being engaged on this tremendous aircraft carrier, which is only now reaching completion, at a time when the whole strategy of naval warfare has been completely changed.
We had from the hon. and learned Member for Northampton a very lucid analysis of the strategic situation which confronts us today. He pointed out that the situation has completely changed during the last few years. When this ship was laid down in 1942, for example, the present Prime Minister was still a fellow-traveller with Joe Stalin. At that time we were all enthusiastic about the Russians, and the fishermen in my own constituency were sacrificing their lives, as naval reservists, taking convoys to Russia. Even in 1948, when the Prime Minister made the speech which I have quoted, the present Prime Minister did not think about Russia in terms of being enemy No. 1 at all. Now, we are finding that this aircraft carrier, which was presumably built for one kind of international position, is coming into service in another.
The hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) has gone into the question of the number of Russian submarines. This question of the number of submarines Russia has was the subject of argument on the occasion of the last Navy Estimates. Then, we had the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Crookshank), who is now the Minister of Health—thank goodness, they have not brought him to the Admiralty vet—argued that there were 300 to 400 submarines and, when he was challenged by the then Minister of Defence to say what his authority was for saying Russia had so many hundreds, he refused to give any authority. He went on to say that some people said the Russians have a thousand submarines.
That was entirely different from the figure given yesterday by the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister had any evidence that Russia had a huge fleet of submarines I am sure he would have flourished it across the Floor of the House. In fact, he said that there were only comparatively few Russian submarines. He referred to the new fast U-boats of which, he said,
the Soviets have happily at present only a few."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 441.]

Yet, in opposition, hon. Members opposite were talking in terms of a thousand submarines. Today, when the Prime Minister has the advantage of the fullest possible information from his intelligence service, all he can say is that the Soviets have happily at present only a few submarines.
Against these submarines, which are in ports which some parts of the year are blocked by ice, we are asked to continue this huge Navy as it was in the days when we were prepared to fight alone against the naval forces of Germany, Japan, and Italy. Now there is no German Navy, although I do not know whether they are going to reconstruct one. If it is right to have a German Army I know of no argument against a German Navy. We have the huge naval might of America, which has more ships than any other nation in the world. The old menace has disappeared and there is no real evidence to show that we are not spending this huge sum of something like £325 million for what is perhaps a phantom navy.
If the Russians have one thousand submarines, or anything of that kind, it proves that in view of their technical backwardness there must be something very efficient in their organisation and industrial system which can produce one thousand submarines, highly technical vessels needing much skilled labour. I think it is quite probable that Russia has a certain number of submarines and that the right hon. Gentleman cannot disclose the full number to the House, but I do not believe that there are in existence at the present time, nor are likely to be, such huge fleets of submarines in Russia as to justify this enormous expenditure.
The case that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton argued—I mean his general conclusions, although he argued a different premise—is right, that we are incurring a huge burden of capital expenditure when we need all the labour and materials for the export industry. The First Lord told us about the shortage of skilled labour in the dockyards and about shortages of steel. There is a shortage of steel, and all kinds of material, technical skill, and experience needed in the dockyards are producing commercial ships. If he increases the personnel in the dockyards he will absorb


from the commercial dockyards the skill, material, and labour which goes to manufacture commercial ships.
I, as one who lives near the Clyde, am very apprehensive indeed at the way in which labour in this country is being diverted from the kind of ship-building that is necessary if this nation is to continue as a manufacturing and industrial Power in order to produce ships to combat a menace which I believe is largely imaginary. I regret that at a time when we are faced with the possibility of competition from the ship-yards of Germany and Japan we are likely to lose that market for ship-building which has been one of the necessary assets to the economic life of this country.
We have heard about submarines holding up food supplies from America, but if we cannot pay for that food the source of supply will dry up. If this country turns its great ship-building industry to the manufacture of vessels which will be obsolete in another 10 years, we shall destroy the economic prosperity of this nation.
I would ask hon. Members who have served in the Navy to answer the question contained in the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton; how shall we be affected by the atom bomb? It is no use imagining that the atom bomb does not exist, or thinking in terms of 1914–18, or even last-war strategy, when this tremendous new weapon has been developed by our potential enemy. The Prime Minister has warned us that if Russia dropped only 50 atom bombs on this country the consequences would be fearful.
What will be the position if we have a wonderful Navy chasing submarines in the approaches to the American coast, or in the Channel, when our great cities are being obliterated by atom bombs? The atom bomb is the great final determining factor in modern war which must be taken into account when discussing questions of security and defence.
An hon. Member has talked about barracks being destroyed. There is a greater danger than that. Our wonderful Navy with its aircraft carriers and frigates cannot stop the atom bomb, and if we do not do that this country will be destroyed. America is disposed to regard this country as an aircraft carrier

for the United States. As a result, there is dire peril awaiting this nation if we ever have to face war in modern terms. We have travelled a long way from the days of Queen Elizabeth, but a great deal of our naval strategy seems not to have moved at all. With that determining factor in our minds, instead of building up these armaments, adding ships upon ships and increasing our naval forces at a cost which must become more and more astronomic as prices continue to go up, we should look another way.
Before the war, we used to put in front of our disarmament programme the suggestion that we should ask the nations to agree to the abolition of the submarine. Why should we not do that today? Why should we not have a positive programme of 'disarmament as a counter-plan to the plan the Russians brought before us? In order to deal effectively with the submarine menace, our policy should be to go to the disarmament conference in Paris and say that this country stands for the abolition of the submarine. If we abolished the submarine, we would have no need for these tremendous annual sums of money that are asked for each year in these Estimates.
I submit that the alternative to bankruptcy—and that bankruptcy will bring all the consequences which one hon. Member dreads so much—is not piling up new naval forces or any other of these colossally expensive armaments, but to go to a disarmament conference realising that we have a great deal to gain by international agreement. We may be sceptical about this, but it would be better than taking risks which would result in the destruction of the economic life of the nation, and of the people who have worked so hard to build up this nation.

1.37 a.m.

Captain Robert Ryder: At this late hour I hope to be brief, so I will refer straight away to the remarks made by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), who was kind enough to give me warning that he intended to criticise the speech I made last night.
I listened very attentively to what he said, and I feel that, without repeating what I said yesterday, I should emphasise


that a great deal in one's approach to the strategical problem, in my view, depends on whether one regards war as something that is inevitable or whether one bends all one's efforts to building up a deterrent against it. I feel that the hon. and learned Gentleman must have clearly in his mind the attitude that he regards war as more or less inevitable or to such an extent that that should be the main theme of our strategy.
Anyhow, whatever priority is to be accorded to the building up of our Forces as a Continental Power, as against our maritime strength, the diminished influence which we may exert in the world at large, is something which we should regard with great misgiving. It was with that thought in mind that I addressed myself to the White Paper, and I must say that, when I first looked at the White Paper, I had a number of criticisms and misgivings in mind, criticisms and misgivings which have been largely set at rest by the speech of my right hon. Friend the First Lord, and principally his remarks about the Fleet Air Arm being the main striking power of the Fleet.
When I first looked at the White Paper, my first criticism was that today we have a very small active Fleet and a very large Reserve Fleet. To that extent our naval forces today are quite different from what they used to be before the war in peacetime. And I wonder whether we are right, within our limited resources, to spend so much money on our Reserve Fleet at the expense of the active Fleet. This is a matter which always deserves very careful consideration. The Reserve Fleet, which we are glad to learn is in good condition, has a somewhat destructive effect on the morale of those who look after it.
I think the First Lord's words were that it is not a very inspiring existence. What we need above all, apart from the effect it has on our influence throughout the world, is an increased active Fleet where the main training of all seamen must really be carried out. When it comes to war-time expansion, the lack of training and the reduced scope of command and of commanding officers will tell. We have to balance that against

the Reserve Fleet we keep and hope to man in the event of mobilisation.
The Prime Minister has referred to the emphasis that has now been placed on harbour defence and in-shore minesweeping. There is no doubt that the Admiralty have got an eye on the ball there; it is a very practical consideration, but harbour defence and in-shore minesweeping will not extend or increase our influence throughout the world. However necessary they may be, we want to be careful that we do not become too harbour defence-minded. We have to balance the practical defence requirements against the much broader requirements of our maritime influence throughout the world.
I have looked also at the tables of naval strength to see where we can increase the striking force of our Fleet. There are the three light fleet carriers on which construction has been delayed for a long time—"Powerful," "Leviathan," and "Hercules." The "Majestic" is being completed for use on loan to Australia. But the other light fleet carriers seem to have come to a complete stop for some time. It is an important element in the strength of our Fleet awaiting completion, and I ask for a statement of Admiralty policy on that question.
In conclusion, my criticism of the White Paper is that it is a severely practical document. It concentrates on the main threat, but it does so at the expense of our maritime influence overseas at a time when this is very much needed. I hope, therefore, that before next year's Estimates my right hon. Friend will give thought to that point of view.

1.45 a.m.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: Like the First Lord, whom I should like to congratulate on his office, this happens to be the seventh time also on which I have spoken in the Navy Estimates debate from the Front Bench; unfortunately, on this occasion it happens to be from this side. I have looked at some of the speeches of those who have preceded me on the Opposition Front Bench, and have found that on many occasions they have repeated all that has been said by other speakers on their side, and taken up a considerable amount of time.
I shall try to avoid as far as possible any repetition of the speeches made on this side today, and confine myself to what is contained in the First Lord's statement and in the Estimates. There is on page 2 of the Statement a rather startling sentence:
It is, however, my intention to effect such administrative and other economies, and reductions in overseas expenditure, as is consistent with maintaining the traditional efficiency of the Royal Navy.
That seems rather dangerous wording. I do not know exactly what he means by effecting economies abroad. Is he going to close any dockyards, or reduce the numbers employed there? Neither of these things would bring about efficiency, and that statement will cause some of the people who have to administer dockyards abroad concern as to what is to happen to them in the forthcoming year.
On page 5 there is a paragraph about commissioning bases for small craft, the last sentence of which says:
The maintenance in reserve of large numbers of wooden craft is a novel problem for the Royal Navy in peace time and these commissioning bases provide the most practicable and economical solution.
I rather gather from that that the Admiralty are not certain what they are going to do to maintain these craft, and I should like to be assured that we have proper means of preservation before we order too many of them, so that they may not be allowed to rot.
On page 6, in the paragraph marked "General," it refers to trouble with raw materials and labour for the 1951–52 programme, and goes on:
Taking all these factors into consideration, progress on the naval programme has not so far been unsatisfactory, but the stage is now being reached where a considerable increase of manpower on naval work in the shipbuilding bards will be necessary to maintain progress.
Are any additional steps being taken to increase the labour force? I am sure the First Lord will agree that if all the labour necessary for the work which could he undertaken in the Royal Dockyards within the re-armament programme is not recruited, once again we must fall down on the programme and re-armament will not be carried out in the time proposed.
I was very interested in the paragraph on re-engagements, on page 11, and I was glad to hear the First Lord say today that there have been some improvements

in re-engagement since the new pay code was introduced and the pensions increased. There seems, however, to be a little inconsistency between the First Lord's statement and the sub-head which deals with payments for re-engagements, in which there is rather a large reduction. It may be that fewer will be entitled to the £100 gratuity. I do not know whether that will be the answer, but I should be obliged if the Parliamentary Secretary could tell us something about that.
The First Lord also spoke about encouraging longer periods of service, by men being allowed to sign on for five years after having finished their 18 months and 12 months. I presume that that will mean five years from the end of the 12 years, making 17 years in all. He did not say whether the men would get a bounty or a pension at the end of the 17 years, and my view is that unless they are paid something similar to what is paid to men who serve 22 years—perhaps a gratuity or smaller pension in ratio—the five-year scheme will not benefit the Navy much in these days of full employment. Will these men who are taken on for the extra five years from the end of the 12 years period be paid anything?
I am glad to note that the Government have more or less agreed that we tried to cut down the numbers in the Admiralty Office as much as we possibly could. This statement says:
The number of staff at Admiralty headquarters at 1st January, 1952, was 11,059, or 484 more than at 1st January, 1951.
Then the next sentence pleases me most:
This increase has been due to the continuing demands of the Government's re-armament programme, but it has been, and will continue to be, Admiralty policy to confine any increases to the lowest possible limits.
That is some admission that we were trying to do what we could to limit the numbers engaged at the Admiralty Office under Vote 12; and that answers the criticism of the Parliamentary Secretary himself a year ago, and also of the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith), who now adorns the Government Front Bench.
There is one other item which perhaps many hon. Members have not realised, and that is that there is a £1 million increase in the Vote this year over last year. No doubt that is due to increased


salaries, but that is a statement of fact, and I am sure that in his probing of the Admiralty Office the First Lord will find it extremely difficult to reduce the numbers without creating quite a lot of inefficiency there.
Now I should like to turn to the Estimates themselves, and refer to a few items. I should like to talk about Vote A first. It will be noted on page 9 that out of the total of 143,500 in 1951–52, there were 12,085 Royal Marines, but with Vote A at 153,000 for 1952–53, there are 11,700, which means a reduction in the numbers of the Royal Marines so far as Vote A is concerned. I feel sure the admirers of the Royal Marines will be very perturbed indeed to learn that, with a bigger Vote A, the number of Royal Marines is reduced. I notice there is a reduction of officers from 685 to 650. I do not know what will happen to these officers, and whether these 35 are going to be made up by wastage, or something of that sort. But it does seem odd, and I do not think that most people will be pleased about it.
On page 10, Vote A. there is shown a rather large increase in Flag officers. There are 60 Flag officers in 1951–52, and that figure has gone up to 68 for 1952–53; there were 26 officers of relative Flag rank for 1951–52, but this is increased to 28 for next year. I take particular note of the fact that the number of dental officers has been reduced from 138 to 120. I wonder if this is an economy of any sort, or is it because of some arrangement with the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Education in connection with schools?
It appears to me to be a retrogade step to reduce the number of dental officers in the Navy when Vote A is going up. I do not know if there is an answer, but it seems, knowing these dental officers are used to treat the wives and families in married quarters, whose numbers are increasing rapidly, that this is going to be a false economy, as a result of which someone will suffer.
On Vote 2 I would raise a point about mess traps. Expenditure is coming down from £566,500 to £370,000. There is only one other item showing a reduction—all the others are increasing. Therefore, can I be told whether this is an economy measure, whether it is to be taken out of

stocks, or are we not to have so many mess traps in the Navy in the coming year?
On page 46, dealing with Fleet Services, I note that there is a rather large decrease in the numbers employed. I note that boom defence and salvage vessel personnel are reduced from 1,943 to 1,730. I should be interested to learn why it is that the crews of boom defence and salvage vessels are coming down. Is it because the jobs are being taken over by Service men or because the number of vessels is being reduced? I should also like to know something about the reserves. When we were in the Government we heard a lot from the then Opposition about the state of the Reserves. Yet the amount of money for this purpose next year shows a reduction on the amount for this year. The amount for the Royal Fleet Reserve is going down by almost half, and that for the Royal Marine Force Volunteer Reserve also shows a reduction.
For the last three or four years at least it has been said that every effort ought to be made to increase the Reserves, particularly the R.N.V.R., and the R.N.R., apart from the Royal Fleet Reserve. It is striking to read these sums and to find that no provision has been made by the Admiralty for increasing the size of the Reserves next year. So far as the Royal Fleet Reserve is concerned, it appears that the numbers are coming down to 20,000. This is no doubt due to the fact that numbers have been called up for some time. I should like to know if any effort is being made to build up the size of the Reserves, particularly the Royal Fleet Reserve. We cannot afford to allow this Reserve to go down.
There are other matters about which I wish to talk, but I do not want to use too much time. There is one alarming matter in the Estimates. Hon. Members will all remember the questions raised on the matter of security at the dockyards and armament establishments, and on the necessity for tightening up security measures for the prevention of sabotage. These questions came especially after the explosions of the last few years.
It is rather distressing to find that on almost every Vote which includes the Admiralty constabulary the numbers of the constabulary have been reduced. That


seems to me to be cheeseparing economy, if it is economy. I cannot see any reason for a reduction of the Admiralty constabulary, and I think it is true that those in charge of the constabulary have for some time been asking for increased numbers.
With regard to the increased staff which will be required for Vote 8 and Vote 10 work this year, it appears to be obvious that if the plan is to be complied with a large addition of professional staff will be necessary. Is any step being taken to secure early increase of the present complements, or are we to live in hope that something will come along? It is a serious matter if we are to have these Estimates looking very high year after year, and, at the end of each year, we find that the additional professional staff and others have not come along—perhaps because we have not gone out of our way to get them—and that there is a large under-spending. It is not good for the Navy Estimates of the future to have large under-spendings carried on each year, making the task look the more formidable.
Now I want to deal with a question which is rather close to my heart, Vote 10. Here again, there was quite a lot of complaint from this side of the House when we were in office about the progress which we were making with married quarters and with work in the dockyards. I agree entirely with my hon. Friends the Members for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) and Devonport (Mr. Foot) about the great necessity for carrying out as quickly as possible large works programmes to bring the dockyards into a really efficient state.
The hon. Member for Devonport may not realise the considerable amount of money that has been spent since 1945 out of Vote 10 funds for that purpose in all the dockyards. I can assure him that it was as much as we could spend at that time within the capabilities of the area to provide the labour force. However, I am a little worried to find that in these Estimates there is only a very small allowance for works in the dockyards. I notice that for 1951–52 £20,000 was voted to the dockyards and factories for new works and that £496,000 was provided for continuation services, whereas in this financial year there will be nothing at all provided for the Royal dockyards, and only a sum of £472,000

for continuation services, which is obviously work put in hand by the previous Administration.
There may be some economy cut here, but in my view it is bad economy to cut out the work which is so necessary if the dockyards are to be able to carry out their job more efficiently. I shall not blame anybody for the condition of the yards. Most of it was due to the effects of the war because for six years everybody was concentrating on winning the war and there was very little opportunity of carrying out the necessary work there. I can assure the House that it will be very serious if these yards are not properly looked after.
I want to know what is happening with the dockyard reconstruction scheme? I hope that will not be shelved because the only future for the yards will be one of the grossest inefficiency unless that reconstruction scheme is put into operation as soon as time permits. It will obviously take a long time and much money, but it will be for the benefit of the nation and for the benefit of the people running the yards.
There are two other disturbing features in the Estimates. I do not want to play party politics on this, because we do not usually do so on Navy Estimates, and I hope we shall never have to do so, but I am very disturbed to find that there is no provision in Vote 10 this year for new works for married quarters. The House probably knows that so far as married quarters under Vote 10 are concerned, these relate only to those abroad and in Northern Ireland, whereas those in the United Kingdom come under Vote 15.
After all that has been said about married quarters for men in the Navy, and particularly for those serving abroad, there is not a penny in the Estimates next year for new works in this respect. We have been doing all we can since 1946 for this purpose. I see there is £172,000 to be voted in 1952–53 for works started previously. Unless we are to have something in the programme each year, however, we shall fall down on this matter. I have had some dealing with provision of accommodation for personnel and nobody knows better than I do how much is the need for the improvement of our barracks.
We have gone a long way towards it. We modernised blocks, we built new


canteens, and I myself agreed to a scheme, before I left office, whereby the original plans for the modernisation of the barracks in the home ports would be expedited by 100 per cent., if the money was available at the Admiralty. But, instead of it being expedited, it looks as if we are going back.
It is disturbing to the man who has to serve in these barracks to be told after these last five or six years, when we have been trying to do all we could in this direction, that there is no provision in Vote 10 for this particular phase of Admiralty employment. Last year, we voted £88,000 for new works to be started in 1952–53 to accommodate personnel. When one does that for new works, it usually means a sum 10 times as large for the complete job, so that this figure for new works was not far less than £1 million. We voted £499,000 for continuation services, but now we come down to £384,000. That will put us back for a long time, and will put us back in places where we should not have allowed it to occur.
I realise the difficulties of new Ministers when taking over in a period when the Estimates are almost completed, but I am shocked at the fact that the provision, which we had made and for which we had prepared next year, for married quarters under Vote 10, for accommodation of personnel and for dockyards and factories, has been allowed to be interfered with.
Finally, on Vote 15, I note something else which is a little bit alarming. Vote 15 is the Vote out of which we obtain the expenditure for married quarters at home. It will be found again that we allowed £1,500,000 for 1951–52 while there is £2,150,000 for 1952–53. That shows an increase of £650,000, but, I think that on reading the explanatory notes it would be found that there is less work being started this year compared with last year. I imagine that the increase in the Vote is nothing less, but is a run-over from this year's actual work. I cannot be certain what is the exact position with regard to the married quarters' programme for this year under the Vote, but if there is a reduction, compared with last year, I should like to know and I should be very sorry about it.
Last, but not least, the First Lord will know that there was an agitation for some

time that we should have married quarters for the home forces under Vote 15. We set up a working party which reported just before I came away. I should like to know whether its report has yet been considered and what is the decision reached by the Admiralty.

2.16 a.m.

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Commander Allan Noble): I have had some experience of the Silent Service, but I do not think that I have ever been so silent in this House as I have during the last few months at the Admiralty. Therefore, I must ask for the customary indulgence of the House for those who speak from this Box for the first time. May I say what a great honour it is for me—and I am sure the same was felt by both the ex-Parliamentary Secretary and the ex-Civil Lord who have also served in the Navy—to be undertaking this task on behalf of the Admiralty tonight.
This has been a very long debate, quite a Marathon, and I hope that hon. Members in all parts of the House will excuse me if I do not answer all their points even if they have let me know about them beforehand. It is difficult to answer in detail a long speech like that of the former Civil Lord at this time of night.
May I add my congratulations to those which have been given to the two maiden speakers, the hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. R. Allan) and the hon. and gallant Member for King's Lynn (Commander Scott-Miller). All hon. Members will agree that their speeches showed great knowledge and we shall, look forward to hearing them in our naval debates in the future.
Such a vast field has been covered that it would be best if I tried to divide my reply into subjects instead of speeches. I will start by talking about officers and men, although perhaps the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) would rather I said "chaps" or even perhaps "often." One's thoughts come at once to the need for the Navy to continue to retain men beyond their normal time in the Navy and the recall of more men from the Royal Fleet Reserve.
My right hon. Friend referred to that in his speech, and he said that we had great sympathy with these men and that


we would do everything in our power to cut down the period of retention and recall. Some hon. Members have said that retentions are unfair and some have said that recalls are unfair. This shows the need for a balanced policy in this matter, and that we really are trying to be fair about it.
My predecessor said that it was about time we had settled our manpower problems, but it is not quite as easy as all that. In 1949 Vote A was 154,000, which is roughly the same as today, but it must be realised that in the interval it went down to 143,000 and that it was planned to go down to 127,000 at the end of 1950. What happened while it was being planned to go down to 127,000? We had Korea, the re-armament programme, three programmes, in fact, one after the other, each getting larger, which could not have made it at all easy to plan the manpower needs of the Navy. Then there has been the question of National Service with the periods again altered from time to time. In these conditions it cannot have been easy for the manning department of the Navy to plan ahead.
There is also the question of re-engagement. We on this side of the House started asking Questions about that as early as 1948, when it was apparent that sufficient men were not signing on after 12 years to complete their time for pension. There were various reasons for that, and I am glad to say that the position has improved. But we are getting to the position this year when the big entries of just before the war, who have completed their 12 years and have been held for another 18 months, will be going out.
My predecessor asked why it is that Vote A will rise rather higher this year and fall towards the end of the year. He said he thought we were misusing the Royal Fleet Reserve. I would not say that at all. The Royal Fleet Reserve is being used for its proper purpose, and these men will continue to be available in that Reserve. We are also offering to men who have completed their 12 years and their 18 months' retention, that if they join the Royal Fleet Reserve the 18 months will count as their time for having been called up.
I think that from what I have said it will be seen that even if we were able

to recruit more men at the moment it would not help our shortage of men; and as my right hon. Friend said, the Navy depends more than the other Services on senior and highly trained technical men. We have done everything possible to encourage re-entry and re-engagement and transfers to longer periods of service.
On the question of dilution, I am sure that the former Parliamentary Secretary would agree that one can carry that too far, both from the point of view of safety, and also because it would give the senior men far too much work, with perhaps the result that they themselves would not re-engage. The former Civil Lord asked about the extra gratuity being offered to men extending their service. The answer is that that gratuity is being paid at the rate of £25 a year for service after the tenth year.
My predecessor asked about the introduction of task forces. That matter, as he knows, has been under consideration for a long time. An example of what has been done is the present America and West Indies Squadron. There used to be a squadron based on Bermuda, but now ships of the Home Fleet do a year on the Station and then come back for leave at home.
It was suggested that re-fits for the Mediterranean Fleet might be carried out at home and re-fits for the Home Fleet in the Mediterranean. But that would open up tremendous problems. The hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. W. J. Edwards) referred to married quarters. What would happen if we were sending families out to the Mediterranean and, at the same time, bringing ships stationed there home for re-fit? I do not think that the matter is as simple as it sounds.
Perhaps, under the same heading, I might refer to the question of beer in the Navy. The answer which I might have given was put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett), who seemed to know a great deal about it. As he said, the chief problem is one of storage. What we really want is a reliable dehydrated beer which, I understand, is not at present available. People may quote the example of the French Navy, where, I understand, they have glass or plastic-lined tanks for the wine for their ships' companies. As my hon. and gallant


Friend said, they would not be suitable for beer. I would say, however, that we have the greatest sympathy with this idea; investigations have gone a long way, and are still proceeding.
I should like to join in the tributes which have been paid to them from all sides of the House to the Royal Marines. First of all, may I say, in answer to the questions that have been put, that there is no intention to reduce their numbers and that the figures shown in the Estimates are merely a normal type of fluctuation in Vote A. It merely means that more men from the big entry before the war are coming out this year, and, therefore, there will be a drop in numbers.
A question was asked about 41 Commando, formerly in Korea, and why it has been disbanded. That Commando was specially formed for that particular job, and it has been disbanded now the job has come to an end. Some of the men have come home for normal Service duties and some of them have joined the Commando Brigade in Malaya. I was also asked whether the Commando Brigade in Malaya was to be relieved by Marines. It is not, but by military forces. One other small point about the Marines concerned the wardroom attendants. Their future is under consideration, and they will eventually be replaced by stewards.

Mr. Callaghan: Can the hon. and gallant Gentleman give a time-table for that?

Commander Noble: No, I afraid I cannot.
Many points were raised about the Royal Fleet Reserve, and perhaps I could answer first the question raised by the last speaker and say that many members of this Reserve have been called up are accounted for on another Vote.
One hon. Member asked about men of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve not being wanted when they go to sea for training, and he quoted his own case prewar when nobody wanted to speak to him. I would be horrified if that sort of thing went on today, and I can assure any would-be recruits for the R.N.V.R. that they will get a first-class welcome when they go to sea. I am quite certain that commanding officers take a great deal of trouble about the training for these

officers and men. Somebody mentioned watch-keeping certificates in this connection. We are considering the introduction of intermediate watch-keeping certificates for these officers.
My right hon. Friend made an announcement about the cadet entry, and I would ask hon. Members to await the results of the Working Party which he said he would set up. I rather thought that some hon. Members were more inclined to attack a possibly lower age entry than to defend the 16-year-old entry, but I would say straight away, and emphasise what my right hon. Friend said, that there is no intention of abolishing the 16-year-old entry. Should it be that the decision of the Working Party is in favour of a lower-age entry, it will surely be for very broad entry and the greatest trouble will be taken to ensure that it is.
I notice that the ex-Parliamentary Secretary shakes his head, but I can give him an assurance on that point. It really would be tragic if the officer entry to the Navy and the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth were to become a kind of political shuttlecock and be one of the first things to suffer from a change of Government. We feel this very acutely. The greatest care will be taken with this matter and our endeavours will be centred entirely on getting the best possible officers for the Royal Navy.

Mr. Callaghan: We fear that there is considerable prejudice about this and that before the Working Party starts there are very substantial influences at work to ensure that there will be a return to the 13½-year entry to the Navy at all costs. We do not say this without knowledge. If the hon. and gallant Member is going to carry us with him, let him ensure that the Working Party is drawn from a wide and independent section of the nation and does not include only those who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the future of Dartmouth.

Commander Noble: I most certainly give that assurance. I am certain that those are exactly the lines on which my right hon. Friend would set up such a Working Party. He has already said that he is going to do it in conjunction with the Minister of Education.
Many questions were asked about both the Fleet in being and the Fleet of the


future, and at this late hour I could not answer all of them. The "Tiger" class cruisers are awaiting the development of their gunnery and fire control equipment. Of the carriers, only the "Victorious," at the moment, is committed to modernisation. What the future policy will be, both for the carriers on which work is not going on at present and the carriers that would be suitable for modernisation is based on a comprehensive plan. We have to have balanced carrier forces; we have got to have both task forces of Fleet carriers and trade protection carriers. Whether we go on modernising, as with the "Victorious," or proceed quickly with the others depends on the balance of our carrier forces at the time.
I was glad that there was such considerable emphasis laid on naval aviation during the debate. I particularly use that expression in spite of the fact that hon. Members on both sides dislike it. It fits in with what my right hon. Friend said—that aviation is now an integral part of the Navy and we do not want people to think of it as a separate arm. The air crew position is better. Advertising has done a great deal of good and it was remarkable to see the graph of how applications went up after it started. But there is still a long way to go, and we want a 50 per cent. increase on what we are getting now.
The "Eagle" has not yet got her aircraft. The squadrons are now being formed ashore, however, and she will have them soon. Korea held up the supply of modern aircraft to the R.N.V.R. squadrons, but we are very conscious of their need. The hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) asked about Coastal Command. After the war, following Departmental discussions, there was an agreement between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry on what should be done. Briefly, it is that the Navy is recognised as normally the predominant partner in combined sea-air operations. The total strength of the maritime arm of the R.A.F. is determined by the Chiefs of Staff or higher authority, and its allocation to the various theatres is a matter for Admiralty and Air Ministry agreement. Everything possible is done to achieve co-operation at all levels.
There is a joint sea-air warfare committee which was set up to go into questions concerning both the Services. There is also the joint anti-submarine school at Londonderry, where both services combine on anti-submarine work. I feel that, as the hon. Member said, the Admiralty should make their position clear, and it is this: Should either party to the agreement wish to revise it, it is open to them to start discussions. If the proposed change was a major one it would be for the Government to decide. The Admiralty have not so far asked, and are not at present asking, for any such change.
The hon. Member will appreciate that I cannot prejudge the outcome of any future consideration which may be given to this question. I am choosing my words carefully. In any such future consideration the Admiralty would need to take into account not only the arguments of principle, for and against a fundamental change in the administration of maritime aircraft, but also the large practical problems which would be involved if the decision should be in favour of such a change. At the moment we have a good many preoccupations in getting on with the re-armament programme as fast as we can with the resources available.
Many hon. Members have drawn attention to the elaborate equipment we have and the difficulties of maintaining it and keeping it up to date. Others have suggested that we should have even more complicated equipment, and they have set problems to the Admiralty which are being given every consideration. A little rhyme came to my notice the other day:
My Lords, the new equipment that must now receive publicity
Is fashioned with considerable care,
And what appears to be a model of simplicity
Is really an elaborate affair.
That explains the position better than any words of mine. We are trying to avoid duplication of effort, and in this respect are working in close consultation with the United States and Canada.
The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson) referred to guided missiles. We attach the greatest importance to them. They fill the gap between the limits of the conventional gunners we have known in the past and the distance at which our fighters can intercept enemy aircraft. That is the role that the guided


missile will play. The hon. Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton) raised a question about electrical engineers. I think he was under a misapprehension that the officers were struggling along on salaries in force before 1946. All of these have been given new rates, the same as or comparable with officers having similar ranks in other Government service.

Mr. Houghton: I was not under any misapprehension, nor did I complain that no adjustment had been made in their pay. What I did say was that their final rates, to be effective from 1st January, 1946, are still unsettled, and that I criticise. There is some ground for regret that it takes so long to settle rates which have such a long retrospective effect.

Commander Noble: I quite agree, and I am sorry that there has been such a long delay; but I am sure he will appreciate the difficulty and that we are doing our best.
I fully realise the problems of work in the dockyards, but there are many difficulties. There is overcrowding in many places, and we are still suffering from the effects of bombing during the war. It was suggested that what was done about this sort of thing was decided by the admiral superintendent. That is not the case. That is, of course, very much a matter for the Admiralty. But I think that our works programme, both within and without the dockyards, have to be looked at in the perspective of the whole works programme of the country. I think that the Navy has borne the impact of that in a way that we should—

Mr. Foot: Before the hon. and gallant Gentleman leaves the question of the dockyards, would he say whether the Admiralty propose to give to the House a summary of their views on the recommendations made by a Select Committee of this House?

Commander Noble: I have not yet reached that question.
While still on the subject of works, I would say that the Admiralty would like to have spent much more on this, but it has been necessary to limit the impact of the defence programme on our building programme as a whole. In those circumstances, I think the House will agree

that the emphasis of the Admiralty works programme must be on those things directly required for the support of naval operations. These include the expansion and re-servicing of airfield runways, the provision of additional facilities at Royal Naval Air stations to meet the increasing demands of naval aviation, the improvement of naval communication facilities throughout the world, work on the seaward defences of the principal naval docks, and safer and more efficient storage facilities for naval equipment at strategical places throughout the world.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: We have had to undertake all those things under Vote 10 for at least the last three or four years, and particularly for the last year, but I notice that under Vote 10 almost all the new works, except stores, have been cut out. I should like to have an assurance that something will be put back next year for the dockyards, for married quarters and for the improvements of barracks for the benefit of personnel.

Commander Noble: I am sure that the former Civil Lord will agree that the continuing services are very heavy. Although I could not give him the categorical assurance for which he asks, I will say that we will always do everything we possibly can in these matters. But I must emphasise that the considerations I have just stated must come first. Work is being continued on married quarters at home and overseas, and we are building a substantial number this year under Vote 15, which the hon. Gentleman quoted, although they are starting perhaps a little later in the year than we would have liked.
The hon. Members for Devonport (Mr. Foot) and Edmonton (Mr. Albu) raised several points about the dockyards. I cannot go into them in any great detail now, as I am sure they will understand. Several of the matters with which they dealt, as they themselves said, were the subject of recommendations in a Report by the Select Committee on Estimates. A number of these recommendations are still under consideration by the Admiralty, and I must ask hon. Members to await the detailed reply which the Admiralty will shortly be sending to the Select Committee.
I feel that even after such a long debate as we have had I am, perhaps, going on


too long, but there is one other point I would like to make and that is to say how glad I was for the support of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder). I think that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence said we would tonight refer to the speech which he made yesterday. I am glad he appreciates the need for our present policy in Europe. I feel that he probably has very vivid memories of his own efforts to get our forces back on to the Continent in the last war. What he said is very much in our minds, and I would refer him to the paragraph in the Defence White Paper where it says that the duty of the Navy is to support our policy throughout the world. It may well be that one day we shall be able to adopt the sort of policy he desires.
I think, Mr. Speaker, that we may say this has been a good debate, if a very long one—and I have done my best to answer some of the points that have been raised—and that it is a good example of the sort of debate we have in this House on the Navy Estimates. Most hon. Members speak for the good of the Navy and to help the Navy. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), attacked the Prime Minister in his speech today for having criticised his Government about the Navy in the past. But I would say—and I am sure that the whole House will realise this—that he was attacking in the spirit to which I have just referred.
Finally, I would say that two messages should go out from the House tonight. The first is that the Navy is in good heart, and the second is that the hon. and right hon. Members of this House are doing their traditional duty and seeing that the Navy is able to be in good heart.

Mr. Burden: Before the hon. Gentleman sits down, would he mind giving an answer to the one specific question I asked about H.M.S. "Ceres"?

Commander Noble: I apologise to the hon. Member. I meant to refer to that earlier. I cannot give him now the exact date, but the Admiralty are very conscious of the disappointment caused by the fact that H.M.S. "Ceres" is not now going to the old Royal Marine barracks at Chatham. We will, in consultation with the other Services, see if something can

not take the place of the "Ceres." I have myself been to see these barracks and take a personal interest in the matter.

Mr. Adams: Would the hon. Gentleman say a word about the views of his Department upon the strategic reserve?

Commander Noble: The hon. Member, and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), raised the question of the Navy Estimates with regard to the running down of some of our strategic stockpile, but that argument cannot be sustained in an isolated case like this. This must be looked at within the whole canvas of the economic picture. One isolated example like the Navy Estimates cannot be considered by itself. We shall soon be asked for some sort of graph such as one showing escort vessels as against food supplies. That sort of thing cannot be supplied without looking at the whole picture of the economic situation today.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Colonel Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1952–53

VOTE A. NUMBERS

Resolved,
That 153,000 Officers, Seamen and Boys and Royal Marines, who are borne on the Books of Her Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, and members of the Women's Royal Naval Service and the Naval Nursing Service, be employed for the Sea Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953.

NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1951–52

VOTE A. ADDITIONAL NUMBERS

Resolved,
That an additional number, not exceeding 5,500 Officers, Seamen, and Boys and Royal Marines, who are borne on the Books of Her Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, and members of the Women's Royal Naval Service and the Naval Nursing Service, be employed for the Sea Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1952–53

VOTE 1

£49,842,000, Pay, &c, of the Royal Navy and Royal Márines.

VOTE 2

£19,457,000, Victualling and Clothing for the Navy.

VOTE 6

£14,559,000, Scientific Services.

NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1951–52


£10 (Supplementary), Navy Services.


Schedule




Sums not exceeding




Supply Grants
Appropriations in Aid




£
£


Vote






1. Pay, &amp;c, of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines
…

1,500,010
—


2. Victualling and Clothing for the Navy
…

4,250,000
250,000


4. Civilians Employed on Fleet Services
…

200,000
—


6. Scientific Services
…
Cr
300,000
—


7. Royal Naval Reserves
…
Cr
300,000
—


8. Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, &amp;c.—






Section I—Personnel
…

1,400,000
—


Section II-Matériel
…
Cr
1,500,000
3,500,000


Section III-Contract Work
…
Cr
4,200,000
200,000


9. Naval Armaments
…
Cr
1,400,000
300,000


10. Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad
…
Cr
1,750,000
250,000


11. Miscellaneous Effective Services
…

800,000
—


12. Admiralty Office
…

400,000
—


13. Non-effective Services
…

100,000
—


15. Additional Married Quarters
…

800,000
*-1,500,000


Total, Navy (Supplementary) 1951-52
…£

10
3,000,000


* Deficit.

Chairman to report Resolutions and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Butcher.]

VOTE 9

£36,720,000, Naval Armaments.

VOTE 10

£14,579,000, Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad.

VOTE 13

£15,106,000, Non-effective Services.

VOTE 15

£100, Additional Married Quarters.

Resolutions to be reported this day.

Committee to sit again this day.

ROAD ACCIDENT, GILLINGHAM

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Butcher.]

2.53 a.m.

Mr. A. G. Bottomley: The Gillingham bus accident occurred on 4th December, resulting in the death of 24 cadets and serious injury to many others. The nation was shocked, and Mr. Speaker accepted from me a Private Notice Question. Following that Question, the Minister of Transport promised a public inquiry. I asked whether that inquiry could be convened at an early date, and that question was answered in the affirmative.
I waited for some time, and subsequently put a question asking when the inquiry would be held. The Minister then made the surprising announcement that he did not propose to hold an inquiry into the accident in pursuance of the powers conferred upon him by Section 23 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. That Section states that where an accident arises out of the presence of a motor vehicle on the road, the Minister may direct inquiry to be made into the cause of the accident. The Minister, when making his announcement, explained that the cause of the accident had been determined by the criminal proceedings brought against the driver. He went on to say:
Apart from the human implications of all concerned, I have reached the conclusion that no useful purpose would be served by holding an administrative inquiry which could only cover the same ground as that already covered by judicial proceedings."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1952; Vol. 496, c. 436.]
I told the hon. Gentleman at the time, and I repeat, that his decision caused widespread concern in my constituency, where most of the victims lived. The need for an inquiry has been supported by the national newspapers and by organisations like the Pedestrians' Association and the British Road Federation.
I quite understand the concern of the Minister for what he referred to as "the human implications of all concerned." He had in mind, I imagine, that a further inquiry would mean another ordeal for the parents and the driver. But let me say first that, as far as local sentiment goes, the Transport and General Workers'

Union in the district wants the inquiry as promised: it is strongly backed by the powerful Trades Council in the Medway district, and I myself have had an opportunity of meeting all but two of the parents concerned and they are unanimously and strongly of the opinion that the inquiry should be held. Indeed, I find they have since sent a letter to that effect to the Minister.
Nobody, of course, wants to submit the parents or the driver needlessly to further suffering, but surely the character and the atmosphere of this inquiry would be different from that of the coroner's court or an Old Bailey trial. The inquiry could be conducted in such a way that written statements could be accepted from those who were concerned, instead of having them appear in person as they did at the inquest and at the trial. The inquiry, I feel, could be modified to meet the very natural humane considerations of the Minister. As I have said, it is natural that we should all wish to spare the feelings of those so tragically involved in the accident.
I want to deal with the Minister's suggestion that an administrative inquiry could cover only the same ground as that already covered by judicial proceedings. It could hardly be suggested that proceedings in a coroner's court or a trial at the Old Bailey provide an adequate substitute for an inquiry under the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The function of the coroner's court is circumscribed. It is concerned with how the victims died, and whether there was gross negligence leading to death. The proceedings at the Old Bailey are only to find out the facts which result in a prosecution. That happened in this case, as we know, the driver being prosecuted and found guilty. But there were many contributory factors which as yet have not been considered. Let me give one illustration.
There was a point made in a letter from the Pedestrians' Association to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Association raised the question of the Highway Code and the Director of Public prosecutions, in a letter to the Pedestrians' Association, said that the defending counsel tried to draw a distinction between a body of small boys and a body of troops. The Director of Public Prosecutions, in his reply, said that this was irrelevant in the opinion of the prosecution, and then went on to say that in


these circumstances the prosecution did not pursue the question whether it was right or wrong to march the boys according to the Highway Code. Clearly that has not been investigated and should be.
The Minister may have in mind that the wording of the Act limits the investigation to ascertaining the cause of the accident. He may later argue that the conviction of the driver shows that the accident was caused by careless driving. I suggest to him that this is only the proximate cause. There are many contributory factors. Surely the underlying purpose of any inquiry is that a report shall be produced which will lead to measures being taken to prevent such accidents in the future. I think we have a precedent in the sense that expert inquiries are carried out when there are accidents in the air, at sea, on the railways, in the factories, and in the mines. I agree that in this case the Minister is given a discretion.
Surely, it is an odd decision for him to take not to hold an inquiry into the worst accident that has ever happened on the roads in Britain. I would say that this accident provides the very opportunities for that full inquiry to be carried out. There were present all the factors involved in road accidents. There was the Highway Code and whether it was culpable or not, the question of street lighting and whether or not it was up to the standards required, the state of the highway itself, and the dangerous driving. All those things, if there were an examination in the form of an inquiry, would do much to enable us to see what could be done to prevent accidents.
The Minister will say that many of the factors have already been considered by the Committee on Road Safety. All I can say is that this Committee on Road Safety will have to do much better in the future. The Committee has met only nine times in the last four years. It might be said that it could hold other kinds of inquiries, but to my mind it is not the body to do the job that we have in mind. An inquiry would show the cause of the accident and the Committee would be able to make suggestions on how future accidents could be avoided. That would be their function, but it is not their function to do the work of an expert inquiry.
Another matter for serious consideration is that, in view of the Minister's promise to hold an inquiry, many interested parties refrained from attending at the coroner's inquest, where they would have been represented by counsel. The Medway Trades Council were interested, but because of the Minister's promise to hold an inquiry, they decided not to go. The same is true of the Pedestrians' Association. In their case they had briefed counsel for the inquiry. These bodies feel that they have been cheated of the opportunity of making their representations. The feelings of the constituents whom I represent are, as I have said, strongly that the inquiry should be held.
There are many questions which they feel are unanswered. They are not desirous of finding scapegoats, but are only concerned to see that accidents like the one in Gillingham do not occur in future. There is an old saying that not merely must justice be done, but it must be manifestly done. In the same way, it is not enough for private consideration of this accident to be conducted by Departmental officials, by the Committee on Road Safety, or by any other body. The inquiry must be searching and must be held in the full light of day. "The Star" evening newspaper, on 26th February, said:
Since Chatham the public conscience has been thoroughly aroused. People are no longer content to leave this grave problem to the private ruminations of the Standing Committee on Road Safety.
That is the feeling in my constituency.
The Bishop of Rochester, in his funeral address, said:
My dear parents, your children will not have died in vain. They shall yet save numberless lives by their untimely passing.
It is in the desire that their children's sacrifice shall serve that cause that the parents are calling for a public inquiry. I appeal to the Minister to see that their request, and the request of many others, does not pass unheard. I am awfully sorry that yesterday the Minister did not seize the opportunity to answer a question by the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. H. Nicholls), about the appointment of a Royal Commission. The answer might be the same as the one he gave me, but if we are to avoid road accidents we must have the full searchlight of public opinion upon the subject, and that can


best be achieved by the appointment of a Royal Commission.

3.5 a.m.

Mr. F. A. Burden: I should like to thank the right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley) for giving me this opportunity to intervene, because this unfortunate and dreadful accident happened in my division. I think the whole country was shocked and horrified at the fact that out of a column of 52 little boys, marching along the road in the early evening of 4th December, 10 only evaded injury or death.
It is true that there has been from the hon. Gentleman pressure for an inquiry into this particular case, but I have found in my division, which also suffered, that there is not that widespread request for an inquiry. I do not believe that any new facts brought to light can in any way assist more in keeping death off the roads. I know of no further real information which can come to light than that which is already known. I attended the funeral and the trial at the Old Bailey, and because of this I have a sharper appreciation of the terrible nature of the tragedy than most people.
I believe that the pressure for an inquiry into this accident is misplaced. The matter has been before three courts, and all the relevant factors have been unfolded during the exhaustive investigations which were undertaken by the police before the prosecution. The accident inspectors of the Ministry of Transport also went fully into the condition of the vehicle and the circumstances of the accident. I believe that the speeches by counsel and the long summing up by the judge at the Old Bailey indicated clearly what were considered to be the relevant factors in causing the accident.
The cause was clearly established. The major reason for the accident was the failure of the driver to take the elementary precaution of putting on his headlights at a time when they should have been on. Many people think there were contributory causes; indeed the Prime Minister made it clear that he considered one cause was that this marching column did not have lights at both front and rear. As a result of an instruction issued immediately afterwards, marching columns on

the roads now have lights at the front and back.
It may be that there were other contributory causes, but the main and contributory causes are all known to the intelligence and statistical departments of the Ministry of Transport, whose job it is to work in close touch with the Department of Industrial Research in studying material for general information, watching the trend of events, and throwing light on casualties. I hope the Minister will assure us that that information has in fact been received and will be put to the best possible use by his Department.
In view of that information, why have another inquiry into this accident which, no matter how sympathetically it may be conducted, will once again cause the driver and the parents to live again the horrors of that afternoon in December? I do not think any inquiry narrowed down to this particular accident can serve any useful purpose. Nothing we can do can restore those 24 little boys to life. If the tragedy stirred the public to a consciousness of the awful toll of the roads, if it means that the Minister will take active steps to look into the whole question of road safety, and, as a result of his actions, lives that would otherwise be sacrificed may now be spared, those little Marine cadets will certainly have given their lives for others.
If I held the view before that an inquiry should not be narrowed down to Chatham, that view has been strongly reinforced by the tragic accident which occurred in Manchester only two days ago, as a result of which four little schoolchildren were killed and six others injured. If there is to be a separate inquiry for Chatham, why not a separate inquiry for the Manchester accident? If the Minister is not satisfied with the activities of the Road Safety Committee, I am sure he will look into this matter with the utmost sympathy and do all he can to ensure that the toll of the roads is arrested.
I believe there should be a constant appeal to the fear and emotion of the people and I believe that continuous propaganda is essential. One of the best posters which ever appeared in this country was the picture of the woman in black. There are 24 women in black in Gillingham as a result of this ghastly


accident. That poster was withdrawn because it struck stark horror into the minds of many people. I believe that is the sort of impact we must make on the people of this country before they will take the necessary steps to stop these tragic road accidents.
If the Minister would agree to set up an inquiry on a broad basis into the whole question of road safety, it would serve a much better purpose than if it were narrowed to the Gillingham accident, and would carry into effect what the people of Gillingham require.

3.12 a.m.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. John Maclay): The right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley), who opened this discussion, and the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) have put their arguments in a most balanced and proper manner. After the tragic accident at Gillingham and then the accident at Manchester two days ago, everyone approaches the problem of death on the roads with the one desire to make the right decision and with the determination that from this type of accident we shall learn a lesson which will stop similar happenings again.
I must deal with the question of an inquiry, having said that I proposed to hold a public inquiry, and then, after most careful and searching thought, said that I had come to the conclusion that I should not do so. I know that hon. Members will realise that that kind of decision could only be made after the most anxious consideration of what purpose an inquiry would serve if we continued with it.
The Section of the Road Traffic Act to which the right hon. Gentleman referred lays down quite clearly that when an accident arises out of the presence of a motor vehicle on the road, the Minister of Transport may direct an inquiry to be made into the cause of the accident, to establish the cause of the accident, with the object of deciding what steps shall be taken to secure that a similar accident does not occur in the future. That can be the only purpose of such an administrative inquiry.
When I made that statement originally in the House, the accident had just happened and I could not tell what would

come afterwards. The various proceedings brought to light very clearly the main contributory factors to this accident. Any road accident is nearly always the result of complex factors. My duty as Minister was to decide whether a further public inquiry could produce more evidence than had already been disclosed. What it had produced was pretty comprehensive, and I do not see how it could have produced more, in view of the nature of the proceedings that went on.
The road conditions were most thoroughly examined, and the lighting of the road was quite clearly established as being very poor; the column of cadets were marching along without lights or look-out; the condition of the bus was very carefully examined; the side-lights were on and not the headlights; the driver's eyesight had been tested only a few days before the accident—point after point which one would have expected to come out at a public inquiry had been most clearly established.
What I had to ask myself was whether, if we had another public inquiry—and I confess freely that the question of the human implications had to be in my mind—it would establish anything more that could help to prevent this kind of thing from happening again. I came to the conclusion that we could not establish more facts than had already been disclosed. The real question was the followup—how it could be brought home to the country and how this kind of thing, if it were humanly possible, could be avoided again.
I submit that the action which we are taking and which will be taken in the months to come is the most effective action. The Committee on Road Safety, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, has already made a preliminary examination of all the factors that have emerged, and will be considering the matter further. They have already made certain suggestions to me, but they are only preliminary suggestions and I think I should take more time to consider them.
Let us take the question of the column marching on the left side of the road without lights. The Services have already taken action, and I have prepared something which will go out to all organisa


tions which may have individuals going about in groups, whether in columns of four or two, and any similar movement on the main roads must be covered with appropriate protection by lights at the forward and rear ends of the column or by proper look-outs. It is not at all easy to find exactly what advice to give, but we want to make certain that anybody with responsibility for such a column or group understands the dangers and so prevents another tragedy of this kind.
Take the question of the lighting of the road. Alas, we know that in this case the lighting was very poor, but too many of our roads all over the country have lighting which is not good. That is a thing which can be put right only over a long period of time, and improvement comes all too slowly. I could go through a number of other details, but I would emphasise that it is the duty of all of us to try to make certain that the lessons are learned with a view to avoiding any similar situation recurring. That is what really matters.
I will give one other detail concerning the question of sidelights and headlights. That clearly was a major contributory factor, and we have to consider very carefully what advice can be given. One of the most difficult things is to got wise advice on headlights in built-up areas where the lighting is different, because obviously, in certain lighting conditions, to put headlights on at the same hour of night with a wet road might produce more dangers. This matter will be most carefully examined by the Department of Scientific and Industrial

Research, or whatever body is most appropriate, and we have to be cautious, because the facts are known. There is a problem, and we have to get the right kind of advice. The Highway Code is being examined now on the question whether there should be amendment and what kind of advice should be given in it.
Finally, there is the question of what kind of wider inquiry might be conducted to cover not only the tragedy of Gillingham but the more recent tragedy in Manchester. I have a big responsibility there, too. A Royal Commission does sound like a very desirable method of dealing with this, but I have to have in mind the right body to get urgent and continuing opinions and results. I have said in reply to Questions that I am not satisfied that I should be justified in recommending a Royal Commission.
It would be absolutely wrong if I said my mind was totally closed, it is not. But I must satisfy myself, with a full sense of responsibility, that I am not myself running away from the problem by making a recommendation in that direction. My mind is not closed to anything that might help to cut down this desperate toll of life which has been brought so markedly to public attention by these two tragic accidents but which is, alas, going on in our streets all over the country.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-two Minutes past Three o'Clock a.m.